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Schematic diagram of HTRE-1 aerothermal and control systems. The
Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Program sought to combine a nuclear
reactor with a turbojet engine and produce an airplane that was
sufficiently light enough to take off and sufficiently shielded
to protect the crew during flight. Source: APEX-901, p. 40.
PART ONE
INTRODUCTION TO TEST AREA NORTH 
The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) established the National
Reactor Testing Station (NRTS) in 1949 as a place for the safe
conduct of reactor tests and experiments. It selected a desert
site in eastern Idaho on the Snake River Plain for its abundant
supply of subsurface water and its relative isolation from
densely populated settlements. The land already was in public
ownership because the United States Navy had acquired it during
World War II for use as a proving ground in connection with its
Pocatello Ordnance Depot. The AEC purchased the land from the
Navy and adapted it for nuclear reactor experiments.1
The NRTS presently consists of about 890 square miles. Its
name was changed to Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL)
in 1974 and then to Idaho National Engineering and Environmental
Laboratory (INEEL) in 1997.2 The AEC was replaced by the Energy
Research and Development Administration (ERDA) in 1974; ERDA, by
the Department of Energy (DOE) in 1977. The regulatory and
reactor licensing functions originally within the AEC now reside
in a separate agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
Local custom in Idaho has consistently distinguished Idaho Falls'
in-town facilities from the desert venue by referring to the
latter as "the site."
Among the early mix of military and peaceful missions for
nuclear reactors, the business of the NRTS was to build and
operate different types of reactors, demonstrate their utility,
and then, in the case of "peaceful" uses, disseminate knowledge
about them to commercial interests. The United States Congress
wanted to foster a commercial nuclear power industry. Much of the
testing and experimentation at the NRTS aimed to develop reactor
fuels, suitable reactor materials, and safe reactors. In the
years after 1949, a vast program of research and experimentation
investigated alternative types of reactors and the parameters for
their safe operation.3
The Cold War between the United States and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) brought a number of military
projects to the NRTS. Each nation wished to assure itself a
superior position in the control of weapons, particularly nuclear
weapons. The competition between the two countries for weapons
supremacy launched an arms race that had the significant
consequence of opening new operational areas at the NRTS.
By the end of World War II, the only nuclear weapon that had
been developed (and used) was the atomic bomb. However, military
planners envisioned nuclear power for the propulsion of
submarines and jet bombers. As soon as the war ended, the U.S.
Navy and the U.S. Air Force each advocated that research begin
immediately into nuclear propulsion.
Both services obtained the support of the AEC and the U.S.
Congress in authorizing and funding the requisite nuclear
research. Private contractors conducted the research, built
laboratories, and began their experiments. The Navy went on to
produce nuclear powered submarines and surface ships. The Air
Force expected to produce a nuclear powered turbojet airplane
but, ultimately, did not reach its goal.
For both services, the AEC directed that the nuclear reactor
experiments take place at the NRTS. The Navy hired Westinghouse
Corporation to develop the Naval Reactors Facility, and the Air
Force hired General Electric (GE) to develop the Aircraft Nuclear
Propulsion Project (ANP) at the area now known as Test Area
North.4
Of the two services, the Navy was the first to arrive in
Idaho, breaking ground on its first reactor building in August of
1950.5 This building, along with its cooling tower and other
support facilities created a new center of activity to join the
four others also under construction at the time -- the Central
Facilities Area (CFA), the Test Reactor Area, the EBR-1 complex,
and the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (now named Idaho Nuclear
Technology and Engineering Center, or INTEC). 
These five clusters were located in the southwest portion of
the NRTS. The Navy's old proving ground buildings was adapted as
a central services area dedicated to site-wide functions such as
warehousing, craft shops, records management, health physics
support, fire suppression, and security. EBR-I was south of CFA.
The Chemical Processing Plant and the Test Reactor Area were
about five miles north of CFA, and the Navy's establishment was
another five miles to the north along a connecting road named
Lincoln Boulevard.
The NRTS had a Site Selection Committee whose responsibility
was to assign locations for various reactor projects. The
committee considered the consequences both of normal operations
and potential accidents in which radioactivity might be released
into the air. To that end, the NRTS established a Weather Bureau
Station at the site in 1949 and began accumulating meteorological
data. The committee took account of annual and diurnal patterns
of prevailing winds across the desert. For most of the year,
prevailing daytime winds came from the southwest.6
The siting criteria also considered the power level at which
a proposed reactor was expected to operate. The higher the power,
the more distance (measured in miles) was required between
reactors. Reactor buildings were arranged so that if an accident
Figure 1. Direction and frequency of the wind was a major
environmental influence in the siting of reactors of the Aircraft
Nuclear Propulsion program. The row of reactor buildings -- FET,
IET, and LPT/STF -- are roughly perpendicular to a wind direction
from southwest to northeast. Locations marked Proposed Runway,
Future PSTF, and Future STAF were never built. Source: Luke and
Gilliland, Hazards Summary Report for Susie Reactor, p. 8.
were to release radioactive gases or particles into the air, the
prevailing winds would not carry them in the direction of other
reactors, work areas, or "civilians" outside the NRTS boundaries.
Within the ANP area, where several reactors were to be operating,
the prevailing wind also determined the geographical
relationships among them. 
When Congressional authorization and funding for the Air
Force's ANP program came together in 1951-52, its General
Electric and Air Force managers desired as much isolation at the
site as possible and were not interested in using the site's
central services.7 In the Cold War, secrecy was valuable. In
addition, they were planning for reactor experiments to take
place outside in the open air, an excellent reason for putting
distance between the ANP and other NRTS activity areas. The Site
Selection Committee allowed the project to occupy the far
northeast corner of the site. In 1952-1953, the old Navy trail
known as Lincoln Boulevard was extended and paved to TAN, a
distance of about twenty-seven miles from the Central Facilities
Area.
TAN is situated on fairly flat ground. Basalt rock lies
beneath most of the site, covered by varying depths of sand,
silt, and gravel. To the north and west, the mountains of the
Lemhi Range rise to create a panoramic background. A stream
called Birch Creek flows from the eastern slope of the Lemhis;
its waters are either diverted for hydroelectric power production
or sink into the soil and disappear into the aquifer.8 Flooding
of the ANP area was considered to be a rare event, but possible.
GE's architects contended with this eventuality in determining
the elevations of tank storage buildings and other structures.9
The flat contours of the site are interrupted by remnant
features of ancient fresh-water Terreton Lake, the ancestor of
modern Mud Lake. Geologists in 1952 described one of these as a
"sinuous sand bar" running in a north/south direction. It formed
a low ridge about 25 feet high, with higher ground to its east
and an escarpment facing the flat long-since-dry lakebed toward
the west.10 Later geologists decided that this feature actually
was a shoreline of the ancient lake.11 ANP builders enlisted this
feature as an element in nuclear-age architecture. See HAER Photo
No. ID-33-E-111.
Lincoln Boulevard brings traffic from the rest of INEEL
around the eastern edge of (most of) TAN, continues east, and
joins Idaho State Highway 33, exiting INEEL about ten miles from
TAN. Not far from the INEEL boundary lie the small settlements of
Mud Lake and Terreton. Still farther east, Highway 33 intersects
Interstate 15 at Sage Junction, which takes a traveler south to
Idaho Falls or north to Dubois, Idaho, and the Montana border.
As General Electric considered their planned experiments,
the various reactors they would be testing or using, and the
required non-nuclear support facilities, they realized they would
have to subdivide their corner of the site into distinct working
areas separated from one another by appropriate safety distances.
They began at first with four such operating areas and later
added a fifth. These five clusters of buildings and structures
compose TAN, connected variously by roads, electrical and
communication lines, and rail track. They retained their identity
for the next fifty years; no others were added. Surrounding each
cluster was a chain link security or exclusion fence.12
This Historic American Engineering Record (HAER) on TAN is
being prepared because DOE has decided that no further missions
remain for most of the buildings in these clusters. For many
years, DOE has been cleaning up or remediating hazardous waste
sites at TAN (and at other locations at the site). Since 2002,
DOE and its contractor Bechtel BWXT-Idaho have been
"accelerating" this remediation. The proposed activities include
the removal of all decommissioned buildings, nuclear and
non-nuclear alike, historical and non-historical alike.13
Historical analyses prepared in the last five years have
assessed NRTS nuclear research activities that occurred between
1949-1970 as exceptionally significant in American history even
though the buildings connected with them are not fifty years old.
14 Based on this assessment, the INEEL Historic Architectural
Properties Management Plan for U.S. Department of Energy, Idaho
Operations Office classified several historic buildings as "key
individual properties" potentially eligible for listing on the
National Register of Historic Places. Several "key" properties
are located at TAN. Following consultation with the Idaho State
Historical Preservation Office and the Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation, DOE agreed to mitigate for the demolition
of historic TAN properties by recording them in the format of a
Historic American Engineering Record.15
This is the second HAER to mitigate for the alteration or
destruction of historic TAN properties. The first was prepared in
1995 when DOE planned to modify the roof of TAN-629, the ANP
hangar built to house the anticipated nuclear powered bomber. In
addition to a detailed record of the hangar, that report contains
a history of the ANP program, its origins, the political tensions
that influenced its progress, and its major achievements and
significance. The present report will not repeat that material,
but rather focus on the functional and architectural features of
the entire ANP complex, supplementing the earlier historical
account as appropriate.16
PART TWO
THE IMPERATIVE FOR RADIOACTIVE SHIELDING
AEC Commissioner Sumner Pike once said, in justifying the
creation of the NRTS in a remote desert location, that the AEC
"didn't want to put work like this next to a high school."17
"Work like this" was experimental work with radioactive materials
and nuclear reactors. The art of placing work activities in safe
relationships to one another was a young one in 1951 when the
architects sat down to design the ANP work areas. Nuclear
facilities had a history on the earth of less than ten years.
Before embarking on a tour of historic Test Area North, it
is well to review the salient behaviors of reactors, radioactive
materials, and their potential to harm people and the
environment, particularly as these were understood early in the
1950s.
Atoms are conveniently visualized as small solar systems,
consisting of a central nucleus containing neutrons and protons
in the position of the sun. Electrons circle the nucleus.
Electrons and protons have opposite electrical charges. Neutrons
have no charge, but add weight to the atom. The atoms of each
element contain a unique number of protons, which give the
element its identity as carbon, mercury, lithium, or other
matter. In nature, each and every atom of the same element may
not contain the same number of neutrons. When they do not, each
specie of the atom is called an isotope. The isotope lithium-7,
for example, has one more neutron than the isotope lithium-6.18
Most elements in nature are composed of "stable" atoms, in
which the positive and negative charges are balanced. A lump of
pure iron, for example, if left alone in a vacuum for a million
years will be exactly the same element and weigh the same as it
did in the beginning. However, uranium is not stable, and a lump
of this element will not be the same in a million years. Its
atoms spontaneously eject small parts of the nucleus. These
particles flee from the atom into the surrounding matrix and/or
environment. Depending on the particular element and isotope,
particles ejecting from radioactive substances may be single
electrons or helium nuclei, known as beta and alpha particles
respectively. Some breakups also produce gamma rays, a form of
electromagnetic energy similar to light but more energetic. Given
enough time, a lump of uranium will transform into lead.
In nature, our "lump" of natural uranium is a mixture of two
common isotopes. Most uranium atoms contain 238 protons and
neutrons (U-238); however, for every 140 of these atoms, there is
one atom with 235 protons and neutrons (U-235).
The excitement of 20th Century physics was the discovery
that when scientists bombard an atom of U-235 with neutrons, the
atom splits into two roughly equal fragments, transforming the
original uranium into pairs of elements such as barium and
krypton. However, the split is neither neat nor tidy: small
particles and rays flee from the atom -- one or two neutrons
(sometimes three), miscellaneous electrons, alpha particles, and
gamma rays. Among the results of the fission are the release of
energy and heat.19
A nuclear reactor is a device built to exploit two products
of nuclear fission: neutrons and heat. If enough U-235 atoms are
placed close together (in a mass said to be "critical"), the two
or three liberated neutrons are likely to hit other uranium atoms
and split them, keeping the process alive in a chain reaction. A
continuing and sustained fissioning process generates continuing
and sustained quantities of heat. For thousands of years, human
society has used heat to do various kinds of work. Most pertinent
to a nuclear powered airplane, the heat of fission could
substitute for the combustion of chemical fuel. In a jet engine,
hot compressed air is sent out a small nozzle for thrust. 
The unhappy fact that fission is untidy complicates all of
its useful possibilities and raises its cost. Gamma rays, for
example, which leave the U-235 atom at up to 44 million miles per
hour, penetrate matter very easily and go a long distance, only
gradually slowing down depending upon what is in their path. If
they enter the human body at certain speeds, they strip electrons
from atoms in the molecules of human tissue. The fragments are
called ions and represent an upset in the balance of electrical
charges. These changes can produce cell mutations which in turn
can cause cancer.20 When a safe distance from the source is not
practical, blocking gamma rays requires an investment in various
thicknesses of lead, concrete, earth, or water to absorb their
energy.21 Neutrons can also penetrate deeply into the human body
and damage tissue.
Alpha particles lack the energy of gamma rays. Colliding
with the atoms in a few inches of air will stop them.22 A person
can block them by wearing gloves or arranging a shield no thicker
than a piece of paper. However, if the person inhales or ingests
alpha-emitting substances, they may lodge in the lungs or bones,
where they become an ionizing force damaging the surrounding
tissue. Nuclear work spaces therefore exhibit careful investments
in ventilation systems that carry alpha-emitting materials away
from work areas. 
Beta particles are faster and more energetic than alphas.
But they have very little mass and can be stopped by a thin sheet
of metal. Contact with human skin can cause burns, and inside the
human body they can be as harmful as alphas. 
The neutrons fleeing uranium atoms can induce radioactivity
in elements that in nature are not radioactive. For example, a
neutron that penetrates an atom of nitrogen in the air will
transform it from a stable isotope to an unstable one that emits
gamma rays, beta particles, and heat as it "decays." This
secondary effect of uranium fission is potentially just as
harmful to the human body as the primary one. Even after a
reactor has been shut down, radioactive decay continues long
after the chain reaction has been quenched. Within shield
materials such as concrete, atoms near the surface of the shield
that have been "activated" may emit secondary gamma rays that
exit the shield entirely. Shield thickness merely reduces the
odds of such an occurrence.
Another untidiness of fission is that the split uranium atom
does not always result in barium and krypton, but any number of
200 other species of atoms, most of them radioactively unstable.
These fission products require different amounts of time before
they stabilize or "cool off" (decay). Some require less than a
second; others, thousands of years. The time it takes for a
substance to lose half of its "activity" is expressed as its
"half-life." Until these substances have decayed, their emissions
of alpha, beta, and gamma rays make them hazardous enough to
require careful management. At nuclear reactor facilities,
therefore, architect/engineers design systems for safely
transporting, sampling, analyzing, storing, concentrating, and
dispersing solid, liquid, and gaseous forms of radioactive
"waste."
One characteristic of neutrons is that they can collide with
the atoms of air gases or dust particles and deflect their
course. Merely erecting a wall-like shield between the source and
a work site will not necessarily protect workers from this type
of scattering. Gamma rays and neutrons escape the fuel in all
directions; a shield will slow down and absorb only the ones
directly aimed at the shield. Neutrons that flee high into the
air may be deflected back towards the ground, effectively jumping
over the shield. When arranging the distances between work spaces
and reactors, therefore, architect/engineers consult nuclear
analysts who calculate the pathways of neutrons to determine safe
separation distances. These calculations are one of the reasons
that the five ANP activity areas have "distance" between them.23
Designing interior work spaces is another matter. Workers
must assemble and manipulate components of reactors, be in
visible contact with reactors, manage chain reactions, and move
radioactive fuel elements from place to place without themselves
receiving doses of ionizing radiation. Similarly, fission
products have to be controlled so that air and water resources
beyond the work space do not become contaminated and harm others
at a later time in a distant place.
Since alpha and beta radiation are relatively easy to block,
any device that absorbs gamma and neutron radiation will also
block those. Thus, most shielding plans, calculations, and costs
center on gamma and neutron radiation.
In the early 1950s, the medical understanding of how
radiation harms the body had progressed passed several milestones
since 1896, when French scientist Henri Becquerel discovered that
uranium was radioactive. Workers who painted radium dials on
clocks and watches in the 1920s tipped their fine brushes between
their lips, bringing upon themselves early and tragic deaths.
Scientific committees organized thereafter to determine what
levels of exposure might not harm workers. In 1934, a "tolerance
dose" was one that did not cause skin irritation. By the 1940s,
the distinctions between external and internally deposited
radiation were more clear. Standards were developed for both, and
these served Manhattan Project workers producing the atomic bomb.
After the bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, radiation
exposure became a public health issue, affecting populations far
beyond industrial workers. Animal studies revealed that it was
possible to inherit a genetic mutation induced by radiation
exposure to reproductive organs. Protection concepts shifted
quickly from a "tolerance dose" to a "maximum permissible dose"
and an attitude of "the less exposure the better."24
Around 1951, protective standards for atomic workers made a
distinction between "whole body" exposures and exposures to
extremities such as fingers and feet. Handbooks setting standards
for internal emitters would not be published until 1953, but
"body burdens" of various materials were known. To protect the
environment, recommended standards indicated permissible
concentrations in air or water. When these were published, the
handbooks contained long lists of isotopes and an allowable
concentration for each in air or water.25 In effect, a
concentration limit implied that a radioactive material might be
discharged into the air or water provided it was sufficiently
diluted by the time it reached its point of human contact. Since
an experimental nuclear airplane engine would discharge
contaminated air directly into the NRTS environment, the role of
the wind in diluting air-borne contaminants was of intense
interest to architect/engineers.
As GE embarked upon its project for the Air Force, the
protective standard for the AEC's nuclear workers was expressed
as no more than 0.3 Roentgens of exposure to the "whole body"
during a six-day work week.26 Units of measurement eventually
became more diverse in order to differentiate among the ionizing
power of gamma rays, radiation doses that human tissue would
actually absorb, and the injury likely to be caused by a dose.
Instead of using Roentgens (a quantity of X-rays that would
produce a specified degree of ionization under certain
conditions), the work standard was expressed as a "rem" (roentgen
equivalent man). The rem expresses the likely biological injury
resulting from an exposure.27 During the 1950s, both of these
expressions were in use.
Maximum permissible exposures in rems were described in 
Handbook 59, published by the National Bureau of Standards in
1954. However, the recommendations of the national and
international committees that had been studying the effects of
radiation since the 1920s were understood prior to this date.28
Thus, the architect/engineers for the nuclear airplane project
had to meet certain standards despite the fact that they had not
been published formally.
The maximum permissible exposure of the whole body to
external sources of ionizing radiation was expressed as 300
millirems per work week.29 In designing work spaces, the
architect/engineers had to understand what type of nuclear
experiments and activities were expected in various work
locations. Health physicists helped evaluate the threats these
activities could pose to workers. Further, they considered the
nature and consequences of errors, mistakes, accidents, equipment
failures, earthquakes, and floods. These concerns, together with
a goal to keep dose rates below the maximum permissible, called
for an architecture of shielding at Test Area North.
PART THREE
THE MISSION OF THE ANP PROJECT
The basic mission of the ANP project was to prove that a
turbojet aircraft engine could run on nuclear power. If so, the
mission would evolve to create a reactor/engine power plant that
could actually fit into an airplane, fly the airplane, run
reliably on a military mission, and be shielded somehow to
protect the pilot, crew, and ground personnel from harm. The Air
Force called its ultimate goal Weapon System 125-A, a term
embracing all of the inter-related technology, the airframe,
resources, ground facilities, supply chains, and trained human
talent required to launch and carry out a combat mission.
Figure 2. NEPA Project logo circa 1947
The Air Force already had an idea of the many technical
barriers in the way of achieving its goal. Beginning in May 1946,
it had authorized a group of engineers to go to Oak Ridge,
organized under the name Nuclear Energy for the Propulsion of
Aircraft (NEPA), and begin studying the feasibility of the
project. Most NEPA work was strictly on paper, the working out of
problems in mathematical and physics analysis, reactor design,
radiation damage, and shielding. The group faced the fact that no
reactor built to date had been designed to operate at extremely
high temperatures. What kind of structural materials and reactor
fuel would withstand the corrosive insults of high heat, high
pressure, and radioactivity? The central problem was to transfer
enough heat from the reactor to the engine to lift the plane,
propel it, and give it speed. Thus, high heat was at odds with
preserving the reactor fuel. Protecting the crew was a collateral
concern. The airplane had to be light enough to fly, but
shielding materials were notoriously heavy.30
The NEPA group developed two general ideas about how to
transfer heat to the engine. In the "direct cycle" approach, the
transfer medium was ordinary air that would flow through the
reactor core and absorb heat directly from the fuel elements.
Heat expands the air, increasing its pressure. It would pass
through the turbine and be expelled through the exhaust nozzle.
As usual, things would not be tidy. In its passage through the
reactor, the atoms of air gases (such as nitrogen and argon) were
likely to absorb neutrons and become radioactive isotopes. Any
dust particles or moisture that happened to be in the air would
also be subject to change. The exhaust would introduce
radioactive contamination into the atmosphere. Gamma rays and
streams of neutrons along with the other usual fission products
would pose their usual hazards.31
The other idea was an "indirect cycle," which provided an
intermediate heat exchanger between the air and the reactor. A
liquid metal, contained in a closed loop of piping, would flow
through the reactor core to absorb heat. Acting as a radiator,
this hot metal would give up its heat to the exhaust air. The
liquid metal would return to the reactor to be reheated. This was
the cleaner of the two designs. The reactor could be smaller and
require less shielding, but its engineering would have to be far
more complex and precise. The "liquid metal" was, as yet,
hypothetical; no reactor to date had been cooled by a liquid
metal.
The Air Force and the AEC decided to pursue both concepts
simultaneously. It hired General Electric to develop the direct
approach, the simpler of the two to engineer, but just as
difficult to make succeed. Air is a poor absorber of heat;
therefore a very large volume of air would have to pass through
the reactor in order to absorb the energy required to fly the
plane. The reactor would have to be relatively large and bulky.
The reactor fuel would have to be made of such sturdy stuff that
it could survive temperatures up to and higher than 2000 degrees
F. without itself burning up -- a material that had not yet been
discovered or devised.32
Up to this time, all the reactors in the United States had
been built to be immobile, not operate within a moving object
like an airplane. Immobile reactors could be planted in one
place, then surrounded with shielding. Space and weight were not
constraints, so thick walls of (relatively inexpensive) concrete
served as shields. Experience at Hanford, Oak Ridge, and
elsewhere had produced a body of knowledge about the types and
thicknesses of materials that could do the job. 
GE already had experience with standard shielding. In 1946
it had become the AEC's prime contractor at Hanford Engineer
Works. Here, GE scientists studied reactor design, radiobiology,
radiological and meteorological monitoring, and related fields.
When the AEC expanded Hanford for increased plutonium production
as the Cold War began, GE built the reactor and production areas
known as 100 DR and 100-H. Architect/engineers for these
facilities had produced 2,500 drawings.33 The drawings that would
accumulate for ANP would reach well beyond a thousand. Managerial
experience with nuclear work counted for something, and GE
clearly was a leader in nuclear technology by 1951. The ANP
challenge was to advance the technology for shielding mobile
reactors.
Designing its Idaho facilities, GE engineers had to imagine
the journeys that its reactor/engine would take around the site.
Merely to prove the principle one time, engineers would assemble
the reactor/engine in a large shop, move it outside somewhere to
a test pad, bring the reactor to criticality, then to full power,
measure the transfer of heat to the air (and many other operating
parameters), and demonstrate that it ran the engine. Hot air
would exit the jet nozzle. Even though the test assembly would be
outdoors, the humans at the control center could not be. Gamma
rays would flow and the exhaust would be contaminated, so no one
could be exposed anywhere near the experiment during or in the
hours immediately after it took place. The first run would begin
with a clean reactor and clean engine, but after its first
operation -- at the "initial engine test" area -- radioactive air
would have blown through the engine, contaminating it. This
complicated the procedures for moving the engine back to the
shop. Moving any given assembly to the pad for its first test
would be safe enough, but hauling it back and forth thereafter
would be another matter.
The shop area had to encompass a wide range of crafts and
laboratories to prepare the experiment before its initial test
and all subsequent tests. The reactor would need periodic
refueling; workers would have to examine, handle, and store spent
fuel elements somewhere. The jet engine would need its own tests,
not to mention chemical fuel, regular maintenance, and servicing.
After an assembly was contaminated and/or partly radioactive,
workers would need to disassemble it, extract measuring and data
instruments, examine components, evaluate failures and problems,
and prepare for more refined experiments -- without getting doses
of radiation. This called for a wide array of remotely operated
handling tools. The reactor/engine assembly would certainly be
heavy; it was likely to be as tall as a three-story building, so
the shop containing it and overhead cranes would be quite large.
The test pad and the shop/laboratory complex would have to be at
a suitable distance from the test area to protect shop workers
while the reactor was running outside. 
GE expected it would need small reactors (other than the
airplane reactor) as tools to support the main mission. As the
project began, GE did not know the optimum materials or shape of
the airplane reactor's nuclear fuel elements. Given a particular
arrangement of elements in the core of the reactor, how much fuel
would be needed for a critical mass? What were the nuclear
characteristics of fuel configurations? Investigators performed
"critical experiments" to answer these and related questions
about how best to control or quench the chain reaction. Such
studies used very low-power reactors -- so low that they
generated practically no heat and required no great effort to
remove it. As reactors went, low-power reactors were cheap.34
In addition, research on the problem of shielding the crew
needed to continue. A low-power reactor would be useful for this
as well. Using safety distance formulae, low-power reactors had
to be located away from the engine test area and the laboratory
complex. Thus, a low-power test area was TAN's third subdivision.
GE expected to employ hundreds of people to run and support
the experiments. Situated as far as they were from the NRTS
services at CFA, employees would need a dispensary, cafeteria,
change rooms, security, and other services. Management needed its
Idaho headquarters. The fourth area was defined, therefore, as an
administrative area. Its workers would not be engaged in nuclear
work directly, so their offices would be "cold" areas.
When the ANP program had evolved well past the point of
proving the principle, it appeared that an airplane might become
a reality. GE planned a fifth area to house such an airplane in a
hangar. It would be large and equipped to service the reactor,
the engine, the crew, and the rest of the airplane. Similar to
the initial engine test, the craft would begin clean, but after
its first flight would be contaminated. A shielded control room
and methods of remote operation would be required here as well.35
GE ultimately would need one final asset to perfect its
mission -- a runway for the airplane. Aside from being flat, the
runway had to be arranged so that an arriving or departing
airplane could be observed from all directions and be in a
suitable relationship to prevailing winds. If the aircraft were
disabled or crippled, workers had to be protected from the
consequences of accidents or rough landings. The craft would be
burdened with shielding, so the runway would need to be heavily
reinforced and at least four miles long.
The five areas were named Initial Engine Test, Assembly and
Maintenance, Low Power Test, Administration and Service, and
Flight Engine Test. These areas quickly assumed acronyms in
everyday use: IET, A&M, Admin. The Low Power Test sometimes was
referred to as the Susie area. The Flight Engine Test area was
referred to as the FET, or simply as the TAN Hangar area.36
The ANP project would need the usual support utilities:
connecting roads, sewage treatment plants, water supply,
electricity, meteorological stations, security fencing, telemetry
towers, and communication lines. Following a practice used at
other industrial plants, GE decided on a locomotive and railroad
system for hauling the heavy reactor assembly from place to
place. However, the details for adapting the locomotive, dolly,
and tracks for hot nuclear cargo would be anything but usual.
The Air Force and GE had every confidence that many more
nuclear tests would follow the "initial" one, and that the
mission would continue until an aircraft took to the skies. They
designed Test Area North for an enduring series of experiments
and left plenty of room for expansion.
PART FOUR
THE RALPH M. PARSONS COMPANY
GE's headquarters for the ANP project was at Evendale, Ohio,
near Cincinnati. In 1951 it was preparing this facility for the
work to come.37 The company would design the reactor here,
assemble it, and develop the various tasks required before ground
tests could begin elsewhere. It built new laboratories, shops,
and offices, converting older buildings from obsolete uses, and
erecting new ones.38 Until the AEC decided where ground testing
would take place, GE referred to it as "the Remote Site." Once in
Idaho, GE called it the "Idaho Test Station."
As soon as it was evident that the Remote Site was going to
be the NRTS, GE hired the Ralph M. Parsons Company to survey the
site and determine its feasibility for the expected work. Parsons
joint-ventured with other industrial firms as the
Parsons-Macco-Kiewitt Corporation. GE had been evaluating various
alternatives of the general layout, still undecided as to how
concentrated or dispersed the various functions would be. It
discussed these with Parsons along with an appropriate
"philosophy of shielding personnel vs. the reactor."39
Many Parsons employees and construction managers already had
security clearances and were familiar with government procedures.
Even its California headquarters office contained
security-cleared drafting, laboratory, and office areas.40 The
company founder, Ralph M. Parsons, had joined the Bechtel-McCone
Corporation in 1937 and become a principal in 1938, when the
company added his name to the title. Parsons had brought to the
group a specialty (and patents) in petroleum refineries and
chemical industries. The group's innovative force was to offer a
full range of design and construction services for complete
industrial plants and all their appurtenances; the client was
relieved of the management overburden of dealing with a multitude
of contractors and subcontractors for each component of an
enterprise.41 During World War II Parsons acquired experience in
aeronautical engineering. In 1944, he withdrew from
Bechtel-McCone-Parsons and organized his own company with
headquarters in Los Angeles, California, where he continued to
seek work with private industry, the military, and governments.42
For the site survey, which began in the fall of 1951,
Parsons investigated the lay of the land, potential water supply,
the geological characteristics of the aquifer beneath TAN,
potential contamination hazards, availability of electrical
power, waste disposal options, the climate, and means of securing
the site.43
In June 1952, GE recommended that the AEC select the Ralph
M. Parsons Company to provide a master plan and follow up with
detailed designs for the Idaho station. The AEC agreed, and
Parsons began immediately to design a fully integrated test
facility for Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion. Among Parsons' chief
engineers, architects, and managers were Nick W. Bolotin (senior
architect), O.R. Garrett (chief mechanical specialist for shield
doors, handling dollies, remote handling equipment), William A.
Jack (manager), David C. McDowell (resident manager of
construction at NRTS), Robert E. McMeen (project engineer for
FET), Gordon C. Murray (resident engineer and assistant project
engineer), William A. Siegrist (engineer), Harry Wilson
(operating manuals and specifications engineer), J.J. Wodal
(piping engineer), James R. Young (project engineer), Leo H.
Barbour (exterior design).44
Construction drawings began to emerge from Parsons drafting
rooms by the end of 1952. Plans for the A&M area bear the
earliest dates. Resources were allocated such that the first
halves of the A&M and Admin buildings were built first and then
"expanded" in a second construction phase. This scheme allowed
beneficial work to begin while construction took place
simultaneously. By the time the enlarged facilities were ready,
the pace of research and testing had accelerated. New personnel
fit right in to the new spaces.45
PART FIVE 
THE ANP "HEATER" REACTORS
GE assembled the first reactor/engine rig during 1955, made
the reactor critical for the first time in November, and proved
the principle of jet operation in January 1956. Test runs
continued through 1956, some lasting more than 100 hours of
continuous operation. Each test was different than the previous
one, but a chief point of interest always was the temperature of
the fuel and how much heat had been transferred to the air
exiting the reactor core. The tests usually involved running the
reactor on both chemical and reactor fuel. During early tests,
for example, the engine was started on chemical fuel and
gradually switched to reactor operation. Later runs started the
engine solely on reactor fuel.46
A reactor/engine assembly was officially called a Heat
Transfer Reactor Experiment, or HTRE, pronounced "heater." During
the course of the ANP program, GE built two assemblies. The
first, HTRE-1, connected the reactor to one (modified) J-47 jet
engine. The experiment made no design concessions to its future
home inside an aircraft fuselage. It was bulky, equipped with
access ladders and platforms for the convenience of the workers
assembling the ducts, connections, and instrumentation devices. 
The design and materials for the reactor core of HTRE-1 was
under constant review and development almost to the month of its
first run. Nevertheless, enough of its nuclear characteristics
had been predicted and calculated so that the architect/engineers
could design the appropriate shielding around the IET and A&M
work spaces.
The reactor, the heart of the HTRE, was wrapped like a jewel
in ever-larger boxes. The uranium fuel was sandwiched between
stainless steel cladding. These elements, arranged in concentric
rings, were contained within a cylinder with a diameter of 5.25
feet and about three feet long. Air entered at one end and flowed
between the elements, picking up the desired heat and cooling the
reactor. Surrounding the cylinder, about 160 gallons of
demineralized water provided additional cooling and also
moderated the speed of neutrons leaving the fuel during a chain 
Figure 3. HTRE-1 reactor fuel was shaped in concentric rings to
allow air to flow through and collect heat. The fuel cartridges
stacked 18 fuel elements in a tube, which was then inserted into
the reactor core. Source: Thornton and Rothstein, Comprehensive
Technical Report, APEX-901, p.37, 39.
reaction. Circulating fresh cool water into the reactor core
would have to be one of the capabilities at the IET.
The next "box" was a shield in the shape of another
cylinder, this with an outside diameter of ten feet and just over
twelve feet long. This tank-like structure was made of iron and
contained 4100 gallons of borated water. Boron is an element
disposed to capture neutrons, taking them out of play for a chain
reaction. This shield stopped neutron flux, but not gamma rays.
Thus, gamma radiation was the chief (although not only) hazard
dictating the shielding needs beyond the reactor. Neutrons were
still expected to exit the engine jets with the exhaust.47
 The 4100 gallons of water were drained after an experiment.
This chore took place after the reactor had been hauled back to
the A&M building, and never before the reactor had been shut down
and cooled off for at least one day.48 However, when the pace of
experimentation picked up, workers thought one day was too long
to wait, so they did things differently. Richard Meservey, an ANP
instrumentation engineer, recalled: 
As soon as a test was finished, they drained the water from
the annulus [the space between the inner and outer
cylinders] and pumped the space full of mercury. Mercury is
a high-density material, and it made a great shield. It
allowed the workers to climb back up on the assembly sooner
to change out the instrumentation or make other adjustments.
The mercury reduced their exposure. They didn't have to wait
for the short-lived isotopes to decay away. As soon as they
were finished changing the instruments, they would drain out
the mercury and pump water back in. Then they'd haul the
reactor back down the track to the coupling station [IET]
and run another test. 
We had three-quarters of the free world's supply of
mercury here at the Site at one time. We had so much, that
when the program was over, we had to release it slowly back
on the market so that it wouldn't cause an economic
upheaval. It wasn't radioactive because the mercury wasn't
in the annulus when the reactor was running, so it wasn't
irradiated.49
Storing and disposing of the irradiated water after each run
dictated that the A&M facility be equipped with pumps, piping,
and storage tanks to handle, hold, and dispose of it.
The operating life of a fuel loading was expected to last
about 100 hours, during which time the uranium atoms would
decrease and the krypton, barium, and other fission products
would increase. If a fuel element ruptured toward the end of a
run, the jet exhaust would release to the atmosphere a bigger
inventory of dangerous materials than if the accident had
happened during the first hour. When analysts designed shielding
requirements, they were conservative; that is, they assumed an
accidental rupture would occur at the end of a run, not the
beginning. Similarly, for design purposes, they assumed a power
level of 200,000 kw, for example, rather than the expected IET
operation of 75,000 kw. The IET support facility had to tolerate
and accommodate the heat, vibration, noise, and radiation
produced during such a test.50
After its year of tests, HTRE-1 was adapted for use as a
materials test reactor. The ANP project had relied on the
Materials Test Reactor (MTR) at the NRTS for this purpose, but
the MTR was in great demand, and the ANP project was competing
with many other customers, including the U.S. Navy, which was
developing nuclear propulsion for ships and submarines. NRTS was
developing a second test reactor, but it was not yet on line. GE
redesigned the core of HTRE-1 so that samples could be inserted
in the midst of the neutron flux. Its first specimen was
irradiated in July 1957. The reactor's new name was HTRE-2.51
HTRE-3 was a completely new reactor/engine rig. Instead of
running with one J-47, it ran with two. The fuel had improved.
Instead of demineralized water, the moderator was
zirconium-hydride, a solid material that could survive the high
operating temperatures near the core. The overall profile of the
rig was more horizontal, a closer approximation than HTRE-1 of
how the thing might fit inside an airplane. HTRE-3 made its trips
to the IET beginning in 1959 and continued through most of 1960.
After each test, the experimenters, GE, and the Air Force waited
eagerly to learn how much heat the reactor had transferred to the
air.52
PART SIX 
SITING AND BUILDING THE INITIAL ENGINE TEST AREA
The chief ANP innovation in the architecture of shielding
was born of the necessity, especially at the IET, to "divide the
shield" between the mobile reactor and stationary work places.
The shielding around the outdoor reactor did little to block
radiation in the stream of exhaust air. Shielded indoor spaces --
combined with strict administrative rules on where and when
people could be outside -- did the job.
Siting
The philosophy executed in the design of the IET was to
place shielding chiefly around personnel, not the reactor. GE
considered the IET design a unique "significant step forward in
the development of mobile reactors." The IET was a forerunner of
the far greater challenge of dividing the shield within an
airplane between reactor and crew. Not only would radiation be a
threat directly from the reactor, but also indirectly from the
scattering of radiation that exited the fuselage of the plane,
hit dust particles or air gas atoms, and bounced back into the
cockpit area from outside. Some of the tests that GE planned at
the IET concerned scattering effects of reactor operation,
another reason for enclosing personnel in completely shielded
work spaces.53
Other than the danger implicit in any reactor experiment,
the basic danger of outdoor operation was going to be the
radioactive "particle problem." Running the reactor would send
three types of particles into the air. GE health physicist C.C.
Gamertsfelder, who defined the problem, projected that these
would include small erosion fragments of the stainless steel
cladding surrounded the fuel elements, a normal corrosion process
in high operating temperatures. Likewise, any dust in the air
going through the reactor core would become radioactive. The
third type of particle would appear if the cladding completely
failed or ruptured, allowing the fuel itself -- U-235 and
whatever load of fission products had accumulated in the fuel --
to escape up the stack.54
Gamertsfelder analyzed the likely size of the
rupture-product particles, how they would affect the skin and
lungs of anyone exposed to them, their likely concentration in
the air, the amount of radioactivity likely to be released, and
the probability that anyone downwind would actually be exposed to
the particles. He concluded that the reactor should operate only
when the wind was blowing in a harmless direction, and only when
the breeze was strong enough to carry it off and dilute it.
Detecting a fuel rupture should be a task of instrumentation. A
rupture would occasion an immediate reactor shutdown and end the
run.
If there was a total of 20 ruptures in a year's time, then
there would be [2x10-4 ] particles per person per year [in
the direction of the prevailing wind]. This is the same
order of magnitude as the chance that any one person will be
killed in an automobile accident during a year. However, it
is very improbable that every inhaled particle could cause a
death.55
Thus, weather patterns were the chief determinant as to how
the ANP work clusters would relate to one another. Fortunately,
the prevailing southwest-to-northeast direction placed none of
the populated communities in the region in the path of wind-borne
releases. Being near the northern border of NRTS, operations were
less likely to impact other site activity. The northmost ANP
cluster had to be the IET. Anyone who desired a visual reminder
as to the direction of the prevailing wind had merely to look at
the rail track leading to the IET: it ran parallel to this
direction.56
A very sparse population lived northeast of TAN. Sherman
McGarry, a DOE health employee at the time of the ANP project who
later wrote of his ANP experiences, knew one of the residents.
One old widowed rancher lived [up] that way and would not be
intimidated to give up his living there, although at 25 mph,
any radiation effect [on] him or his animals was far below
unmonitored life [natural background radiation]. He was
stubborn.57
Having determined that the IET had to be located at a
latitude north of the rest of the ANP, the next issue was the
safety distance between the IET and the A&M area. Nuclear
analysis had determined that the separation should be 6000 feet,
a little over a mile. Anyone out-of-doors within 6000 feet of IET
could receive radiation above the permissible dose.58 Therefore,
a fence surrounded the IET. It aided secrecy, but functioned more
importantly as an "exclusion" fence, preventing ranging stock or
people from wandering inadvertently too close during a test.59
Layout
To visualize the IET layout, readers should imagine the
railroad journey of a HTRE from the A&M building as if they were
passengers inside the locomotive riding along with its two
operators. The locomotive is heavily shielded, windows limited to
the front and rear. It pulls the HTRE rig westward from the A&M
building on a double-wide dolly toward the railroad turntable.
Because of the extraordinary weight of the loaded dolly, the
track has four rails. The locomotive travels only on the two
center rails, while the dolly rides on all four. The journey is
slow. The locomotive's top speed when burdened with the HTRE is
3.5 miles per hour. However, it would be extremely inconvenient
if any of the rails were to spread and cause a derailment, so the
operator travels no faster than 2.5 mph. The locomotive remains
in radio communication at all times with the IET control room and
video-camera observers in the Hot Shop.60
Having successfully maneuvered at the turntable so that the
locomotive is pushing the rig (rather than pulling it) northward
toward the IET, the driver arrives at the chain-link exclusion
fence. With about a mile still to go, the rig passes through the
remotely operated gate and continues to the test pad.61 On the
horizon, lined up with the tracks, are an aluminum building shell
and, behind it, an exhaust stack. To the right (east) of the
aluminum building is a concrete retaining wall parallel to the
track and to its right an earthwork form with a flat top. The
earth is a shield cover for a buried, bunker-like control room.
IET features not visible from the railroad approach include
the "coupling station," also directly ahead but covered by the
aluminum building. Workers sometimes referred to it as the
"quick-connect" or "quick disconnect" station. When the dolly and
HTRE are nudged snugly into position against the coupling
station, leads are "plugged in" to the support services needed
during a test: electricity, cooling water, jet fuel, lubricant,
compressed air, instrumentation, and others. Leads from the dolly
fit quickly into receiving ports with the help of workers waiting
in the station. The jet nozzles from the engine fit into the
receiving end of ducts that will carry the exhaust into the stack
200 feet away.
On the north side of the control room are two small
buildings. The one on the east (TAN-625) contains fuel transfer
pumps. The other (TAN-627) shelters storage tanks. See HAER Photo
No. ID-33-E-31. If the locomotive had a window on its right side,
the occupants might be able to see the road coming from the
direction of the A&M building. The road disappears down a ramp
into a shielded tunnel at the east end of the control building,
where vehicles can park and turn around. Autos are brought inside
to prevent radioactive particles falling onto them during a test.
They are aimed for quick departure in the event an emergency
suggests that evacuation would be wise. 
The locomotive pauses at a position about 100 feet from the
coupling station. The operator retracts a floor hatch in the cab
that mates with a hatchway between the two center rails just
below. The passengers disembark, climbing a ladder down the
hatchway where they enter a tunnel angled toward the control
room. The locomotive operators can wait in the control room or
return to the A&M. During 100-hour reactor runs, the hatch and
tunnel allowed for shift changes. When it was time to haul the
rig back to the A&M after the test, the operator climbed back up
into the cab, and proceeded, never exposed to radiation. See HAER
Photo No. ID-33-E-56 (IET plot plan).
Figure 4. View of the IET from the railroad. Dead ahead is the
movable aluminum building (TAN-624). The coupling station and
exhaust duct are directly behind it, out of view. The exhaust
stack is 150 feet high. To the right is the earth shielding
covering the control building. Note weather tower and railroad
signal light. Source: INEEL Photo 62-6218.
South of the control room is a steel-frame weather/telemetry
tower painted in alternating bands of red and white.62 GE hoped
to send weather data directly from the experiment to receivers at
the A&M and the site's Central Facilities Area. Of these efforts,
McGarry recalled:
Incidentally, the use of telemetry was in infant stage at
the time and was not very successful in this application at
IET. GE struggled a long period of time to make it work but
ended up using the equipment (instrument racks) in the
operations areas for their data.63
The other facilities rounding out the IET layout were two
fuel tanks buried below grade on the north side of the control
room. One contained jet fuel; the other, diesel. The Arrington
Construction Company built the IET facility.
The Mobile Test Building, TAN-624
The mobile test building, made of corrugated aluminum siding
mounted to a frame of aluminum girders, protected the experiment
from the weather. It had no floor. It had wheels and rolled on
250 feet of its own tracks if it had to be moved forward or
backward. It also could be positioned over the HTRE rig and moved
all the way back to A&M. It had no role in shielding, although a
fine water spray was available for fire suppression.64 One
advantage of aluminum was that it was unlikely to absorb neutrons
or become radioactive. For this reason, analysts recommended that
"every effort should be made" to substitute aluminum for steel
wherever possible for framing, scaffolding, pipes, and fixtures.
Alloys containing copper were to be avoided.65
The most striking feature of the building was its shape. The
front and rear facades show a pentagonal outline, with a
low-pitched roof and walls that slope inward from the eave to the
wheels. The building was 45 feet wide and 60 feet long. From
ground level to the ridge line it was 44 1/2 feet high. The
doors, one in the front and one in the rear, had a clearance of
33 feet. They were motor-driven and fashioned in vertical panels
to slide up into the top of the building. During an engine test,
both doors were open while the HTRE rig was under test and hooked
up to the coupling ports and exhaust duct. See HAER Photo Nos.
ID-33-E-46 and ID-33-E-57.
The framework inside supported banks of floodlights,
closed-circuit television monitors, cameras, radiation
dosimeters, and other instrumentation, all of which aided the
bunkered crew to observe test progress or the emergence of a
problem.66 Of a typical test, McGarry wrote:
Four closed-circuit TV monitors were used to observe HTRE
and engine operations. Two were on each side of the building
observing the HTREs; fore and aft. A redundant system of two
periscopes were installed from the operations bunker (like a
submarine periscope), one on each side of the rigs, [so that
individuals could observe] if the TVs did not work or to
zoom in on a small area...67
Occasionally, the light-weight building was no match for the
high winds of the desert. One day, the sides and roof were blown
away. Another time, the wind lifted the entire building from its
rails and dropped it on top of the control room bunker. The HTRE
was in the A&M at the time, and no one was hurt.68
The Coupling Station
Located at the end of the four-rail track, the coupling
station was the physical point of contact between the HTRE rig,
its service requirements, the exhaust stack, and the control
room. The utility leads from the reactor and jet engine plugged
into their respective ports. Control wiring terminated at
appropriate panels and display banks in the control room.
Figure 5. General Electric schematic of the IET. Top:
Relation-ship among track, tunnel between control room and
coupling station, periscope tunnels. Artist omitted exhaust
stack. Bottom: Hatch and ladder down which locomotive driver and
passengers proceeded towards control room. Source: APEX-131, p.
8, 14.
When approaching the front of the Coupling Station on the
four-rail track, the structure looked somewhat like a large
altar. It presented a horizontal profile 40 feet wide, a flat
top, and a massive appearance. Sticking up on each side were the
columnar shields surrounding the periscopes, an analog, perhaps,
to the candlesticks on an altar. A slot in the back (north) wall
was 28 feet wide and about 5 feet high provided an opening
through which the tailcones of the jets connected to ducts
leading to the exhaust stack. In the south wall, another opening,
22 feet wide, received the leads from the dolly. See Section A in
HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-58.
The coupling station had two levels. The top level (room
117) gave workers access to the dolly. See Section B of HAER
Photo No. ID-33-E-58. The lower level contained a service room
(room 116) with pipe sleeves and other equipment. From there, the
path to the control room was via a tunnel with several sharp
turns, a shielding feature called a labyrinth or maze.69 The
massiveness of the station was dictated by the dense shielding
materials of its construction. The side and rear walls consisted
of five feet of ordinary concrete. The surface was treated with a
boron coating (gunite) to absorb neutrons. 
The standard for shielding the personnel tunnels was
specified at a dose no greater than 1 milli-Roentgen per hour (1
mR/hr). Given the position of the reactor so close to the
coupling station, the shielding calculations required that the
roof over the tunnels would consist of 16 feet of tamped earth
over one foot of concrete. At 100 feet from the reactor, the
depth of tamped earth could reduce to 8.5 feet. Where a tunnel
passed under the railroad tracks, earth shielding was not
practical, so the alternative was six feet of concrete.70 Even
with shielding, one operating rule said that people were not to
enter the tunnel and go to the coupling station until the reactor
had been shut off and cooled for at least 20 minutes.71
Figure 6. HTRE-1 on the A&M Turntable. Shielded locomotive behind
to the left. Tapered bar plug is at lower right of rig. Leads
from the reactor are routed through pipe conduit and neatly
organized in a row of "quick connect" fittings. The jet nozzles
will fit into a slot in the coupling station wall and connect to
ducts conveying hot radioactive exhaust up the stack. Source:
Sherman McGarry notes and GE photo U-1190-9.
The shielding for the coupling station roof had to be just
as effective as the roof over the tunnels; however, excessive
thickness was not practical because the jet nozzles had to fit
through the slot. Roof shielding consisted of a steel plate 1.5
feet thick and an equal thickness of barytes concrete. Barytes is
a mineral composed of barium sulfate and replaces the sand and
gravel aggregate in ordinary concrete.72 The material is denser
than ordinary concrete and supplied equivalent shielding at a
lesser thickness.73
Engineers took considerable care in designing and improving
the fittings connecting the HTRE rig, the dolly, the coupling
station, and the movable building. Vibration was unavoidable
during a run, and plug and jet openings provided outlets for
radiation. Aside from careful shielding, the contacts needed to
be mechanically secure to prevent the dolly pulling away from the
building and the various plugs.74
The dolly was equipped with a tapered plug bar on the
forward end of the dolly. The bar was about 19 feet wide, 1 foot
high, and 1 foot thick.75 It mated with a matched recess in the
wall of the coupling station, where the connect/disconnect
fittings were located. (See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-58, Section B,
upper right of room 117. Compare with plug on HTRE rig as seen in
photo on Page 41). After the bar was moved into position, a
15-inch-thick lead barrier was moved directly in front of the
wall opening to protect workers who were connecting the lines. A
steel overhang, two feet thick, shielded the plug region from
direct radiation. 
Pipes continued on their way out of the station through
penetrations in the shield walls, into the earth, and to their
source of service. The plug bar accommodated as many as 6000
electrical wires. These went downward to the lower level service
room. They proceeded via cable trays into the control building in
the same tunnel used by personnel. The lower level also had a
ventilating system, a sump pump, combustible gas and heat
detectors, and alarm horns.76
The two motorized periscopes allowed for a view from the
bunkered control room directly at the HTRE rig. The viewing and
operating station for the periscopes was inside the control
building from a position on the west wall behind the U-shaped
control console. A pair of (periscope) tunnels penetrated the
west wall of the control room and earth shield, and angled toward
the periscopes. The roof above the tunnel was high-density
concrete three feet thick.
The shielding surrounding the periscopes made them unique.
Around the periscope tube and its casing was a layer of lead
several inches thick. This was surrounded in turn by high-density
concrete, boron-treated concrete, ordinary concrete, and an
additional layer of boron-treated concrete as the outermost layer
of shielding. The scanning head was covered by a removable
concrete cap lined with steel and fitted with a lifting ring. It
was shielded with lead and concrete to match the shielding
thicknesses along the shaft. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-59. 
Each periscope shaft extended above the test cell floor
about 14 feet, counting the height of the cap. The scanning head
had a track length of 90 degrees and a vertical movement of 60
degrees.77 The periscopes were equipped with mirror boxes at the
angle joint connecting the horizontal and vertical portions of
the shaft. A service pit for each periscope was located beneath
the shaft below the floor level of the service room. See HAER
Photo Nos. ID-33-E-35, ID-33-E-38, ID-33-E-47, ID-33-E-58
(section A), ID-33-E-59.
Accessories and fixtures within the coupling station
included recessed lighting, junction boxes, cable trays,
breakers, transformer, explosion-proof receptacles, starters for
the periscope motors, telephone outlet, an ion chamber outlet
(radiation detector), sump pump motor, exhaust fan, intercom, and
space designated as room to expand for "future relay panel" and
"future aircraft energizers." See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-60. 
The Duct and Stack
During an experiment, the jet exhaust went through a
214-foot-long duct to the stack. The engine's tailcone was
connected to the duct by a spring-loaded flange, to which was
attached a half-round silicone gasket. When operation commenced,
the silicone heated and expanded, exerting a pressure of 340
pounds and securing the connection.78
The duct ran above ground, supported by reinforced concrete
braces on substantial footings. The centerline of the duct was
about 13 feet above ground level. Each jet connected to a
separate duct, each of which gradually widened to an internal
diameter of about 30 inches. The two ducts joined together at a
distance of 56.5 feet from the jets. Now with an internal
diameter of 76 inches, the duct continued another 84.5 feet,
where it turned at a slight angle to the west. Nearing the stack
another 62 feet, the duct angled once more, this time 109 degrees
toward the east, then entered the stack. Inside the stack, the
duct angled upward, directing exhaust to the top of the stack.
The duct was made of stainless steel. At seams, the
expansion joints anticipated temperatures ranging between -40
degrees F and 1400 degrees F; thus, welds and their ring braces
supported this range. The ring braces were made of structural
steel. An explosion relief port was located just beyond the
junction of the two jet ducts. The exhaust could be sampled.
Sample lines led to a small shack just north of the stack. See
HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-61. 
The purpose of the stack was to elevate hot, radioactive
gases exiting the jets during a test. Breezes at 150 feet above
ground would, it was expected, carry the exhaust away from the
IET and any other NRTS facilities, mixing and diluting it to
concentration levels below the allowable maximums before the
material crossed the boundary of the NRTS.
Between 1952 and 1954, when drawings were at last produced,
GE scientists discussed the stack a great deal. One issue was how
high to build it. They assumed the exhaust would be hot enough to
continue rising once it left the stack. However, to make
conservative estimates, they calculated the consequences should
the gases not rise any further, but begin mixing and diluting at
that level. In the end, they built the stack 150 feet high, but
allowed that better data in the future might dictate additional
height. Thus, the stack had a rather stout, even stubby, profile
when seen from a distance. The top opening had an exterior
diameter of 20 feet.79 See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-31.
Another issue was whether or not to filter the exhaust.
Gamertsfelder had argued that if care was taken to operate only
under the best weather conditions, this might not be necessary.
The decision, however, was made to filter the exhaust. The filter
bank was at the jet-nozzle end of the duct. The system could
dispose of 250 pounds of air per second, with expansion
possibility for 600 pounds.80
The stack was made of ordinary concrete, poured and
reinforced according to standards issued by the American Concrete
Institute. Leaving an air space of about six inches next to the
stack wall, a layer of firebrick supported by horizontal and
vertical carbon steel bars lined the inner face of the stack.
The height of the stack from just below the finished grade
to the top was 155 feet. Its interior diameter at "nozzle level,"
where the duct entered, was 20 feet. The stack gradually tapered
to an interior diameter at the top of 15 1/2 feet. Below grade,
the (exterior) diameter at the bottom of the foundation was 33
feet.
Sixteen concrete piles supported the foundation, each
extending through the soil and a further distance of at least
three feet into the sand and gravel bed beneath. The foundation
was shaped like an octagon, each face measuring 13 feet 7 7/8
inches. The octagonal shape continued above ground about 13 feet,
above the duct opening, whereupon it was round. 
A ladder equipped with rails and safety hoops extended up
the north side of the stack. About halfway to the top was a
sampling port, at which point a working platform was available
for the worker. Brackets were mounted near the top of the stack
for hanging aircraft warning lights. See HAER Photo Nos.
ID-33-E-61, ID-33-E-62, ID-33-E-42, ID-33-E-43.
The stack was finished in the summer of 1955 and taken over
by GE, as was the 200-foot high weather tower.81 GE began
preparing for test operations. Workers hauled the engine to the
IET (sans reactor) and checked out the turbojets, dolly systems,
power and control wiring, and fittings.82
The IET Control and Equipment Building (TAN-620)
During a nuclear run, the staff was bunkered inside the
Control and Equipment building. It contained not only the control
room, but the support systems necessary for self-sufficient
operations in both normal and emergency conditions. Here were the
termini of the personnel tunnel from the locomotive hatch, the
periscope tunnels from the scanning heads in the coupling
station, and all of the service leads from the HTRE.
The most obvious feature of the building was its
invisibility. It was below grade, its roof and walls covered and
banked with 14 feet of compacted earth. In the beginning, the
contours of the earthwork were crisp and sharp. Ensuing years
brought an annual cycle of wind, snow, and blown-in seeds, all of
which helped erode the edges and "naturalize" the appearance of
the structure. Eventually, the earth shield resembled a somewhat
shapeless mound. See HAER Photo Nos. ID-33-E-64, ID-33-E-6.
The control building was 200 feet long on its east-west axis
and 50 feet wide. From these dimensions, various projections
added to the footprint. The paved road from the A&M area ramped
down (10 degrees) into a shielded driveway on the east end. The
driveway was about 400 feet long and ended at an underground
turnaround. The building was one story, but included sump pits.
The floor, walls, and roof were poured concrete, variously
normal, high-density, and boron-treated, depending on the
shielding requirement. The floor was 15 feet below grade, and the
ceiling height was 13 feet. The exterior walls were two feet
thick, treated like all the outer surfaces to prevent the
penetration of moisture. The ceiling was three feet thick. The
foundation rested on piers. 
Within the building, the reactor control functions were on
the west end, closest to the coupling station. A double thickness
of shielding concrete -- about five feet -- separated this area
from the service area in the center and east end. The control
area was roughly 50 feet square, but chambers projecting to the
north included a conference room (capacity: 12 people), counting
room, a photographic dark room, a mechanical equipment room, a
pump room, and the tunnel leading to the coupling station.
Penetrations in the west wall provided viewing access to the
periscopes. From the south wall, a tunnel took off for the
railroad hatch. Internal walls were made of ordinary pumice block
or plywood panels.
A person entering the building from the end of the road at
the east end and heading for the control room would enter through
an eight-foot-wide shielding door, then walk down a well-lit
corridor passing various utility rooms, roughly 20 feet wide
each. (Thrust beams in the ceiling rested on piers about 20 feet
apart.) The first room on the south side was a diesel room (room
101) containing a diesel generator, fuel leads, and related
switch equipment. Sufficient fuel and capacity was available for
15 to 20 days of operation in case the normal electrical system
was unavailable to cool reactor water.83 Next was an electrical
equipment room, and then a boiler room. On the north side were
pads for additional equipment, sump pits, tanks, and an acid
neutralizing pit. Just to the east of the control room were the
men's and women's bathrooms. See HAER Photo Nos ID-33-E-63,
ID-33-E-64, ID-33-E-39, ID-33-E-12 (turnaround area), ID-33-E-24
and ID-33-E-25 (control room).
Equipment within the building produced bone-conducting noise
and vibration. Cork joints surrounding the control room helped to
reduce this impact. The building was heated or cooled as needed.
Other auxiliary systems included compressed air (200 psi for
operating the dolly plug; 90 psi for shop air); electricity (a
2000 kva substation transformed power from the A&M area); heating
(boiler); water, both domestic and industrial; air-conditioning
at all times for the control room area; auxiliary cooling for
compressors, diesels, air conditioning equipment. The wet tower
for the cooling system was outside the control room next to the
equipment room.
Inside the control room itself, the centerpiece was the
control console, a set of cabinets arranged in a semicircular
array. From the north and west side of this area ran the
personnel tunnel to the coupling station and the periscope
tunnels respectively. The personnel tunnel to the railroad hatch
left from the south side. This room was the center of remote
control operations, including two-way radios and controls that
opened the perimeter gate to allow the HTRE rig and locomotive to
approach the coupling station. Remote controls could couple and
uncouple the HTRE leads and engine tailpipes, open and close the
doors of the aluminum building, move the lead shield barrier in
front of the dolly plug, and operate fire-fighting equipment.84
The cabinets composing the control console were identical in
size and wired as a single unit. Leads to these could be
disconnected easily for replacement with a different cabinet
needed, perhaps, for a new test. Mindful of the end goal, an
airplane under control by a single pilot, a place was reserved at
the semicircle for a future cabinet in which all the controls
would be operable by one operator.85
The Exclusion Guard House, TAN-621
The guard house was located at the perimeter fence east of
the control building, its function to exclude anyone with no
business inside the IET area. 
The small flat-roofed building was 26 feet long and 15 feet
wide. The spare functional style (sometimes referred to by
architectural historians as "industrial vernacular") of the
single-story structure was typical of many other non-shielded and
non-reinforced buildings elsewhere at TAN. It was made of pumice
block walls to a height of ten feet from grade to the top of a
coping strip. The foundation and floor were poured with ordinary
concrete. At a wall height of 7.5 feet, a 4-foot-wide canopy
surrounded the building on north, south, and east sides and
shaded a concrete deck beneath. Corner poles supported the
canopy, which was made of fiberglass.
Each of these facades also had a hollow-metal door with a
wireglass window in the top half. Wireglass windows were
installed in all four walls: those on the west elevation were
arranged in two triple banks. An aluminum antenna mast for radio
communications extended 16.5 feet above the northeast corner. The
roof consisted of pre-cast pumice slabs with built-up insulation. 
Inside, the major feature of the single room was a U-shaped
counter fitted against the west wall and made of plywood with
metal trim on the top. A two-way turnstile divided the north and
south halves of the room. The plans show no provision for a
toilet, any other plumbing, heating, or cooling.86 McGarry noted
that the guard house was occupied chiefly when non-nuclear
activities were taking place at the IET. The operating rules
would not have allowed occupancy of this unshielded building
during a reactor run.87 Near the west wall was a radio
transmitter cabinet. The radio console was part of the counter
equipment. See HAER Photo Nos. ID-33-E-66 and ID-33-E-44.
Tank Building, TAN-627
The Tank Building sheltered two large tanks and contained
space for smaller tanks and pump equipment. It was 46 feet long
and 27 feet wide. Like the guard house, it was flat-roofed, made
of pumice block walls bordered on top with a coping strip, and
had a concrete foundation. The building had no windows. The one
door was on the north side. It had wireglass glazing. The roof
was made of exposed metal. Notes on the architectural drawing
indicated that the building could be extended on either end for
future expansion. Inside, the tank vessels each rested on their
sides on a pair of concrete braces and anchored into the floor.
See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-68.
Other IET Features
Other features completed the service requirements for the
IET. The electrical substation brought power from the A&M area.
The switch and transformer equipment was erected on a concrete
pad, fenced, and not sheltered. Two very large tanks were buried
underground. These stored engine and diesel fuel. A drain line
carried contaminated liquids from the IET to the A&M area, which
had holding tanks and concentration facilities. See discussion
below for TAN-616. Water came from the Admin area. A small
chlorination building (TAN-626) stood near the sewage treatment
area.The sewage line extended from the south wall of the building
to a filter bed. For plot plan and utility layout, see HAER Photo
No. ID-33-E-56. 
Small monitoring stations surrounded the IET at various
distances from the coupling station and stack. These enclosures
contained dosimetry and radiation detection equipment, where data
was collected after each hot run of a HTRE experiment.88 Aerial
photographs taken during the years of testing at the IET show the
marks of trails leading into the desert like spokes in a wheel,
the hub of which was the coupling station stack. These paths led
to monitoring stations positioned beyond the immediate environs
of the IET as far away as the NRTS boundary.
The IET was given its first detailed shakedown in the fall
and winter of 1955. Workers ran the HTRE-1 assembly -- without
the reactor core, which was still under testing at Evendale along
with 40 fuel elements -- on chemical fuel. The workers practiced
IET procedures as they simulated actual runs with a dummy core
and dummy fuel elements: checking instrumentation, filling and
draining the core, manipulating control and fuel rods, loading
fuel elements into the core. These efforts uncovered defects in
electric circuits, missing components, improper connections, and
the like. They checked the dolly apparatus: diesel generators,
fans, pumps, heat exchangers. They took data on airflow
characteristics from the top of the stack.89
On November 4, 1955, the scientists loaded HTRE-1 with 36
fuel elements and brought the reactor -- without the jet engine
-- to criticality for the first time, a major milestone for any
reactor. During the next month, it was brought to criticality 50
times for short runs, typically at low powers of 12 watts or
less, for further checkouts of fuel and control rod performance
and tests of instrumentation.90
The elaborately prepared and long-awaited experiment proving
the principle of nuclear flight occurred on December 30, 1955.
The wind was blowing in the right direction and at the right
speed. The behemoth HTRE-1 rig, anchored to its dolly on the
four-rail track, was positioned on its test pad, plugged into the
coupling station, and under the control of the team inside the
bunkered control room. The operators started the engine on
chemical fuel, gradually switched to nuclear operation, and ran
the reactor up to 60 watts. The jets expelled the hot exhaust
through the ducts and up the stack. This was the first known
operation in world history of a high-temperature, gas-turbine
engine running on nuclear power. Cheers went up in the control
room. After shutting down the reactor and leaving it to cool, the
team repaired to a tavern in Mud Lake to celebrate.91 In the next
weeks, the crews took the reactor up to full power operation.92
When a run was over, the shielded locomotive hauled the
HTRE-1 dolly back to the A&M complex, where A&M specialists were
ready to examine, refuel, maintain, and repair the reactor and
engine. During the trip, scattered radiation (secondary effects
continuing after the reactor had shut down) continued to be a
hazard. People working at A&M and the nearby Administration area
remained indoors until notified it was safe.
The SNAP Program
The space program aroused the IET for a new mission in the
mid-1960s. By that time, the idea of nuclear power had been
brought together with another product of World War II: rockets. 
Not long after the war, Cold War tensions inspired the U.S.
government to consider how it might improve surveillance of the
enemy. The U.S. Air Force and the AEC asked the Rand Corporation
of Santa Monica, California, to study the possibilities. One
issue was how such satellites might obtain operating power in
orbit. Industry studies came up with two ideas worth exploring.
One was the use of radioisotopes; the other, nuclear fission.93
The U.S. space program began officially in 1955 with the
Vanguard satellite program. The first satellites weighed only a
few pounds and were powered by solar cells. More power would be
needed for heavier satellites. The same year, the AEC began the
Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP) program. Odd numbers
were given to power plants using radioisotopic fuel, and even
numbers to those powered by nuclear fission. 
The experiments that arrived at the NRTS were concerned with
SNAP-10A, a "fission battery." The heat of fission generated
electricity without moving parts. The power output was 500
kilowatts. Before this system was launched into space in 1965, it
had to undergo an analysis of the accidents that might occur and
how they could be prevented. 
What if a satellite in orbit failed and began to reenter the
earth's atmosphere? If it fell back to earth or into the ocean,
how much radiation would be released? The National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) asked that NRTS conduct some
special experiments and to consider what safety features might be
built into the space reactors. The early stages of the program at
the NRTS began in 1961.94
One goal of the program (among others to determine dynamic
and kinetic characteristics of the SNAP 10A reactor) was to
demonstrate the consequences of a "maximum credible accident."
This called for destroying the reactor in simulated accidents and
recording the effects. The issues were explored in three tests
that took place at the IET, an ideal facility for them. It was
isolated and had a test pad, coupling station, and shielded
control room. The shielded locomotive was still running. It could
haul dolly-mounted experiments back and forth between the IET and
the A&M labs and shops.95
The investigation of the SNAP 10A involved three reactors.
One of them, SNAPTRAN-1, involved research that was accomplished
just short of destroying the reactor. After the usual studies and
preliminaries, two others met their (intended) ends at the IET.
SNAPTRAN-3 was the first. The accident was to simulate a
reactor crashing into the ocean after a fall from space. The test
could run only under highly restricted weather conditions, which
occurred after several postponements on April 1, 1964. As
described by Richard Meservey, an instrumentation engineer, the
procedure reused IET facilities -- and ad hoc shielding -- as
follows:
They took an old ANP double-wide rail car, put a huge tank
on it and filled it with water. The tank had a plexiglass
sleeve in the center to exclude water. The reactor was
placed in the center of that plexiglass sleeve. When they
were ready to run the test, they used explosives to drive
the plexiglass sleeve away so water could rush in on the
reactor. That simulated crashing into the ocean. 
My job was to measure the temperature of the fireball if one
should occur. I had a little hoghouse, a triangular
structure set up at the ANP coupling station near the test.
We had to worry about neutrons coming out and destroying the
instruments, so we set up paraffin and cadmium shielding to
thermalize the neutrons, and lead to stop the gamma
radiation.96
A fireball did develop, but the use of mirrors and shielding
around the temperature instruments preserved a record of the heat
Figure 7. SNAPTRAN 2/10A-1 step impulse drum and drive assembly.
Note rotating control drum. Source: INEEL drawing
032-0624-40-706-200077.
measurements. The test demonstrated that the impact of a crash
would cause the reactor to destroy itself, not continue to
operate and build up a high inventory of fission products if it
fell into the water. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-48.
A second reactor was destroyed at the IET on January 11,
1966. The simulation related to impact on land if a rocket launch
had to abort before the satellite had reached orbit. In normal
operation, control drums rotated to obtain criticality only after
the satellite was safely in orbit. Could impact on earth, even
though the reactor had not gone critical, cause the drums to
rotate in such a way that the fuel could go critical and begin
building up an inventory of fission products? The issue would be
of serious concern to anyone recovering the reactor after the
crash. Data collected at the IET was aimed to learn how the
reactor disassembled itself upon impact.97
An Atlas rocket launched the first SNAP-10A into space on
April 3, 1965 from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.
Electricity powered an on-board ion-propulsion unit, telemetry,
and a number of small experiments. Waste heat was radiated into
space. The reactor functioned successfully for 43 days and was
then silent, probably because of a false scram.98
The revival of the IET for SNAP reactors ended its useful
mission at the NRTS. The facility was abandoned until it was
demolished around 1999. The stack was brought down by explosives
and buried where it fell.
PART SEVEN
THE ASSEMBLY AND MAINTENANCE AREA 
The gateway to the Assembly and Maintenance Area (built by
the Utah Construction Company), from the IET was the railroad
turntable. Here the locomotive operators, using a system of
lights, mirrors, and radio contact with video observers in the
A&M building, turned the HTRE rig toward the east and pushed it
down the four-track rail to the gaping doorway of the Hot Shop.
Siting
If the Parsons site surveyors of 1951 had stood on the
future location of the turntable and faced east, which they very
likely did, they saw in the geological formation before them a
useful opportunity. The low shelf of the ancient shoreline
trended north/south. The ridge was elevated about 22 feet from
the flat "lakebed." This natural earthwork would make a superb
shield between hot operations and an administrative area above
and farther east. To improve its effectiveness, Parsons
heightened the ridge another fourteen feet by building a berm on
top of it. See HAER Photo Nos. ID-33-E-157, ID-33-E-111, and
ID-33-E-156.
Thus, the ridge/berm became the very visible dividing line
between the laboratories and craft shops that were the industrial
heart of TAN and the more prosaic administrative and personnel
service center to its east. The huge Assembly and Maintenance
Building, TAN-607, spread out below, its back to the berm and its
receiving doors facing the turntable. 
Layout
The turntable provides a good viewing position from which to
consider the long west facade of building TAN-607 and a few of
its auxiliary buildings. The most noticeable feature of TAN-607
is its variable roof line. Each roofed section represented a
functional area segregated from its neighbor and defined as
"hot," "warm," or "cold." See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-112 for A&M
building as it looked after its first phase of construction.
The highest section, at the north end, was the Hot Shop. A
hot shop, also referred to as a hot cell, hot cave, or hot
laboratory, is a shielded chamber in which workers outside the
chamber are able to examine and manipulate the highly radioactive
materials within. Walls and viewing windows protect them from
gamma and neutron radiation. The size of the hot shop depends on
the nature of the material to be handled or studied. Likewise the
remotely controlled manipulating tools are sized and designed for
the expected work. 
This high-bay section accommodated the substantial height of
a HTRE rig. The door opening was 33 feet high. Inside, the
ceiling was nearly twice that high. The shop was deep and wide
enough to accommodate two HTRE rigs on their dollies at the same
time.99 The extra ceiling height was for the 100-ton crane to
lift and move the components of the HTRE assembly. Of the TAN Hot
Shop, it was believed -- and often said -- that it was the
largest and "most unique hot cell constructed this side of the
Iron Curtain," perhaps the world.100 One of the delicate
operations performed in this chamber was the removal of spent or
"used" fuel elements from the reactor and safe transfer into a
"swimming pool" for storage. 
The swimming pool projected north of the Hot Shop. Its flat
low-profile roof indicated no second level. The pool itself was
Figure 8. General Electric sketch of the A&M and Admin areas. Top
: First phase of A&M Building's first four sections (three
levels): storage pool, Hot Shop, Assembly shop, and craft shops. 
Bottom: Relationship among A&M, Admin, and IET areas. Source:
APEX-131, p. 6, 16.
below grade and 35 feet deep. Here, fuel elements were left to
cool (decay radioactively) for awhile before they were packaged
into transport casks and sent away from TAN altogether. The water
shielded workers above the surface and allowed them to use
grapplers and other tools to move the elements to their storage
spaces.
Looking to the right (south) of the Hot Shop's high bay, the
next section of the A&M building had a lower roof line. Its large
door opened to another set of railroad tracks. This was a "warm"
assembly area, where radiation hazard was present, but at
comparatively lower levels than in the Hot Shop. It was equipped
for remote operations if needed. At times, this area served as a
decontamination shop.101
The next shift in roof profile indicates the beginning of
"cold" regions, where craft workers were free to touch their
tools and the materials with which they worked. The section with
the lowest roof profile housed small machines and carpentry
shops. Towards the south end, (which, as noted previously, were
built in a second phase "expansion") the high-ceiling section
enclose a large machine shop equipped with jigs, bores, and two
overhead cranes, one of which was rated at 125 tons, and a large
assembly and laydown area. Finally, the south-most section of the
facade was the ANP's major decontamination center, equipped with
acid vats and high-pressure steam units, a place designed for the
wide range of decontamination problems, nuclear and non-nuclear,
that might arise during operations.102
Other A&M buildings supported the main events at TAN-607. To
the north were water-management facilities to demineralize the
storage pool water. Contaminated liquids were sent to an
evaporator, where water was boiled off (TAN-616). Pumps and
piping delivered water from the large supply well located in the
Admin area on the other side of the shielding berm
The Actuator Building, TAN-615, was also situated at the
northern fringe of the complex. An actuator in a reactor system
is the motorized apparatus responsible for moving a control rod
into (and out of) the fuel region to regulate the chain reaction.
Control rods were crucial components during both normal and
emergency operations. Should a fuel element rupture or some other
urgent departure from the expected occur, an extremely rapid
shutdown would involve thrusting the control rods instantaneously
into place -- a "scram" of the reactor.103
One final building completed the original A&M layout. South
and west of the A&M building and near the edge of the A&M
perimeter fence stood an Engine Test Pad, TAN-609. Sherman
McGarry described its purpose: 
...to test the X39 engines with fossil fuel, testing out the
engines' modifications before being considered for HTRE
operation on the rigs. This building was not unusual except
[for] protecting the testing control room for blast effect
should an engine fly apart. (Only one engine tested ever did
so, in 1957.)104
As the HTRE tests proceeded, the landscape grew to include
various other small buildings and outdoor spaces. Not too long
after operations began, for example, it became evident that fuel
transport casks, bulky radioactive equipment, and parts needed to
be stored somewhere. A shelter was needed for dollies not in use.
GE created a fenced outdoor yard for such storage northwest of
TAN-607 and called it the Radioactive Parts Security Storage Area
(RPSSA). Two buildings (TAN-647 and TAN-648) were part of this
complex.
The Assembly and Maintenance Building, TAN 607 
The philosophy guiding the design and construction of the
A&M complex was precisely opposite to that employed at the IET.
Here, the shielding budget was spent to surround the radioactive
sources, not the workers. The guiding principles for the
architecture and engineering of this building were dominated by
safety and shielding considerations. 
The A&M building was a long row of rooms, their industrial
doorways all on the west side, but their interior dividing walls
of varying construction materials and thickness. Excavation
depths, wall thickness, siding, the number of stories, and
ceiling heights all were dictated by the special function of the
work space -- and by the expected presence or absence of
radioactivity. Inside, this made for interesting doors and
passages from one section to another in order to keep cold areas
from becoming contaminated with radioactivity.
Parsons produced the first drawings for the north half of
the building in 1953 -- the Storage Pool, Hot Shop, Warm Shop,
Locomotive Pit, Special Services Cubicle, Special Equipment
Service room, Mechanical Shop, and Carpentry Shop. Drawings for
the "expansion" were ready in August 1956 and added more shop
specialty areas. From the north wall of the storage pool to the
south wall of the Decontamination shop, the building was about
500 feet long. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-167.
Hot Shop. The Hot Shop was 160 feet long (east/west axis),
52 feet wide, and 60 feet high. The side walls were made of
reinforced concrete 6 feet, 10 inches thick at the base. The top
18' 8" of the side walls tapered to two feet thick at the roof.
The front wall was 5 feet thick and also tapered to a width of 2
feet at the top. The rear wall of the Hot Shop was 5 feet thick
up to the level of the bi-parting doors opening the Special
Services room and then 4 feet beyond. Tapering the walls saved
expense, for no workers could potentially be exposed at certain
upper levels. The roof itself was made of ordinary concrete and
60 feet above grade level. It was two feet thick and supported by
reinforced concrete beams across the width of the Hot Shop. See
HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-165, section C. The foundation was
thickest under the bi-parting doors, less thick under the west
side of the Hot Shop floor, and then the least thick from there
to the east wall. Structural piers ranged in diameter between 16
and 60 inches.105 The four-rail track from the turntable entered
the Hot Shop set into the reinforced concrete floor. HAER Photo
Nos. ID-33-E-158, ID-33-E-159 See HAER Photo No. 169 for shield
wall details. 
On both sides of the Hot Shop were three operating levels.
The Hot Shop chamber itself was a clear space all the way to the
ceiling. It allowed the 100-ton crane 49 feet of clearance under
its hook. A tunnel level below grade provided access to the two
turntables set into the Hot Shop floor.
The imposing doors of the west entrance admitted the HTRE
rigs after a run at the IET. The motorized "bi-parting" doors
were heavily shielded and made of high-density concrete. In their
open position, each half slid into a pocket in front of the
building wall sided with corrugated metal. Installing these doors
had been a major milestone during the construction of the
building, as they had been fabricated at the site. The clear
opening was 28 feet wide by 33 feet high.106
Figure 9. Inside the Hot Shop, facing the bi-parting doors (in
closed position). Dolly and turntable at right hold apparatus
under investigation. Note pool vestibule at lower right. Source:
INEEL Photo 63-1968.
Once inside the Hot Shop, the component parts of the HTRE
could be disassembled, inspected, repaired, and reassembled.
Either of two cranes, the 100-ton or the 30-ton, lifted the
object to one of the turntables, each remotely operated and able
to bear a weight of 50 tons. One was north of the tracks; the
other, south. Each was 16 feet in diameter. Together with a
device called an "upending jig," they made it possible for
workers to see an object from any position. The base for this jig
was located a few feet from the end of the four-rail track.
Another device from above helped workers manipulate whatever
had been lifted into place. Just under the cranes, recalled
Sherman McGarry: 
... was an Overhead Manipulator ("O-man"), on its own rails
(each side of shop) that could traverse the length of the
shop. The O-man was designed and constructed by GE.It was
one large manipulator arm that could be controlled to grasp
a raw egg without breaking it or to clasp [items] up to 1
1/2 tons without losing them, ie, very versatile....The
O-man had a 360-degree-head horizontal maneuver with the
elbow and arm going from 0 degrees to 145 degrees vertical.
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In its weakest position the O-man could exert a force of 400
pounds in any direction, or a 400-pound torque. It had a
repertoire of ten different motions in response to operator
commands.108 Along the walls, two other manipulators, also made
by GE, were affixed on rails that ran the entire length of the
wall at a height of 37 feet above the floor. These provided a
reach from the top of the shop down to floor level and could
maneuver 180 degrees from side to side.109 Operators could use
one or all of the manipulators singly or in groups to perform
exacting operations.110
Utilities and tools such as pneumatic wrenches, drivers,
hammers, electric power, air, water, gas were available inside
the Hot Shop. The plugs and pipes for these installations
penetrated the shield wall. Therefore, the pipes were Z-shaped,
making two bends through the six feet of concrete. The plugs were
stepped, with the narrowest step on the Hot Shop side.111
Operators adjusted flow rates and connected or disconnected these
services by remote control. All service lines had spares. Extra
conduit was in place for future expansion.
In the event that a crane or the O-man needed to be serviced
while a radioactive source was in the Hot Shop, a Special
Equipment Service Room (SES) was located on the second floor east
of the thick shielding wall. This room was 51 feet wide and 30
feet deep. Its ceiling extended through the third level. A
bi-parting shielding door opened to allow the crane and the O-man
to enter the room from the Hot Shop. The O-man rails were moved
out of the way when the doors opened.112
At times, it was useful to remove a component from the rig
in the Hot Shop, isolate it, and take a closer look than was
feasible in the vast space of the Hot Shop. Therefore, a smaller
hot cell provided for this. It was on the first floor level and
projected from the Hot Shop's south wall at its east end. Known
as the Inspection Cubicle (also Special Services Cubicle), the
room was 35 feet long (north to south) and 10 feet wide. The
ceiling was 17 feet high, and the shield walls consisted of
high-density concrete four feet thick. The interior of the cell
was lined with 16-gauge stainless steel sheet metal, a surface
easily cleaned and decontaminated.113
Along its walls were six shielded viewing windows, six feet
thick. Objects were transferred from the Hot Shop into this cell
by means of a special plug-type door connecting the two chambers.
The thick door rolled along the floor and could slide back to
make an opening 4 feet wide and 13 feet high. The plug was
stepped, exhibiting another design aimed at preventing gamma and
neutron radiation from streaming through such penetrations in
shield walls. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-159, below and slightly
to the right of the storage pool vestibule.
The Inspection Cubicle was equipped with its own set of
manipulators: two bridge-mounted overhead and a pair of Argonne
Master Slave fixtures. Appropriate to the more delicate work done
here, tools included sectioning devices, scales, and a periscope
equipped with a camera. Like the larger Hot Shop, this cell had
its own service lines for power, water, deionized water, air, and
vacuum. All fixtures worked by remote control -- as did the
decontamination lines. Drains (appropriately shielded) carried
waste to appropriate holding tanks. Pipes and plugs were z-shaped
and stepped, respectively.114
A control gallery was an accessory of any hot cell,
regardless of its size. The "master" controls to the "slaves"
within were in the hands of operators standing before one of the
shielded viewing windows set into the wall. These were located on
the second floor along the south and north sides of the Hot Shop
(and along the east and west sides of the Inspection Cubicle.)
Below each window was an operating console for controlling any of
the manipulators. The operator also could adjust the light levels
provided by four sets of fluorescent lights that ran the length
of the ceiling.115 Microphones in the cells transmitted sounds to
the operator; operators at different windows could communicate
with one another.116 See HAER Photo Nos. ID-33-E-115,
ID-33-E-119, ID-33-E-120, ID-33-E-123, ID-33-E-124.
McGarry described the Hot Shop windows as being...
... unique in construction. [The combination of leaded glass
and zinc-bromide to fill the void between the glass]
afforded seven feet of shield protection...[For safety, no
two control panels] could be operated simultaneously -- only
one could control; the rest were automatically locked out of
operation by an interlock system. This feature was designed
so no two movements could be made to bring... fissionable
materials together inadvertently. The [viewer] could see the
length of the shop from 15 degrees vertical and to the floor
or the ceiling. Each balcony floor was 35 feet above the hot
shop floor, making an operator's head approx 41 feet from
floor level.117
Zinc bromide had the same index of refraction as the leaded
glass. Despite its thickness, a window gave a clear view without
distortion. The Hot Shop was so large that a pair of binoculars
was a typical accessory near the control panel. Seven windows
were built, with spaces provided should others to be added later.
It was possible for workers to enter the Hot Shop (when the
bi-parting doors were closed) either during an emergency or when
radioactivity levels permitted. The door was on the south side on
the west end. To prevent radiation from streaming into the area,
the architects designed a maze, or labyrinth. The maze consisted
of five 90-degree corners. The walls were 8.7 feet thick and made
of ordinary concrete. Exiting the maze, a person was monitored
for radioactive contamination. From here, he could either enter
the equipment gallery (below the operating gallery) on his way to
the stairs or go to the change room and don special shoes or
other special clothing stored in a personal locker. See HAER
Photo No. ID-33-E-158, first floor plan, room 114.
Two other essential accessories to a hot cell include an
instrument room and a counting room. The Hot Shop's were adjacent
to the south operating gallery. The counting room was the special
province of health physicists (HPs), whose business was to
protect workers from radiation. The HPs sampled surfaces of
floors, desks, doorknobs, and walls for contamination. They
analyzed dosimeter badges and radiation monitor samples, among
other duties. Their counting room was required to be as free of
background radiation as possible. Thus, it was surrounded by
three feet of ordinary concrete shielding and vented for positive
air pressure.
The instrument room was next to the counting room. This was,
in fact, a small laboratory, in which instrumentation engineers
designed and fabricated the thermocouples and other instruments
that were fitted onto the HTRE rig and dollies to detect and
record temperature, pressure, conductivity, and other parameters. 
The third level of the Hot Shop provided access to platforms
and two control rooms for the cranes, one each on the north and
south side. Each was provided a shielded viewing window into the
Hot Shop. HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-158 floor plans illustrate the
three levels of the Hot Shop.
Bulk Shielding Storage Pool. The main part of the pool was a
rectangle 70 feet long (east/west axis) and 48 feet wide. A
smaller part called the "vestibule" projected under the Hot Shop
shielding wall and into the Hot Shop to form another rectangle.
This portion was 35 feet long and 24 feet wide. The pool was
filled with water 24 feet deep. The shielding wall between the
pool and vestibule extended below the pool's water level five
feet, leaving an opening of 19 feet through which the
(underwater) dolly and its load could travel along a two-rail
track laid into the floor.118 See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-174.
The Hot Shop's 100-ton crane lifted fuel elements or other
components onto the underwater dolly while it was positioned in
the vestibule. The loaded dolly was pulled under the shield wall
by a 15-ton crane that was bridge-mounted above the pool and
equipped with a telescoping boom. Once into the main part of
pool, the dolly was parked for unloading. The east and west walls
(the long sides) of the pool had shelves for storing light-weight
objects. Underwater lighting in the pool walls assisted operators
do their precision work.119 See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-125 for a
view of the storage pool and bridge crane.
At the far north end of the pool, a doorway led to a
transfer area, where items could be (remotely) lifted from the
pool and deposited into shipping casks. Spent fuel went to the
Chemical Processing Plant about 20 miles south on Lincoln
Boulevard, where it was dissolved and reprocessed to recover the
unfissioned uranium still present in the fuel. Other items might
be delivered to the RPSSA or to the NRTS Burial Ground at the
southwest corner of the NRTS site.
The depth of the pool water shielded workers above the pool
from gamma and neutron radiation, the hydrogen in the water
absorbing its energy. The water was stripped of its natural salts
and mineral content to avoid creating radioactive ions of these
elements. Depending on the (radio)activity of the items in the
pool at any given time, the water collected heat and required
circulation and cooling. The exterior walls and roof of the pool
were made of ordinary concrete. Personnel access to the Hot Shop
next door was via a ramp to a second-floor corridor along the
east shielding wall end of the Hot Shop. 
Warm Service Area. South of the monitoring room, a wall
divided the Hot Shop section of the building from the Warm
Service Area. A set of four rails entered the (non-shielded)
doorway. This area, while it had a high ceiling, was not as long
as the Hot Shop, being only 81 feet long and about 45 feet wide.
Beyond the wall at the east end of the shop were various labs and
offices.
The floor contained a pit for servicing and maintaining the
shielded locomotive pit. The locomotive weighed 210 tons. It had
two 350-horsepower diesel-electric motors, enough to push the
HTRE rig and dolly up the 1 percent grade to the IET.120
The architectural features of the Warm (and Cold) Service
Area were less interesting than the Hot Shop from a shielding
point of view. Spaces were provided for offices, stairways,
corridors, locker rooms, bathrooms, conference areas, equipment
and fan rooms, janitor closets, and the like. A "special source"
vault was in this area, the receiving area for radioactive
materials used to calibrate instruments.
Cold Assembly. The A&M facility was equipped with a variety
of specialized laboratories. The Chemical Lab (second floor) was
equipped to analyze samples, certify materials, and study such
problems as turbidity which occasionally appeared in viewing
glass fluid. It had a balance room and an emergency shower. The
Metallurgical Lab (next to the Chem Lab, second floor) had a
mobile X-ray unit for inspecting welds (first floor), a plating
room, a darkroom for developing X-ray film, a tensile testing
machine, and radiograph-making equipment for producing weld
reports. The Photographic Lab (first floor) handled standard
black/white film and motion pictures. A Radiographic Materials
Lab included an Elox block cutter with a remotely operated
balance, a periscope/camera outfit for making remote images,
sample cutters and mounting equipment. This lab was ventilated
for negative air pressure, air filtered with disposable filters.
121 For first floor plan, see HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-160; for
second floor plan, HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-161.
Shops. The Engine Maintenance and Large Machine Shops, rooms
140 and 149 respectively, were 45 feet high to allow for an
I-beam trolley bridge, the bottom of which was 28' 4" from the
floor. The welding shop was slightly higher than its northern
neighbor, at 46 feet high. It contained a storage balcony for
jigs and fixtures. On the main floor, a two-ton crane rolled from
north to south. 
High Bay Assembly Shop. This section (room 158) was 64' 10"
high, providing ceiling space for a 25-ton bridge crane and its
auxiliary 5-ton hook. Its sliding door (no. 142) rolled across
the facade, projecting 14 inches from it, and was covered with an
aluminum weather hood.
Chemical Cleaning (Decontamination) Room. At the south end
of TAN-607 was the final section of the building. Its walls were
made of poured, reinforced (ordinary) concrete about 1.5 feet
thick. The room was 39' 3" high and about 32 feet wide and
equipped with a 10-ton bridge crane. Acid and neutralizer pits
contained fluids used in cleaning operations. Radioactively
contaminated liquid wastes entered an underground drain leading
across the front of TAN-607 to TAN-616, the Hot Liquid Waste
building. See HAER Photo Nos. ID-33-E-127, ID-33-E-128,
ID-33-E-129, ID-33-E-130.
The Jet Engine Test Building, TAN-609
GE engineers needed a place to check out the test engines
before they were ever subject to test with a reactor. These were
not engines with established performance records, but modified
experimental models. 
The building was in two parts. The test engine was hauled
into the prefabricated metal part of the building, which had
roll-up doors at the east and west ends. The operator sat in the
pumice block control building on the north side. He operated a
control console and could look in on the jet pad through a
viewing window. Just outside the building was an above-ground
tank, probably containing a supply of fire-suppression water. See
HAER Photo No ID-33-E-133.
The Actuator Building, TAN-615
The Actuator Building, located north of the A&M building
near the old lake shoreline, was the place devoted to testing
prototype actuator mechanisms, the motors, instruments,
electromagnets and other devices that moved control rods in and
out of the HTRE reactors. The operational goal was 100 percent
reliability. Nothing less would assure the safety of the crew in
an airplane. Actuator tests were called "cycles," representing a
sequence of insert and withdraw. Scientists conducted around 5000
such cycles in their quest for fail-safe hardware.122
General Electric designed the Actuator Building in November
1956 and built it soon after. It was a standard prefabricated
steel frame building sided with corrugated metal and covered with
a gable roof, also of metal. The floor was a concrete slab
fourinches thick. Most of the building was 20 feet high from
grade to the roof eave, although a low-bay section on the north
Figure 10. Test Area in Actuator Building, TAN-615. Lockers
against wall stored actuator mechanisms, long assemblies that
drove control rods into the reactor region containing fuel. 
Source: INEEL Photo PN02-062-01, frame 6.
side was 10 feet high. Personnel doors gave access to each
section from the east and west sides. The entire building was 40
feet wide and about 67' 4" long. The low-bay section was 24 feet
long. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-184.
The low-bay section contained a toilet, decontamination
(decon) change room, clean change room, and a clean room. A
gypsum-board wall separated the low-bay from the high-bay area.
The high-bay area was divided in half by a full-height metal
partition down the center under the roof ridge. The west side was
called the "decontamination area," while the east side was called
the "test area." Each side had a floor pit and sump. The pits,
each 14 feet long (north/south axis) by 8 feet wide and 8 feet
deep, were at the south end of the high-bay section near the
centerline. The reinforced concrete partition between the pits
was 8 inches thick. A metal grate covered each pit.
Access to the test area from the low-bay clean-room area was
via an open arch. The room was equipped with work tables, two
control consoles, two test stands, an electronic table, and a row
of tall, narrow upright lockers. The lockers stored actuator
assemblies up to 20 feet long. The decon area contained three
decon tanks, a sink, pump, fume hood, and exhaust stack.123
In the 1970s, the Loss of Fluid Test program appropriated
the building and renamed it the TAN Fuel Handling Facility. The
old "decontamination area" was dismantled by removing the metal
partition in the center.  An I-beam trolley crane was installed
beneath the roof ridge. In 1973, the building was enlarged at the
north end with an addition of 1468 square feet, also
prefabricated metal, but with an eave height of 35 feet. The
addition contained another pit and new aluminum fuel module
storage lockers.124
In 1976 the (southwest) pit in the former "decontamination
area" was filled with gravel and capped with a concrete slab. The
mission continued to involve the testing of actuator mechanisms,
this time for the Loss of Fluid Test reactor. Other modifications
involved supplying the building with steam, condensate,
demineralized water, and air via piping from TAN-616 next door.
Penetrations entered TAN-615 in its south wall. An assortment of
pipes connected the two buildings. A drain and pump sent waste
water to the V-3 tank next to TAN-616.
After the Loss of Fluid Test program ended, TAN-615 became a
general maintenance shop and was renamed Maintenance Building. It
was abandoned in 2001 and has been demolished.125
Hot Liquid Waste Treatment Plant, TAN-616
The strategy for dealing with radionuclide-contaminated
liquids that accumulated due to HTRE operations, decontamination
activities, accidents, and other processes was to isolate, treat,
and concentrate them in a storage tank. To this end, a complex
system of waste drains, pumps, holding tanks, and piping
connected the A&M labs, hot shops and cells, and decontamination
shop to the TAN-616 plant. Waste drains came from the IET, the
Actuator Building (TAN-615), and the Water Filtration Building
(TAN-649).
The system involved various treatments for the waste (acid
and caustic) and an evaporator to drive off water. Initially the
system had three holding tanks (V-1, V-2, and V-3), but another
(V-9) was added later. The first three tanks were buried
underground on the west side of the plant building. These held
wastes being delivered for treatment and concentration.
The building itself, most of which was one story above
grade, was built of concrete, the thickness of any given section
depending on its particular function and shielding need. When
looking at the floor plan, the footprint of the building shows
three sections of unequal length, giving the west side a stepped
appearance. Were the building a complete rectangle, it would be
46 feet long (east/west axis) and 36 feet wide. See HAER Photo
Nos. ID-33-E-185, ID-33-E-149, and ID-33-E-150.
The most heavily shielded section was the room containing
the evaporator pit, with walls 3 feet to 2 feet thick. The floor
of this room was in the basement. The ceiling was the building
roof 15 feet above grade. Other sections, walled with lesser
widths of concrete, functioned as an operating pump room, pump
room, caustic pump room, control room, and entry vestibule. The
control room, vestibule, and caustic pump room had no basement.
The flat roof over these areas was 12 feet above grade. A
"penthouse" above the caustic pump room contained heating and
ventilation equipment. This area was easily identified by its
gable roof.126
The large evaporator vessel was the central feature of the
concentration process. Beginning in 1958, sludge from the bottom
of the vessel was periodically removed to tanks located southwest
of TAN-607 in a field on the south side of Snake Avenue, an
access road.127 The guard house controlling entry to this area
can be seen in HAER Photo Nos ID-33-E-88 through ID-33-E-96.
After years of operation, the vessel cracked from stress
corrosion. The contents leaked onto the floor of the pit. The
vessel was removed and repaired, but eventually cracked once
more. Again, leaks ended up on the floor of the pit. The facility
was shut down in 1970, but waste in the process system at the
time remained where it was. A new system, called the PM-2A, was
installed, but operating difficulties shut it down in 1975.
Again, untreated waste remained in process lines. Sometime after
1983, the roof and access hatches began to leak. Standing water
inside may have found pathways for contamination to migrate
outside the building. A new roof was placed over the building in
1993.128
TAN-616 was one of the DOE's cleanup targets as this report
was being written.129 Radioactive contamination inside its
chambers prohibited the HAER photographer access inside the
building. A large area outside was cordoned off for clean-up of
the soils and drains around the building and near the buried
tanks. This area was also off limits to the photographer. The
list of metals, radionuclides, and solvents in the tanks and as
contaminants elsewhere, is a remarkable postscript to the
intensely industrial character of the ANP project: barium,
cadmium, chromium, lead, mercury, silver, acetone,
trichloroethylene, carbon tetrachloride, Cesium-137, Cobalt-60,
Strontium-90, and assorted isotopes of uranium and plutonium,
among many others.130
Hot Cell Addition, TAN-633
This addition to the hot cell capabilities near TAN-607 was
uniquely situated to examine fuel elements or other items that
had cooled in the storage pool. They could be diverted to this
building and examined before being sent away for reprocessing at
the NRTS Chemical Processing Plant. Among its special tools was
an electron microscope.
The building was tucked between the Actuator Building,
TAN-615, and the Water Filter Building, TAN-608, all under the
shadow of the ridge formation and shield berm on the east. It was
50 feet wide by 91' 4" long (north/south axis), and 16' 8.5"
high. The Hot Cell Addition was connected to the pool building by
a neck (referred to as a "vestibule" on the architectural
drawings) about 15 feet long and 26 feet wide. Inside, the
eastern portion of the neck was taken up with a corridor 7' 8"
wide and about 40 feet long. This corridor connected the pool
building to the cell region of the new addition. Both the main
building and its neck were flat-roofed and made of pumice block
walls. The roof had metal decking and built-up roofing with
double-gravel surface. See HAER Photo Nos. ID-33-E-176,
ID-33-E-177 through ID-33-E-179.
Construction required the re-routing of buried water and
sewer lines to new locations, re-locating of fire hydrants, and
relocating of steam and air lines. The road and a street-washing
apparatus that had provided truck access to the storage was
relocated north. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-177.
Within the building, the block of four hot cells was 12 feet
wide and 40 feet long and surrounded on all sides by high-density
concrete. The roof and floor were made of ordinary concrete. On
the east side, the plans show, step-shaped doors swung open to
receive the fuel container. These were not built. However, an
opening did allow for the insertion of study materials into the
cell.131 Shielded viewing windows were on the west wall. Workers
stood in the operating corridor just west of the windows and
manipulated the contents of the cell by remote control. Each cell
was 6 feet wide, 8 feet long, and 14 feet high. 
Each hot cell was equipped with a unique selection of work
tables, manipulators, and other equipment. Penetrations through
the concrete for control lines and service exhibited Z-shapes.
All had air exhausts, floor drains, and a small "lost tool
opening" on the east side. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-179. 
Fuel caskets moved by remote control in a straight line from
the pool building, down the corridor, and into the Addition. They
traveled on a 5-ton monorail as far as the designated cell. After
the hot cell analysis had been completed, the item was returned
to its transport cask and sent back into the monorail corridor.
Here the cask could return toward the pool for restorage or out a
west-side exit to a waiting transport truck. Alternatively, the
cask could move northward and out the north door of the building.
Here a concrete pad, sheltered by a gabled canopy with a
corrugated tin roof, allowed for a transport truck to pick up the
cask at this location.
Work spaces within the building included a change room, a
set-up area, and tool decontamination area. After the ANP program
had been canceled, the room in the northwest corner was converted
to a photographic darkroom. The mechanical equipment room was in
the southwest corner. An enlargement was planned for the east
side another 28 feet, but this was not built. 
Demineralization Plant, TAN-656
Built along the north wall of the Hot Shop, this building
made use of space between the water filtration building, TAN-608,
and the north wall of the storage pool. Its north and south walls
touched these buildings respectively. The space so created was 11
feet wide and 20 feet long (east/west axis). Water draining from
the plant went via buried pipe to a manhole west of the Hot Cell
Addition.
The plant demineralized the water in the storage pool. It
was divided into two rooms. The "pool water purification room"
was to the east and surrounded by walls of ordinary concrete 1.5
feet thick. The west side, enclosed by a wall 1 foot thick, was
the personnel passageway between the pool building and TAN-608.
The building had a flat roof with built-up roofing. It had no
exterior doors. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-180.132
Radioactive Parts Security Storage Area, TAN-647, and TAN-648
By the end of 1958, the pace of ANP activity demanded an
expansion of utilitarian space for storage of large and bulky
items such as dollies and transport casks while not in use.
Having been exposed to operations or materials that made them
radioactive, they needed to be secured and out of the way. GE
found space for the Radioactive Parts Security Storage Area
adjacent to and on the west side of the IET tracks. The southern
edge bordered an acid pond. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-182.
Access was available either by road or by rail, depending on
the item being stored. Dollies went via rail on a new set of
tracks leading from the turntable directly into TAN-647, named
the Dolly Storage Building. Access by road was from an existing
road leading to the north end of the A&M Building. Items could be
stored inside Storage Building, TAN-648, or set outdoors. An area
southwest of TAN-647 was designated for transport cask liners.
This area lay between the new set of tracks and the tracks
leading to the TAN-609 area. 
Fencing around the storage area consisted of a 7-foot-high
close-grid zinc wire fence topped with three strands of
galvanized barbed wire, for a total height of 8 feet. Warning
signs informed potential visitors of the radioactive hazard.
The Dolly Storage Building, TAN-647, had framing of
prefabricated structural steel with siding and gable roof of
ribbed galvanized steel (vertical ribbing). The sides of the
buildings had ribbed plastic light panels installed all along the
length. The building had a concrete floor reinforced sufficiently
to hold the weight of a loaded dolly. Four-rail track was laid
into the floor. The building was 36 feet wide and 145' 10" long
(north/south axis). Each of the gable ends had large metal rollup
door opening a space 28 feet wide by 34 feet high. See HAER Photo
No. ID-33-E-139.
The Parts Storage Building, TAN-648, was of the same design
as TAN-647, but with different dimensions and only one rollup
door on the north end. It had the same type of framing, roof,
plastic light panels, and siding as TAN-647. The rectangular
floor was 70 feet wide by 97'10" long (north/south axis).133
Cask liners were cylindrical steel containers used to
transport highly radioactive spent reactor fuel or other material
(such as debris from Three Mile Island). For storage at RPSSA,
the liners were placed within concrete shrouds three feet thick.
The outer foot was made of high-density concrete. Cooling ducts
ran through the concrete. These were equipped for the monitoring
and removal of heat resulting from radioactive decay. Each
structure was a total of 12' 4" in diameter and 16' 2" high.
Cranes lifted the liners into and out of the concrete casks.
Steel covers fit over the top. See HAER No. ID-33-E-183; and HAER
Nos. ID-33-E-139 through ID-33-E-141.
The Outdoor Turntable
Once GE engineers knew the dimensions of the dimensions of
the HTRE-hauling dolly and the locomotive, they could design the
turntable. It had to accommodate their combined length. The fit
was achieved with a turntable diameter of 84 feet. Including the
perimeter foundation, the structure was 90 feet in diameter.
Stubbed rail projections from the perimeter allowed for maneuvers
in which the locomotive shifted from a "pull" position to a
"push" position. From the turntable, destinations included the
IET, the Hot Shop, the Warm Shop, the Engine Test Pad, and later,
the Hangar building. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-111, an aerial
view.
Of all the complex structures at TAN, the turntable and its
radiating tracks are among the simplest for a visitor to
understand and appreciate. Parsons engineers, however, who recall
the days when construction was underway remember the job as
exceedingly complex and exacting. Maintaining the proper ballast
and distances between each of the four rails was a challenge.
Derailment, especially if it occurred with a load returning from
a nuclear run at the IET, would have been a very serious
emergency.134
Construction photos show the steps taken to build the
turntable: excavation, formation of piers, laying of the radial
and perimeter foundation rails, filling the space between beams
with gravel, and laying of the wooded deck with its many rails.
The electric motor was operated by remote control. HAER
photographs show a few steps in its deconstruction and
demolition. See HAER Photo Nos. ID-33-E-142 through ID-33-E-146
for construction views, and ID-33-E-77 through ID-33-E-87 for
demolition views.
Modifications to A&M Facilities after 1961
A number of new buildings, typically metal prefabricated
rectangular structures of various sizes, appeared on the A&M side
of the of the earth embankment from time to time after 1961.
These functioned typically as warehouses, shops, or shelters for
monitoring stations. A wooden shack sheltered certain turntable
controls, for example. See HAER Photo nos. ID-33-E-78 and
ID-33-E-79. Additionally, new programs and projects called for
the interior modification of existing ANP structures.
PREPP. The Ralph M. Parsons Company returned for a major
redesign of part of TAN-607 in 1983-84. At this time, DOE was
considering how best to retrieve from the old NRTS Burial Ground
solid transuranic (largely plutonium) waste that had originated
at Rocky Flats in Colorado. (The Burial Ground had in the
meantime been re-named the Radioactive Waste Management Complex,
or RWMC.) DOE's objective was to retrieve this waste and repack
it for shipment and permanent disposal at the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico. A number of steps were involved
in executing this plan: safely retrieving storage barrels,
identifying their contents, and processing them for efficient
shipment to New Mexico. The WIPP facility had certain criteria
that any shipment into its facility had to meet before it would
be accepted. As retrieved from the RWMC, the waste drums did not
meet the acceptance criteria. Further processing would be
necessary.
To demonstrate possible approaches to these problems, DOE
established a Process Experimental Pilot Plant (PREPP). The PREPP
plant took over the then-vacant room within TAN-607 known as the
North Machine Bay. (The shop just south of it was the high-bay
machine shop. These shops were roughly in the middle of the row
of TAN-607 shops.135) The space was cleared out and replaced with
a virtual multi-level building within TAN-607. Its internal steel
walls, concrete floors, and air locks separated the various
chambers enclosing equipment such as shredders, a rotary kiln
incinerator, and compactors. Off-gases from incineration were
further subjected to treatment, and there was a place for large
banks of air filters. The PREPP plant capacity was to be ten tons
of waste a day.136 See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-175, the only PREPP
drawing included in this report, as an example of the re-use of
TAN-607. The exterior of TAN-607 was not affected by the remodel.
The PREPP facility went under construction in 1983 and was
completed in 1986. The operators launched a check-out and
evaluation phase to identify characteristics, faults, and safety
deficiencies, if any, in the process designs. They used
non-plutonium wastes for these shakedown tests. Indeed, the
preliminaries did reveal that the facility needed modification.
Meanwhile, national criteria and standards for the management of
transuranic materials were changing, leaving the PREPP facility
out-of-compliance. In the face of several uncertainties about the
future status of WIPP, the criteria, and the ability of PREPP to
qualify under new requirements for plutonium-handling facilities,
DOE deactivated PREPP beginning in 1990.137
Other Modifications. A&M facilities were adapted for other
programs that came after the ANP project. The Loss of Fluid Test
program was one of the more important of these (and is discussed
below). The floor of TAN-607's Decontamination room was raised a
few inches with a new layer of rebar and concrete. In 1987,
during the period when TAN-607's Hot Shop was receiving Three
Mile Island shipments, workers tired of having to clean the
trucks before they entered the Hot Shop during wet, icy, windy
weather. A metal structure was attached to the front of the
building, hiding the Hot Shop's big bi-parting front doors. But
the "truck breezeway" greatly simplified the necessary truck
cleaning operations. 
As the 1990s passed into the new century, the number of new
missions for the A&M buildings declined. Other areas at the INEEL
took over functions that had occupied TAN-607. INTEC took
possession of the Three Mile Island fuel, for example. The shops
equipped for heavy industry had little new industry to serve. DOE
decided to clean up the area and demolish many A&M buildings.
PART EIGHT
THE ADMINISTRATIVE AREA
The Administrative Area consisted of offices, non-nuclear
laboratories, warehouses, water supply wells and storage tanks,
warehouses, and personnel services such as a cafeteria, change
house, and dispensary. As "cold" activities, they required
appropriate separation from the A&M.
Siting
Because the "shoreline" ridge and berm afforded protection
from radiation, the Administrative Area was located on its east
side, but within walking distance to the A&M complex. However,
nuclear analysts warned that, because of the possibility of
scattered radiation, personnel should remain indoors whenever the
hot HTRE rig was being transported from IET to the Hot Shop.
Layout
The Admin Area was the destination of road access from
Lincoln Boulevard and points south at NRTS. Workers, visitors,
and bus drivers parked their vehicles in a parking lot on the
east side of the security fence. They entered the area by passing
through a guard house. 
The guard house was attached to the Administration Building,
TAN-602, directly to the north. The long low-profile Admin
building received morning sun on its long east side and the
afternoon sun on the west. Continuing west, another tier of
facilities included two large water tanks and their pumping
equipment, a warehouse, and a maintenance building providing
automotive and other shop services. As the ANP program grew,
other buildings were added: TAN-649, water filtration building;
and TAN-628, a second warehouse. 
The boundary of the Admin Area was delineated by a security
fence, which also divided it from the A&M complex. Pedestrian
access to A&M was available at only one point, the Change House.
This building functioned like the narrow middle of an hourglass.
In the early days of the ANP program, all traffic, including
vehicular, between the A&M complex and the Admin area flowed
through this narrow passage. (Later, roadway access to the A&M
went around the berm on both the north and south ends.) Radiation
detectors scanned bodies and feet for contamination; guards
checked badges for appropriate authority to enter. Showers and
lockers were provided. Vehicles could drive through a cut in the
ridge to arrive at the east end of the A&M complex. The
pedestrians path offered a more direct route. See HAER Photo No.
ID-33-E-225.
The aquifer upon which the entire ANP site rested flowed
from a direction generally north to south. The water supply wells
therefore were upstream of all the operations, which in turn
dictated that the sewage treatment facility be downstream. The
plant served both Admin and A&M, so it was located southwest of
the A&M building. The electrical substation was south of the
guard house and away from other activity. 
Administration Building, TAN-602
This building set the design motif for all of the
non-nuclear buildings at ANP. Its building material was cheap,
easy to get, easy to erect, and required minimal exterior
maintenance: pumice block. With few exceptions, buildings were
rectangular, their dimensions governed strictly by the immediate
needs of the space, albeit with expansion possibilities often
noted on plans. All floor foundations were concrete. Most roofs
were flat. Personnel doors were of standard sizes, typically
hollow metal unless a guard station door needed glazing. The
Administration building contained offices, so it had windows, but
windows were relatively rare elsewhere at the ANP. Aesthetic
considerations made no appearance, unless one grants this
function to the coping or bonding strip parallel to the roof line
of most buildings, which was sometimes painted a dark color
contrasting with the pumice block.
The Administration building was one of the first ANP
drawings to come out of the Parsons workrooms, appearing in
December 1952. Not long thereafter, it was also one of the first
to be "expanded." Its interior spaces were modified frequently.
One of the first remodels supplied a Quality Control Laboratory,
for example.
The building was oriented with its very long axis
north/south. Inside, a row of similarly sized offices lay on the
east side of the building, each with a window. Spaces on the west
side of the corridor included other offices and specialty areas
such as a vault, mechanical equipment room, and storage areas.
Soon after construction, parts of the west side were converted
for laboratory use. The first drawings of the building show it as
50 feet wide by 224 feet long. See HAER Photo Nos. ID-33-E-220
and ID-33-E-221. It grew in length and also developed a parallel
Figure 11. Admin Building and Guard House, 2003. Top: Approach to
Guard House from Parking area; east facade of Admin Building. 
Bottom: South end of Admin Building and detail of windows. Source
: INEEL Photos HD-34-1 and HD-34-2.
Figure 12. Admin Building and Guard House, 2003. Top: Interior
courtyard. Bottom: Guard office within Admin building; sleeping
area. Source: INEEL Photos HD-34-1 and HD-34-2.
wing across an inner courtyard, eventually containing 47,803
square feet.138
Service Building (Steam Plant), TAN-603
The Service Building followed the same design already seen
in non-shielded buildings at the IET and A&M. The long axis of
the building was east/west. Its plan was rectangular with basic
dimensions of 192 feet long and 35 feet wide. A rectangular
projection on the southeast end extended 18 feet. The building
was flat-roofed and single-story, although the spaces equipped to
service trucks and other vehicles had a higher roof profile.
Walls were of pumice block bordered on the top with a coping
strip. Trucks and other vehicles gained entry through overhead
roll-up metal doors. The roof was studded with vents and boiler
stacks. The foundation was at grade and made of poured concrete.
Personnel doorways had canopies over concrete entry pads. 
Vestibule-type projecting entries were provided on the east
end into the dispensary and on the north side near the company
store. Concrete ramps at grade level gave entry to the boiler
room/steam plant and repair shop on the north side and the
apparatus room on the east.
From west to east, the building enclosed a steam plant (an
expansion of the original boiler room), locker room, bathroom,
repair shop with auto lift and floor drain, tool and ladder
storage, a company store, kitchen incinerator, garage with an
auto lift, a kitchen, small offices, and an apparatus room. The
apparatus room had a mezzanine. The rectangular projection
enclosed the dispensary, consisting of an exam room, women's
bathroom, lab room, exam room, and ward unit with one hospital
bed. See HAER Photo Nos. ID-33-E-212 and ID-33-E-213. This
building was part of the general ANP second phase "expansion" and
enlarged in 1958 to make space for an additional boiler.139
Figure 13. Service Building, TAN-603. Views of the dispensary in
2003. Top: nurse's office and examining room. Bottom: Hearing
testing booth. Source: INEEL Photo HD-39-1.
Warehouse, TAN-604
Like the Service Building, the Warehouse was also oriented
with its long axis east/west. It was made of pumice block topped
with a concrete bond beam, flat-roofed, and on a concrete
foundation. Doors were either metal overhead roll-ups or hollow
metal for personnel. Concrete ramps or stoops gave access on the
north and south sides. Small shed extensions accommodated paint
storage and a tool shelter. 
Most of the warehouse space was open for storage, but the
east end contained a special room for the storage of chemicals,
men's and women's bathrooms, service counter, and an office. The
building was about 20 feet high, 162 feet long, and 68 feet wide.
Over the years it was modified to meet changing needs. See HAER
Photo Nos. ID-33-E-214 and ID-33-E-215. 
Change House, TAN-606
Continuing the architectural themes of pumice block, coping
strip, flat roof, and rectangular shape, the Change House was
located along the Administrative Area security fence just east of
the shoreline ridge/shielding berm. The building was 86 feet long
(including the guard station on the south end) and 45' 4" wide
(including the projection on the north end). Automobiles drove
alongside the south facade of the building, where they passed
under a canopied porch. 
The interior included a locker room, a counting room
equipped with hand and foot radiation detectors, a sample prep
room, offices, and bathrooms with showers. Hampers were available
for soiled clothes. See HAER Photo Nos. ID-33-E-216, ID-33-E-207,
ID-33-E-208.
Water System Pump House, TAN-610
This pump house served one of two major wells at TAN.
Located on the north edge of the Admin Area, the building
functioned to shelter the pump, chlorine room, and a tank. It was
44 feet long and 30 feet wide and about 14 feet high. Access was
via (one) metal roll-up door or either of two personnel doors. A
monorail along the ceiling anchored a 2-ton lift. See HAER Photo
No. ID-33-E-217.
Fuel Pump House, TAN-611
Again built according to the master style, the fuel pump
house was 30 feet long, 14 feet wide, and 10.5 feet high. Its
floor supported five concrete platform pads to carry the weight
of tanks containing diesel or other fuels. The walls had a 1.5
foot thick layer of insulation. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-218. 
Water Well Pump Houses, TAN-612 and TAN-613.
Located near their respective water tanks, these small
buildings departed for functional reasons from the standard flat
roof observed at most ANP service buildings. These had gable
roofs of moderate pitch, designed for easy removal should the
pumps need maintenance or replacement. The siding in the gable
ends was shiplap wood siding. The walls below gables and eave
line were of pumice block. Each building was 17' 4" long and 12
feet wide. Their function was to shelter the pumps, valves, and
switches pumping water from the aquifer to the storage tanks.
A note on the plans says that the roof was built according
to standards required by the Idaho Operations Office. These have
3 inches of mineral wool (a type of fiberglass) blanket
insulation. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-219. 
Other Admin Buildings
Rounding out the service buildings in the Admin area were
the substation control house (TAN-605), a water pumphouse for
fire suppression (TAN-610), and the guard house (TAN-601). These
were similar to buildings already described. Buildings with TAN
numbers higher than 650 appeared after 1961.
PART NINE
THE LOW POWER TEST FACILITY
The Low Power Test (LPT) facility had been anticipated in
the Air Force Master Plan. Although GE had been planning for it
in the early 1950s, the design of HOTCE, its first reactor, was
still underway late in 1955. Parsons was designing the control
console for it. HOTCE (pronounced "Hotsie") was the acronym for
Hot Critical Experiment reactor. GE engineers were working out
parameters of heat transfer within the reactor core and figuring
out how much power they would need to heat it to desired
temperatures. The "hot" part of this reactor's name referred to
its research mission to obtain information on the temperature
coefficients of solid-moderated reactors, that is, the HTRE-3
reactor.140
HTRE-1 had been under test throughout 1956 and produced air
temperatures lower than GE's target. A major focus of GE research
and experimentation, therefore, continued to be components and
fuel elements that could survive and function amidst ever higher
temperatures and nuclear flux. Each time a new material was
proposed for a component of HTRE fuel, it had to be tested for
its reaction to stresses and for its nuclear and kinetic
characteristics.141 Successful materials had to be further
evaluated for their "critical" qualities, the loading
configurations necessary to initiate and sustain a chain
reaction.
The Low Power Test building contained spaces, or bays, for
two low power reactors to operate simultaneously. Sherman McGarry
recalled:
...GE used each bay individually for different core
configurations and experimented with various moderating
materials and cladding material to try and reach an optimum
core, moderator, and cladding that would be tested at the
IET and hopefully be the reactor system that would go into
Weapon System 125 A.142
GE completed the Design Criteria for the LPT in April 1956.
Parsons' architectural drawings followed in November 1956, and
construction progressed through 1957. Arrington Construction
Company was the builder.143 Following familiar procedure, the 
Design Criteria supplied the architect/engineer with assumptions
about the reactors it would contain and allowable doses of
radiation permissible in various locations around the building.
It described the work spaces that would be required, and
specified the performance characteristics of water, heating,
ventilating, and other systems. 
The two reactor cells were not the same size. The smaller of
the two was the north cell (room 101) and called the CE Cell.
This became the home of HOTCE. The other cell, room 102, was
called the IC cell for "initial criticality." Staffing the
reactors and the building would require a force of 24 people for
each reactor, a total of 48 if both cells were busy.144
The architect was to assume that the maximum operating power
of a reactor operating in either cell would be no greater than 5
MW (a high figure, and thus conservative) and that both might be
operating at the same time. For shield design, the reactor core
was to be assumed ten feet above the floor and otherwise centered
in the cell. People outside the building or on the other side of
the shielding wall in the control rooms were allowed 1.0 mrem/hr
doses. In the counting rooms, the dose had to be one-tenth of
that.145
Siting
The Air Force Master Plan had specified an "isolated site"
for the LPT. This was the only ANP work area situated east of
Lincoln Boulevard. It was flat and about 1 1/4 mile southeast of
the Administration area (longer by road), a prescribed safety
distance.146 Once again, the northeast prevailing wind was a
major siting consideration. Should an accident at the LPT area
release radioactivity into the air, the odds favored the wind
carrying it harmlessly away from populated areas.
Layout
Because the LPT reactors were to operate at low power
levels, they would not be generating a great deal of heat.
Consequently, the LPT was exempt from heavy engineering resources
typically required to dispose of heat when power levels were much
higher. This fact translated into a fairly simple building layout
and a modest support requirement.
The design philosophy at LPT was similar to that at A&M:
isolate the source of radiation and surround it with shielding.
The two reactor cells were side by side, so they shared a shield
wall between them and were otherwise surrounded by shield walls.
The rest of the work spaces -- control rooms, counting labs,
instrument rooms, offices -- were all located in the same
building on the "cold" side of the shield wall. See HAER Photo
No. ID-33-E-292.
Other buildings in the complex dealt with the water supply,
electricity, and security. Thus, the site included well, pump,
water tank, chlorination, and firefighting facilities, a
substation, and a guard house. A security fence and sewage system
completed the utilities. A communication tower was part of the
main building. The Design Criteria called for a rail connection
between LPT and the A&M, but this was never installed.147
Like other ANP facilities, the LPT was fenced with security
fencing and night lighting. The access road from Lincoln
Boulevard, named McKinley Avenue (continuing the NRTS theme of
presidents' names for NRTS connecting roads) branched
(anticipating later construction) to Tyler Avenue and led to the
LPT guard house. Outdoor electrical transformers were located
near the well house for instrument power, heating panels in the
reactor test cells, and for general lighting and power.
The Low Power Test Building, TAN-640 and TAN-641 
When the NRTS assigned building numbers to LPT buildings, it
regarded the two parts of the main building as sufficiently
distinct in character that it assigned them two numbers. The
"Assembly and Test" portion of the building contained the two
reactor cells and was numbered TAN-640. The continuous shield
wall on the west side of the cells divided them from the "Control
and Equipment" side, or TAN-641, where work spaces included the
control rooms, offices, a counting laboratory, change rooms,
instrument room, data room, and rooms for electrical and
mechanical equipment. Except for a tunnel below the control
rooms, the building had no basement level. 
The architectural distinctions between the two parts were
striking. The reactor cells were made of concrete. Because of the
overhead cranes built into its ceiling, the cells were high-bay
structures, with a high roof elevation. The rest of the building
used ordinary pumice block and had a lower profile. 
Reactor cells. The two cells were constructed of poured
(ordinary) concrete of varying thickness. The wall between them
was four feet thick and extended four feet below floor level. The
wall separating the cells from the control area was five feet
thick up to the thirty-foot level. Then the thickness reduced to
eighteen inches (from the outside in). See HAER Photo No.
ID-33-E-260, noting side wall at left of view; and ID-33-E-291.
The outside wall of the smaller cell was three feet thick; of the
larger cell, two feet thick. The interior dimensions of the CE
cell was about 30 feet by 34 feet. The IC cell was about 30 feet
by 45 feet. In each cell, a bridge crane moved east/west across
the full span of the cell. The larger cell projected farther
toward the east than the other, breaking up the east facade.
The ceilings of the cells were reinforced concrete one foot
thick with built-up roofing on top. Accommodating the crane gave
a ceiling height of 43.5 feet. The exterior height of the
building was 45' 9" above grade. As in the A&M Hot Shop, whenever
a pipe or conduit penetrated a shield wall, it was dog-legged
twice (ie, Z-shaped) to prevent radiation from streaming through
the conduit.
On the south side of the IC cell was a pumice block wall
built six feet from the shield wall. Anyone entering the cell via
the personnel door on its south side had to enter this passageway
first. The passageway also offered a weather-protected route
between the control room area and the IC reactor cell. On the
north side of the CE cell was an equipment room that housed an
air-conditioning unit for the CE cell. The exterior wall was
likewise of pumice block. Anyone entering the personnel door to
the cell had to cross the floor of the equipment room first. See
HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-291.
The main access for the reactor and test components was on
the east facade. Each cell had its own metal rollup door with
openings 22 feet wide and 30 feet high, anticipating the possible
future presence of HTRE components. The vicinity east of the
rollup doors was, by administrative order and by exclusionary
fencing, expected to be unoccupied during reactor operation.
Fencing and locked gates prevented people from crossing in front
of the rollup doors during operations. The east perimeter fence
was 177 feet from the concrete facade of the IC cell. Beyond that
a radiation fence prohibited anyone from coming within 1000 feet
of the path of radiation. The maximum separation between the test
cell doors and the fence was 1500 feet. Instead of a material
shield, air distance attenuated radiation.148
Apparatus inside each cell included an overhead bridge
crane. The capacity of the crane in the small cell was 10 tons;
in the large cell, 5 tons. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-292. The
"quick-connect" systems used elsewhere at ANP also had an
application here. A box located on a pad in a corner of each cell
held connectors located on the face of the box. From here,
control lines went below the shield wall to a tunnel below the
main floor, then up to a cable trench in the floor below the
control room, and from there to the control panel in the control
room.149 See cable tunnel location in HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-293,
section A; and HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-261.
Heating panels lined the inside wall of each cell. These
distributed power to the heating elements inside the reactor
whenever a particular test required it.150
Because the test activities within the cell would relate to
temperature changes, the cells were each equipped with heating
equipment to maintain ambient air temperature within desired
ranges during any season of the year. The IC cell had steam
heating with a ceiling exhaust fan. The CE cell had a
refrigerated air conditioning system, steam heat, and an exhaust
duct in the ceiling for air flushing. For firefighting, the cells
also had a carbon-dioxide system for flooding the cells in case
of fire too large for hand-held extinguishers.151
Control and Equipment Area (TAN-641). This part of the
building was one-story, rectangular, and flat-roofed. Its
dimensions were 92 feet by 111 feet (north/south axis). Except
for the southwest corner and a length of wall on the west side,
the exterior walls were of pumice block. 
The room at the southeast corner was the counting laboratory
(room 110), where background radiation was to be as low as
possible -- at least 0.1 mr per hour. The walls surrounding this
room were poured of ordinary concrete sixteen inches thick.
Likewise the ceiling was concrete. Entry to the room included a
short hallway, both sides of which were made of concrete. The
counting room was 19' 2" wide along the south wall, and 26' 7"
long along the west wall. This room, like the perimeter rooms
elsewhere in the building, had no exterior windows. See HAER
Photo No. ID-33-E-291.152
A 13.5-foot length of the west facade wall also was made of
concrete about one foot thick. The room inside was the "special
source" vault, which stored radioactive source materials used for
calibrating instruments and similar controlled materials, all of
which were kept under account. The walls of the entire room, 12
feet by 20' 7", were made of concrete. The door into the vault
was made of steel, the only such door in a building full of wood
or hollow metal doors. One had to know a four-number combination
to enter this room. The ventilation system penetrating the
ceiling was entrance-proof. Should anyone try to tamper with the
door, an alarm registered in the main guard house at A&M. No
James Bond entries or escapes here. See HAER Photo No.
ID-33-E-292.153
The two control rooms (103 and 105) were of identical
dimensions at 30' by 27' 3". Each was equipped similarly: a broad
U-shaped control panel facing the reactor cells, instrument
panels, and acoustical-tile sound proofing. A data room was
situated between the two control rooms. The control and the data
room each had a ceiling scuttle (hatch).
A main corridor lay just west of the control rooms, and
farther west were offices, bathrooms, change rooms, and an
instrument storage room. Larger spaces on the north and west
sides of the building included a shop called the assembly room.
This was where instrumentation engineers attached foils to the
fuel elements to be tested and otherwise prepared fuel elements
for their tests. This room had "battleship linoleum" flooring for
easy decontamination and a stainless steel sink for the
decontamination of small components. The floor and sink drains
carried liquid wastes to an underground tank buried underground
outside the building. Tank trucks periodically pumped this tank
and took it to A&M for disposal and further treatment.154
 A large room provided for the building's mechanical
equipment, boiler, electrical switchgear, and diesel generator.
The diesel generator was for emergencies in case of a power
failure. It provided enough power to separate the tables of a
split-table reactor, keep lights on the security fencing, heat
and light the guard house, and keep the boiler and water system
operating. Heating and ventilating systems kept the assembly side
of the building under positive air pressure to prevent the
entrance of contaminated air from the cells. The control rooms
themselves were kept at a greater positive pressure than the rest
of the building.155
Figure 14. Low Power Test Guard House in 2004, shortly before
demolition. Top: Visitor's view of Guard House upon entering LPT
premises. Bottom: Entry to bathroom was via plastic curtain. 
Source: INEEL Photos HD-40-10, frames 17 and 18.
Guard House, TAN-642
A security fence surrounded the LPT site. This was an
"exclusion" area where anyone entering had to have Q clearance
and special permission.156 All passed through the fence at the
Guard House, located northwest of the LPT building. This
building, made of pumice block, was rectangular, one-story,
flat-roofed, with windows on all four sides. It was 12 feet by
10' 8" in size. From grade to the top of the roof, it was 9' 10"
high. Wall foundations extended at least five feet below grade. 
The building contained a built-in counter, a bathroom, an
electric space heater, and a two-way turnstile. The toilet
occupied such a small part of one corner; it was covered by a
curtain rather than a wall. The building was arranged to include
a small waiting area. Hollow-metal doors with wire windows opened
to all but the west side. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-294. After
the ANP program, the guard house was enlarged slightly. 
Chlorination Building (TAN-643) and Pump House (TAN-644)
The Chlorination Building was a small shed-roofed structure
eight feet square. It was south of the LPT building and served to
chlorinate (sanitary) liquids discharged to a settling tank and
then injected underground via a well.157 The west facade
contained the hollow metal door, and this wall was 8 feet from
grade to roof eave. The walls and roof were made of "Armco 16
steelox" panels, arranged vertically. The north and south walls
contained louvered vents. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-295.
The Water Well Pump House was 500 feet east of the LPT
building. Part of it followed the design similar to those at the
Admin area (TAN-612 and TAN-613) in that it had a gable roof over
the part of the building housing the well and the pump. An
adjacent east section had a flat roof. This section contained a
chlorination room and wall-mounted space heater set to keep the
building at least 40 degrees F. during the colder months.
The walls of both sections were of pumice block. Entry doors
were on the north side. The gable ends had shiplap wood siding. A
large roof ventilator (24-inch throat) sat atop the roof ridge.
The building was 18' 8" long and 16' 8" wide. From grade to the
top of the pumice block, the walls were 9' 10" high. Ventilated
doors gave access to the gabled section. The south, east, and
west sides had louvered vents in the walls and no windows. See
HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-295. 
The capacity of the electric-driven pump was 400 gallons per
minute. In emergencies, a 40-horsepower gasoline pump was
available. The water storage tank had a capacity of 75,000
gallons and was located north of the LPT building.
The HOTCE Reactor
HOTCE was a "split table" type of reactor. Although not all
low-power reactors that would operate in the LPT were of this
type, they all had particular safety requirements and similar
means of communicating between the reactor and the control room.
This one illustrates the general function (despite unique fuels
and core designs) of a low power reactor. See Appendix E for a
list of all the low-power reactors that operated at TAN.
Fuel elements were loaded horizontally into two matching
sections kept apart from one another (split) until criticality
was desired. One side, mounted on wheels, could then be moved
toward the stationary side to bring about a critical mass. A
variable-speed motor moved the table, but, for safety, at pre-set
speeds. As the sides came within six inches of closing, the speed
reduced to a maximum of three inches per minute.158
The reactor had a hydrided zirconium moderator and a
beryllium reflector. The 151 fuel elements were arranged in a
hexagonal matrix. Extra space was available for expanding the
fuel cells to a total of 169. To raise the operating temperature,
strips of electrical resistance wires were attached to
fuel-heating elements or against the outer surface of the
beryllium reflector. The whole reactor apparatus rested on a
special platform inside the CE cell.159
HOTCE's uranium-235 fuel, 93.2 percent enriched, was packed
inside a stainless steel wire 1/8 inch in diameter and wound
around the outside of a ceramic tube. The elements were 30 inches
long. The moderator was in the form of a hexagonal zirconium bar,
treated to contain a substantial quantity of hydrogen atoms. Each
fuel element fit inside the hollow center of the bar. The
hydrogen slowed down the neutrons leaving the fuel element to a
speed that promoted fission when the neutrons hit uranium atoms
in neighboring fuel elements. Some of the corners in the
hexagonal bar were rounded so that control rods containing boron
carbide (in a possible 122 positions) could be inserted into
Figure 15. The HOTCE reactor. Top: Fuel element shows heating
wire wrapped around fuel. Center: HOTCE reactor, sketched with
movable half separated from stationary half. Bottom: HOTCE
control console. Source: J.A. Hoefer, APEX-345.
the midst of the fuel. Surrounding the core, a beryllium
reflector four inches thick bounced neutrons back to the core
region.
The stainless steel fuel wire also acted as a heating
element during tests. One end of the wire was grounded. The other
end was connected to electricity. Resistance heating raised the
temperature of the wire, and the rest of the core was heated by
heat radiation and convection from the wire. With this set-up,
the fuel could reach a maximum temperature of 1600 degrees F, and
the moderator and reflector could reach 1300 degrees F. The
object of research was to mock up various temperatures likely to
be encountered in the actual airplane reactor and study the
results.160
Various rules of procedure governed operations before,
during, and after criticality. Management of the reactor centered
in the control room, where panel indicators, switches, selectors,
amplifiers, scalers, chart recorders, scanners, and signal
readers all informed the two (required) operators. Typical
practice was to operate at a one-watt power level for one to
three hours. Before startup, the engineer-in-charge was
personally responsible for inspecting the test cell to make sure
it was empty of people and then lock the cell doors.
HOTCE ceased operating when the ANP program ended in 1961.
However, the LPT cells and control rooms were homes to five more
low power reactors.
PART TEN
THE SHIELD TEST FACILITY
Shielding a crew in a nuclear airplane required innovation
and a departure from standard "unit" shielding surrounding only
the reactor, which would be too heavy. The Comprehensive
Technical Report written after the ANP program ended described
the "divided shield" idea:
It was soon recognized, however, that a lower total shield
weight could be achieved by dividing the shield between the
crew compartment and the reactor. The combined shield
thickness directly in line between the reactor and crew was
about the same in either arrangement. However, shielding on
the side of the crew compartment was more effective than an
equivalent thickness on the side of the reactor because the
scattering process reduced the energy of the radiation
reaching the crew compartment. Hence, a thinner shield could
be used, resulting in less weight.161
At least, that was the hope. The scattering behavior of
neutrons in air was a sufficiently difficult problem that some
observers wondered if a crew who completed one mission would
simply have to retire, having acquired a lifetime radiation dose.
GE originally proposed to test prototypes or mockups of the
aircraft engines and shield configurations and test them in Idaho
at a building called the Shield Test Facility (STF). It was to be
completed in the spring of 1959.162 Early drawings show a control
building with an apparatus for suspending a reactor outdoors to
the west of the building. Test packets were to be situated on a
turntable and exposed.163 However, the Air Force and the AEC
financed such a facility at Oak Ridge. Known as the Tower
Reactor, this reactor began operating in the early 1950s. GE and
Oak Ridge scientists carried out major shield studies there with
generous funding by the Air Force. This facility obviated the
need for another one in Idaho.164 GE decided that if they need to
do air scattering tests in Idaho, they could use the IET. The
outdoor platform idea and its earth-covered control room were
abandoned.165
Instead, the Idaho facility was designed to do scattering
tests in water. A low power reactor would operate within a pool
of water. As GE wrote, this set-up had virtues such as "inherent
safety features, its adaptability to extensive nuclear research,
its simplicity and minimum cost."166 In a typical test,
physicists suspended a "slab" of material about four inches from
the reactor core. Measurements were made of gamma-ray and neutron
doses, nuclear heat rates, spectral and thermal neutron flux,
power calibration, temperature coefficient of reactivity, and
others.
The biological shield for workers at the Shield Test
Facility relied on the same principle as at other "swimming pool
reactors," by this time not uncommon at universities and
industrial laboratories elsewhere in the country. A sufficient
depth of water acted not only as a shield, but also as the
coolant and moderator for the reactor, which operated within the
pool. The weather-enclosure building required no super-dense
concrete, no complicated gamma ray calculations, and no
investment in mazes, Z-shaped conduits, and stepped plugs. On the
other hand, maintaining the pool's water quality called for a
certain quantum of specialized plumbing. 
Siting and Layout
The swimming pool reactor was a low-power reactor. The
building site was just west of the LPT building. Its east wall
was about 90 feet from the LPT's west wall, and its rectangular
construction was oriented to the same points of the compass as
the LPT. The relationship between the pools and the control and
equipment portion of the STF building was similar to that at the
LPT, except that the reactor pools were on the west side of the
building, not the east. This arrangement put additional distance
between the reactors and pointed the impact of any potential
blast accidents away from worker-occupied areas. The STF shared
the LPT's security fence, guard house, sewage plant, utility
lines, and roadway. During the ANP program, the only people
entering the STF were Q-cleared personnel with a need to know.167
By design or good luck, lava bedrock at the STF site was
about 30 feet below grade, a factor helpful in reducing blasting
requirements for the foundation of the two pools, which lay about
30 feet below grade.
Following a similar numbering logic as for the LPT, the NRTS
regarded the STF as two buildings. The pool side was considered
the "Pool Facility Building," TAN-646. The "Control and Equipment
Building" shared a common wall with the pools, but was numbered
as TAN-645.168
Shield Test Facility, TAN-645 and TAN-646
The building had two heights. To accommodate a bridge crane
over the two pools, the high-bay section was 46.5 feet high
between grade and the roof line. The rest of the building was one
story at 15' 2" high. Roofs were flat. The high-bay section was
primarily a weather shelter over the pools. Framing consisted of
structural steel columns, tapered girders, steel purlins and
metal roof decking. The siding was insulated corrugated
asbestos-cement siding. The one-story control building was framed
with structural steel and sided mostly with pumice block. An
exception, along part of the north facade, was for the special
source storage room. Along this room's 31-foot length, concrete
interrupted the pumice block siding. The roof consisted of a
vapor barrier, insulation, built-up roofing surfaced with double
gravel over the metal decking. Roof ventilators exhausted air
from the pool building at a rate of three air changes per hour.
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The control building (TAN-645) was a rectangle 70 feet wide
by 92 feet (north/south axis). The high-bay pool building was
rectangular, 142 feet long (north/south axis) and 46 feet wide.
Most of the high-bay's excess length projected to the north side
of the building, with about ten feet projecting to the south. On
the west side, another projection 52 feet by 18 feet contained
equipment pads and an access stairway to the basement levels. See
HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-296.
Below the pools were basement and sub-basement levels,
providing access to utility coupling connections for reactor
experiments, a storage room, and a cable equipment room. A
corridor ran between the two pools and continued beneath the
control side of the building for a distance of about 53 feet. The
subbasement gave access to a pump room and sumps. Most of the
one-story part of the building had no basement. See HAER Photo
No. ID-33-E-298.
The Pools. The purpose in having two pools was to allow
testing to proceed in one while mockup work could be done in the
other -- a substantial saving of time.170 The pools were built
below grade. Pool No. 1 was on the north side; Pool No. 2 on the
south. Each was the same size at 40 feet long (north/south axis)
and 25 feet wide. They were each 30 feet deep, with the pool
floor sloping slightly. The entire pool room was open, with no
other partitions or walls.
The (ordinary) reinforced concrete walls and floor of the
pool were 1' 7" thick. The concrete and the earth beyond provided
biological shielding on all sides, while the depth of water above
the reactor absorbed any radiation emanating from the reactor
top. Counterforted walls meant that each pool could withstand the
pressure when water filled the pool or when it was empty. The
pool bottom could support a concentrated load of 25 tons on one
square foot and a maximum of four such loads spaced ten feet
apart. A protective coating called "Phenolene 300" was painted
onto the walls and floor of each pool.171
The open floor area north of Pool No. 1 was 38.5 feet long.
It accommodated a 50-ton bridge crane and its cables, which could
be moved here out of the way during an experiment. The crane,
with a 5-ton auxiliary hook, traveled the entire length of the
pool room. This area also provided the main entry into the pool
room. The door was insulated, about 20.5 feet wide, and located
on the east side. It hung on a channel frame. In its open
position, the clear opening was 27' 3/4" high. The door was in an
open position when slid to the north end of the channel.
A 3-foot high concrete parapet surrounded each pool,
strengthened by vertical struts at 3-foot intervals. A rail was
set into the top of the parapet on the north and south sides of
each pool as part of the reactor support. A personnel ladder
allowed entry into each pool. SCUBA diving suits were routine
equipment around the STF.
A distance of six feet separated the two pools. Below deck,
this space was occupied by the main basement tunnel, which ran
east-west and extended into the control side of the building. It
gave access to the coupling station and cable connections. A pump
room on this level provided great flexibility for managing the
pool water. Water could be pumped from one pool to the other or
drained to the sanitary waste system. If the water became
contaminated, it could be pumped to a tank truck and sent to the
A&M for disposal.172
The building projection west of the pools was known as the
water-treatment building. It contained pumps and related
water-treatment supplies. Water in the pools was demineralized.
Concrete pads provided places for water softeners, deionizers,
disposable resin ionizers, pool filters, an acid neutralizing
pit, caustic, pH controller, rate-of-flow controls, oil filter,
and additive mixing tank. A frost-proof emergency shower along
the west wall was equipped with a quick-opening valve and a pull
chain. The eye wash station was on the east side nearer the
caustic and acid storage tanks. Just outside the building on the
north side was a below-grade salt storage pit. See HAER Photo
Nos. ID-33-E-301 and ID-33-E-302. 
The Control and Equipment side contained the familiar suite
of work spaces necessary to prepare and operate a reactor
experiment: instrumentation and calibration labs, counting room,
control rooms, data rooms, change room (capacity for 20 men),
offices. The building services had their equipment rooms: boiler,
water treatment, diesel generator, and mechanical equipment. It
was a conventional building framed with structural steel.
Special sources resided in Room 102, the Calibration Lab. It
was 26 feet long by 16 feet wide (interior dimensions). The walls
were 2.5 feet thick and made of ordinary poured concrete. Plans
show that six wells were to have been built flush into the floor
as storage units for radioactive calibration sources, but these
apparently were not installed.173 A monorail and electric chain
hoist hung from the ceiling to facilitate moving heavy casks. The
"shield door" was made of reinforced concrete and
quadruple-hinged. A U-shaped handle on each side provided a stout
grip for anyone pulling on the door. It was 7 feet high, 4' 7
1/16" wide, and 2.5 feet thick. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-300.
The counting room was south of the vault and shared part of
a common concrete wall. Technicians here counted radioactive
samples used in the tests. This room was 20 feet by 11 feet and
enclosed with one-foot-thick concrete walls on all sides. The
concrete walls and positive-pressure ventilation helped keep
background radiation as low as possible. The door was hinged,
made of steel one inch thick, and weighed 300 pounds.174
The control and data room (room 109) was 42.5 feet
(east/west axis) by 20 feet and walled with pumice block and
acoustical tile. Its west side was adjacent to the pools and
contained a (non-shielded) viewing window into the pool room.
The Susie Reactor
A typical test might begin with a truck from A&M delivering
a test set-up to the pool building. The overhead bridge crane
would position the assembly for connections to its (flexible)
electrical, implementation, and other leads and hoses. The crane
would then place the entire lot inside the indicated pool. When
the experiment was ready, operators would move the reactor next
to it and bring the reactor to criticality. Typically, the
reactor operated at a power level between 10 kw to 100 kw.175
The reactor core was supported by an aluminum structure that
hung from its own movable bridge. The bridge, made of welded
steel, traveled up and down the rail along the pool length, so
that the reactor could be placed anywhere along the centerline of
the pool. The frame could be detached from the bridge, allowing
the overhead crane to move it to the other pool. (Procedure
manuals permitted this only when the fuel had been removed from
the core.) For critical operations, the top of the fuel was at
least 17 feet below the water surface.
Fuel was positioned at the bottom of the support frame. The
grid plate had spaces for as many as 54 fuel elements in a 6 x 9
array. The aluminum-clad fuel elements were similar to those used
by the Materials Test Reactor elsewhere at the NRTS, shaped as
curved plates about three square inches. They contained uranium
enriched to greater than 90 percent. 
Fuel rods, control rods, ion chambers and other sensing
devices and leads were all enclosed in watertight tubes that
extended above the water level. The actuators (mechanisms to move
the control rods) were mounted a few inches above the bridge
floor. A comprehensive system of lockouts were built into the
moving parts of the apparatus to prevent such actions as moving a
loaded reactor. Scram buttons were available on the reactor
bridge and in the control room. The key to the reactor console
was kept in a locked safe.
Post-1961 Activity
GE continued to run the Susie reactor after the ANP program
shut down, although no longer in service to the ANP. After the
shutdown, the AEC assigned GE to examine the debris from the SL-1
accident of January 1, 1961.176 Susie proved to be a popular and
versatile instrument for scientists located elsewhere at the
NRTS.177
It could be rigged and shielded, for example, so that
exposing a sample to its different "faces" allowed different
radiation exposures. During a test series when organic coolants
were under study, for example, the east face was "gamma rich,"
while the north face was "neutron rich."178
By the end of 1962, however, Susie was no longer in use. But
the Shield Test Facility lived on, its pools drained and adapted
for a new reactor concept called EBOR, discussed in Part Twelve
below.
PART ELEVEN 
MARITIME REACTOR PROGRAM AT TAN
The AEC and the U.S. Maritime Administration jointly wanted
to develop a reactor suitable for propelling commercial maritime
vessels, hoping ultimately to reduce the general cost of
shipping. They inaugurated the Maritime Gas-Cooled Reactor
program in 1956. Nuclear fuel for long-haul cargo ships promised
compact fuel, larger cargo space, and multiple trips without
refueling. Tankers and ore carriers, in particular, could profit
from economies of scale, fast speeds, and less time in ports.179
Around 1961, after President Kennedy canceled the ANP
project, the two agencies contracted General Electric to develop
the "630A Maritime Nuclear Steam Generator." The project was
under the management cognizance of the AEC office in Oak Ridge,
not the Idaho Operations Office. GE did most of its development
work at its laboratory at Evendale, Ohio. The objective was to
develop an air-cooled, water-moderated reactor to produce steam
for propulsion. The contemplated ship was a 30-knot cargo vessel
capable of making thirteen 28-day round trips of 14,000 miles
each. Under this scenario, the reactor could be refueled every
2.6 years.180
While working on designs for blowers and drive turbines,
loadings imposed on equipment due to the motion of a ship, remote
handling techniques, the proper thickness of the ship's reactor
vessel, and how to maintain the integrity of the reactor vessel
should the ship sink, GE required the aide of a critical
experiment reactor. Space was available in one of the cells in
the Low Power Test Facility, so GE, already quite familiar with
this facility, set it up there. 
The small low-power 630A reactor went critical for the first
time in 1962. (Available reports do not indicate which of the two
LPT test cells it occupied.) The hexagonal fuel grid had
positions for 85 fuel cartridges and 132 control rods when fully
loaded. It allowed for the testing of various fuel and control
rod configurations. Before the program shut down, detailed
nuclear measurements had been taken for at least two different
core configurations.181
Other than designing the test apparatus, reactor stand, and
scaffolding surrounding the reactor for any given series of
tests, the operators of the 630A critical experiment reactor
appear to have made no demands on the basic architecture of the
Low Power Test facility.
By spring 1964, GE was evaluating the feasibility of
adapting the IET for ground testing a 630A prototype reactor. It
contemplated using the west side of the trackage near the
coupling station for installing a below-grade boiler, a heat
dump, a crane, and a new personnel change room and access tunnel.
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However, the AEC suspended the 630A project on December 31,
1964, and ultimately canceled it. This act was attributed to an
economic comparison between the air-cooled reactor concept and
the already proven pressurized-water concept. While the 630A
system would cost relatively less to install than a
pressurized-water system, the long-range fuel-cycle cost of the
630A would more than offset it.183
PART TWELVE
THE EXPERIMENTAL BERYLLIUM OXIDE REACTOR (EBOR)
As part of its program to explore a variety of reactor
concepts, the AEC approved the development and testing of a
high-temperature, beryllium oxide moderated reactor to be cooled
by helium gas. The AEC hoped the concept would produce low-cost
electricity, propulsion (of surface ships), and process heat.
Construction began in Idaho in June 1963.184
General Atomics (GA), a division of General Dynamics
Corporation with laboratories in San Diego, California, had
designed the reactor and made the proposal to the AEC to operate
and test it. As usual, a new concept had to be explored for its
performance in a wide range of normal, transient, and emergency
operating conditions. GA had begun its studies in San Diego with
a series of critical experiments on candidate fuels.185 The
attractive possibility of a high-temperature reactor was that it
might burn a higher percentage of its fuel than was typical in
other reactors. The combination of uranium oxide and its
beryllium oxide moderator was considered likely to survive in a
high-temperature environment. The program anticipated testing
fuels such as thorium-uranium and plutonium as well.186
Beryllium is a light metal. Its salient characteristic was
that it does not absorb neutrons easily, but bounces them back
and slows them down. In a reactor core, therefore, it would slow
the fissioning neutrons and promote a chain reaction.187
The AEC decided that the project could adapt the Shield Test
Facility. One of its pools, drained of water, would supply a
ready-made shield for the reactor. Because the experiment focused
on the reactor, no provision was made to generate electricity.
Reactor heat would be collected by helium gas and dissipated to
the atmosphere. The helium would recycle through the reactor.188
Managing helium gas as the coolant required a significant
outlay in new engineering at the Shield Test Facility. The
building had been equipped originally to manage water, but the
water works would not manage helium. GA hired Kaiser Engineers, a
division of Henry J. Kaiser Company of Oakland, California, to
design the remodel for the new reactor and a helium wing.
Kaiser completed the engineering drawings in May 1963. The
M.W. Kellogg Company, a division of Pullman, Inc. of Idaho Falls,
was hired to build. Construction began shortly thereafter, and
the facility was handed to GA in January 1966.189
Fabrication of the 200-ton steel reactor pressure vessel was
contracted to Pacific Coast Engineering Corporation of Alameda,
California.190 The vessel was shipped to Idaho on a flatcar in
November 1964. Press coverage at the time referred to it as a
"big nuclear kettle."191
Things did not go well in the early installation phase of
GA's operations. On February 22, 1963, during a test of
components, about fifty gallons of oil were accidentally injected
into the helium piping, the primary coolant loop into the reactor
vessel.192 Cleaning this up proved to be a tedious and
distracting chore that delayed other installation activities.
Even small traces of oil in the system would constitute a
contaminant in the reactor. Months later, oil was still showing
up in piping side seams.193
Parallel with construction and component testing, the safety
characteristics of the reactor underwent detailed scrutiny. The
AEC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety (ACRS) evaluated GA's
1962 draft Safety Analysis Report, which identified operating
procedures, possible accidents, potential releases of
radioactivity into the environment, and the response of the
reactor and personnel to such events. Among many concerns, the
ACRS questioned whether there were enough safeguards to keep the
reactor fuel from melting if the helium coolant failed. It also
noted that GA expected an operator to remain in the control room
for up to an hour or more after an accident; it wondered if the
control room had adequate shielding to keep such a person from
receiving an excessive dose of radioactivity if contaminated
helium were released into the reactor room. GA thus investigated
the possibility of using the Shield Test Facility's counting room
as an emergency control room.194
Safety discussions continued into 1965 and 1966. Other
mishaps occurred. In March 1965, the EBOR crew started the main
helium blower. The sudden draw caused a complete power outage
next door at the Low Power Test facility, where GE was involved
with a low power reactor program. The EBOR manager had not
informed GE of the possibility of this type of interruption.195
Concerns about EBOR's safety and managerial deficiencies
finally arrived at the desk of Milton Shaw, the director of the
AEC's Division of Reactor Development and Technology. He asked
the IDO manager to "surveil" GA's progress and to keep him
informed of various management difficulties sprouting up due to
the fact that EBOR was under the technical control of the AEC's
San Francisco office.196
Milton Shaw had been a protege of Admiral Hyman Rickover,
the "father" of the Nuclear Navy and noted for being committed to
total safety and quality in nuclear operations. He had been
critical of start-up problems at the NRTS's Advanced Test Reactor
in 1965. EBOR difficulties undoubtedly contributed to his growing
view that profound reform in reactor research at AEC labs was in
order.197
Shaw did indeed initiate many reforms. The one that most
affected EBOR was a decision to narrow the focus of the AEC's
reactor development program. Instead of spending resources on a
variety of reactor concepts, Shaw decided that the AEC should
focus on breeder reactors, a concept with potential to burn up
most or all of its uranium fuel. Investments in non-breeder
concepts like EBOR were precipitously cut.198
The press release announcing the end of EBOR came in
December 1966. Officially, EBOR was making a "diminishing
contribution" to the AEC's reactor program. Closing it was
"consistent with continuing efforts of the AEC to assign
available resources, including funds and personnel, on a priority
basis to those reactor concepts with the best promise of economic
power production and more efficient use of nuclear materials."
The release went on to suggest that beryllium oxide as a
moderator was an alienate for graphite as a moderator, and that
graphite had already advanced to commercial application in the
Peach Bottom (Pennsylvania) and Fort St. Vrain (Colorado)
reactors. EBOR was dead; its reactor vessel had never been loaded
with nuclear fuel.199
Siting and Layout
Once the decision had been made to adapt the STF, no further
siting considerations were necessary. The control side of the
building required relatively little alteration to continue in
service to the new experiment. The pool room was the focus of
alterations. Managing helium required a new wing on the west
side.
The plan was to remove the water from both pools and then
take advantage of their ready-made below-ground shielding
qualities. EBOR and its massive steel cap was placed in Pool No.
2, the south pool, near its bottom. Henceforth, the pool was
thought of as a "vault." The north pool was equipped with racks
for storing fuel elements and control rods.
West of the pools, the projection that contained water
management equipment remained in place, parts of it somewhat
obsolete. The new wing continued to the south. At its southwest
corner was an exhaust stack which was enclosed by the building
and penetrated the roof.
Other buildings around the site continued in service: the
sanitary sewer, water pumps, water tank, guard house. However, a
new pump house with specialized fire protection functions was
built (in 1965) a short distance north of the pool building and
just west side of the water storage tank.
The Experimental Beryllium Reactor
EBOR was to be contained in a cylindrical steel vessel about
twelve feet in diameter and rounded on the bottom. Fuel was to be
loaded from the top by removing its equally thick and rounded
"head." The coolant duct penetrated the pool wall. After the duct
and other hoses and pipes projecting from the reactor had been
installed, part of the void between the reactor vessel and the
pool walls was filled with concrete. Ordinary concrete composed
the lower 17 feet, but special high-density concrete was used
above that level. A high-density concrete cover fit the top of
the reactor vault for shielding during reactor operation. The
cover was of a stepped design similar to shielded plugs used
elsewhere at TAN. Pipe and conduit that penetrated the shield
around the reactor were Z-shaped. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-305,
sections A, C, and D. One of the many management reports on EBOR
problems observed that the reactor vessel's head weighed 57 tons,
while the overhead crane was rated at 50 tons. No one from GA had
analyzed this mismatch to assure themselves that it would not
create future problems.200
Although EBOR never went critical, a series of photographs
taken of the pressure vessel, its outlet port for the helium
duct, pressure vessel head, control rod nozzles, reflector
support tank, and other finely machined one-of-a-kind structures
are illustrative of the type of work taken to prepare any test
reactor. See HAER Photo Nos. ID-33-E-282 through ID-33-E-289.
The New Wing for EBOR, TAN-646
Most features of the new wing related to helium. The wing
lay along the existing west wall of the STF building. It was
roughly 21 feet wide and 124 feet long (north/south axis). A
small projection (rooms 126 and 127, battery storage, diesel
generator set) along the west side of the new wing was about 40
feet long and 15 feet wide. Another projection on the west side
of the wing at its south end (room 125) was an enclosure for the
helium-to-air cooler and the stack above it.
Other features of the wing were liquid nitrogen (a coolant)
storage tanks, helium purification equipment, a compressor, dust
removal equipment, decay-heat removal blowers, emergency cooling
compressor, filters, and iodine removing equipment. The
helium-related rooms were built with concrete walls two feet
thick. A portion of the wing had a second story level, and the
siding for this section was insulated corrugated asbestos cement.
See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-306. 
Below grade, significant additions were made in the corner
created by the existing wall south of the pool and the east
facade of the new wing. Piping was to circulate the helium
between the reactor and the cooling facilities. The pipes entered
a new basement room (Room 124), which was equipped with vacuum
pumps, valves, a stack monitor, and control panel. A monorail
with a door opening on the south end of the wing facilitated
deliveries into and out of the wing. Hatches through the floor to
Room 123 below provided openings to the ground floor. See HAER
Photo No. ID-33-E-304. 
EBOR Changes to Existing Structures of TAN-645 and -646
The wall between the pool chamber and the control side of
the building sustained little impact in the EBOR remodel. A new
door opening was made in the wall between the pool room and the
men's change room (Room 107). Although this room is just south of
the shielded counting room, it appears that GA did not proceed
with any plans convert it to an emergency control room. 
The boiler room was expanded for a new boiler. This appeared
at the southeast corner of the existing building, a small
addition of 10 feet wide by 28' 8" long. See HAER Photo No.
EBOR-ID-33-E-304.
Pump House, TAN-652
The exterior design of this small utility building continued
the design theme of rectangular buildings with pumice block
siding and a flat roof. The building was 30' 8" long (east/west
axis) by 20' 8" wide. It was divided into two rooms, each with a
hollow metal door on the south side and a roof ventilator on the
steel deck roof. Equipment pads were built into the concrete
floor. A hose manifold sleeve projected from the front wall. See
HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-303.
Later Uses and New Names for the Shield Test/EBOR Facility
With EBOR canceled, the Shield Test/EBOR building was
available for other uses. The NRTS became the site of major
studies and experiments in the safety of large commercial
reactors that were being built in the United States in the 1960s
and 1970s. Some of the studies took place in the Shield Test
facility, which was renamed the Semiscale Test Facility. The Low
Power Test building next door was renamed LOFT Test Support
Facility. The general area was called the Water Reactor Research
Test Facility (WRRTF, pronounced "wertif"). In this incarnation,
WRRTF supported non-nuclear tests related to loss of fluid and
other safety studies of commercial power reactors. 
 After LOFT programs ended in 1986, the old STF was the scene
of acoustic tests for detecting flaws in the pipes and piping of
reactor vessels. This work was carried out by the Southwest
Research Institute under contract to Edison Electric and the
Tennessee Valley Authority. Another program tested systems used
to detect explosives.201 Both the LPT and STF buildings have at
last run out of missions. They are being demolished.
PART THIRTEEN 
FLIGHT ENGINE TEST FACILITY
The fifth operating complex for the ANP program was the
Flight Engine Test (FET) facility. This huge airplane hangar is a
worthy symbol for the optimism shared by U.S. Air Force and
General Electric that they would produce a nuclear powered
airplane. Its architectural details, siting, and layout have been
described in HAER Report ID-33-A. The hangar -- with its shielded
control room -- was for ground testing the future airplane. 
Merely proving the principle of nuclear propulsion had
required the major ANP industrial facilities thus far described.
Handling an airframe would be equally complicated, requiring
great forethought and planning. Engineers would have to perfect
methods for removing the power plant from a radioactive and
possibly damaged airplane, service and replace its major
components, reactor included. Ground crews would have to be
trained in all manner of safety routines and remote-control
procedures -- in all weather conditions.202
The Photo Index to HAER ID-33-A contained photographs and
drawings only of the hangar, TAN-629. In 1995, when that report
was published, demolishing its control building (or any other FET
structures) was not contemplated, so the report included
photographs and drawings only of the hangar. Demolition of the
control building is now planned. (The Hangar continues in use as
a shelter for the Specific Manufacturing Capability project,
which manufactures tank armor made of spent uranium.) It is
appropriate, therefore, for the present report to record the rest
of the FET. 
The IET shield philosophy was repeated at the FET. Since the
radioactive source -- the airplane -- would be mobile, the
stationary control room was shielded. As at IET, it was bunkered
under a thick blanket of earth. It was the center of
remote-controlled operations, connected by wire and conduit to a
Coupling Station inside the hangar. The shielded locomotive on
the four-rail track would push the airplane into position for
quick plug-ins to leads and hoses. A platform elevator on the
hangar floor (planned, but not built) would convey a dismantled
reactor/power plant from the airplane to the basement.
Siting
As a source of radiation, the hangar complex had to be
isolated and distant from other work areas. It required a logical
relationship with the planned runway. The separation distance
from the A&M was 8,000 feet in a west/northwest direction. Had
the runway been built, it would have been west/northwest of the
hangar and connected by a 1200-foot-long taxiway.
The early vision of the ANP designers had been far-reaching.
They had assumed that Pratt & Whitney's closed-cycle airplane
might also require its own hangar in the Idaho desert someday.
Sherman McGarry wrote: 
West of the runway were preliminary drawings for other
airport type support facilities including a control tower, a
decontamination facility for the aircraft, and a large
parking ramp. Beyond these facilities...another complex was
going to be built by Pratt & Whitney for their engine and
craft support they were also working on. These never got
beyond the location [stage] with an unspecified on/off ramp
that would also use the runway. Not much was ever known
about the Pratt & Whitney interface beyond locating them
west of the runway control and maintenance facilities.203
The ANP designers had anticipated nothing but a forward
trajectory into the successful long-range achievement of their
goals. In these early years of the Cold War, they were nothing
but optimistic.
Layout
As it was built, the FET area consisted of the hangar
building (TAN-629), the bunkered control and equipment building
to its immediate east (TAN-630), buried fuel tanks south of the
bunker, and a tank building further south (TAN-631). The plan
included a decontamination building, a nuclear service building,
and a transfer station, none of which were built.204 GE designed
a "mobile shielded cab vehicle" (known as "the Beetle") to aid
remote operations inside the hangar, but it never saw service in
Idaho. GE used it at another of its projects.205
From the railroad turntable at the A&M, another set of
tracks went westward toward the hangar, whose massive front doors
opened to the south. The rails entered the hangar for delivery of
an airplane to the Coupling Station near the north wall. 
The basement below the hangar contained tunnels connecting
to the control room next door. One was for the Beetle driver who
might have to escape in an emergency. Another was for the
airplane crew, who would disembark down a heavily shielded hatch
in the Coupling Station. The tunnels led to a decontamination
area containing a shower and change lockers. The crew would go
through this area for checkups and debriefing on their way to the
stairways of the control room's first floor. Other tunnels and
conduit provided access for electrical, fuel, and other service
leads.
On the east side of the control building were two shielded
entrance tunnels. One entrance was a pedestrian access into the
first floor. The other was a shielded roadway, farther north on
the east side, sloped downward to the basement level, where there
was a vehicle turnaround area. See HAER Photo Nos. ID-33-E-308
and ID-33-E-310. 
As usual at all ANP complexes, security/safety fencing and
emergency security lighting with standby power girded the project
area. Also as usual, GE directed that "New facilities shall be
similar in construction and appearance to existing facilities..."
In this case, it also said, "Particular consideration must be
given to the unique and unusual requirements of this
facility...higher degrees of reliability than in normal
industrial practice. Margins of safety are to be large..."206
The Control and Equipment Building, TAN-630
The Control building was built of reinforced concrete all
around. It had two levels. The building was rectangular and flat
roofed, 94' 2" wide and 105' 2" long on the north/south axis. The
walls were three feet thick and poured of ordinary concrete. Atop
the concrete roof, the earth shield was a minimum of 6.5 feet
thick. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-310. Small projections provided
for air intake and exhaust equipment.
The first floor housed the control room and consoles, data
rooms, health physics laboratory, conference areas, change rooms,
auditory alarms, and communications center. One of its unique
features was a corridor (room 123 A) leading from the control
room (room 123) to the east wall of the hangar. Here observers
could see into the hangar through a shielded window. Another
corridor (room 104) led to a door into the hangar. On the hangar
side of the door was a "shadow shield." Constructed of heavily
reinforced concrete, this erect, massive slab would help block
the force of explosions and fissionable materials from entering
the Control building.207
The change room and bathrooms could handle up to sixty men
during any one shift. Facilities included hand and foot counters,
lockers, clothes hampers, showers, and toilets. Elsewhere a
women's lavatory acknowledged that there might be as many as "six
women per shift" somewhere in the control building.208
The shielding around the counting room attenuated background
radiation to 0.10 mr per hour during tests, the same standards in
other ANP counting rooms. This room, 10 feet by 17' 4" in
dimension, was near the center of the building and enclosed in
concrete walls one foot thick. The door (door 31) was equally
thick, triple-hinged, and had a latch/bolt lock. 
The basement floor housed the majority of the equipment
servicing the various support systems: boilers, diesel generators
and fuel pumps, dry chemical storage, acid and caustic storage
and pits, electrical panels and cable, alarm terminal cabinets,
heating and air conditioning equipment, instrument repair area,
jet fuel transfer room. Personnel tunnels connected to the hangar
from the Change Room, carefully routed to fit between the
structural ribs of the barrel-vaulted hangar. One went to the
Coupling Station, another to an access hatch under the four-rail
track. Another tunnel went to a viewing station. A completely
equipped "emergency kitchen" was to be stocked to feed thirty
people for 72 consecutive hours on an emergency basis.209 See
HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-309.
The exhaust and filtering systems were expected to be
similar to the one at the IET, costly features consisting of
ducting, filters, couplings, support foundations, valves,
manifolds, and monitoring systems. They were to be arranged in a
straight line north from the Coupling Station, ducted through the
hangar's north side through a bank of filters, to the stack.
Filters would remove radioactive dust particles from exhaust air
before it went up the stack.210 The system was not installed.
A fuel pump room was on the south side of the building,
where it connected to buried tanks just beyond. They were
intended for fuel oil, diesel fuel, lubricating oil, jet engine
fuel, process water, fire protection water, and fire-suppression
foam solutions. Also outside the building, a weather monitoring
system with leads to the control center inside would constantly
surveil wind speed and direction and other factors at all times
during operations.211
Tank Building, TAN-631
This building sheltered several tanks in a space 29' 4"
wide, 55' 4" long (north/south axis), and 15' 10" high. It was
flat-roofed with metal decking and built-up roofing. Walls were
made of pumice block. Unlike earlier ANP buildings, this one did
not have a coping strip just below the roof line. Part of the
wall on the north facade included a knock-out panel, a precaution
against explosions.
Inside, the concrete floor of the building had built-in
concrete pads and tank saddles to fit the future tanks, which
would lie on their sides. Two hollow metal doors (not glazed)
gave access to the east side, a double door to the south end, a
single-wide door to the north. A dip stick rack was mounted on
the west wall near the south end of the room. A trench and sump
were built into the floor on the north end. Also on the north
end, identified as the equipment room, was an exhaust vent and
hatch to the roof. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-313.
Chlorination Building, TAN-637
The FET area included a sewage treatment facility east and
slightly south of the Control Building. Part of it was this small
shed, identical in design to the Chlorination shed at Low Power
Test, TAN-643, but slightly larger. It was 9' 4" square and 8
feet high. The walls were vertical metal panels. The roof sloped
back moderately from the west wall, which contained the one
hollow metal door. 
The insulated building contained an electric wall-mounted
space heater in one corner, a thermostat, and a concrete pad for
mounting the hypochlorinator stand. Louvered vents were in the
top of the door and in the east wall. See HAER Photo No.
ID-33-E-314.212
Water Pump Buildings, TAN-632 and TAN-639
The water supply for the FET came from two wells located
northeast of the complex. The pump for each was enclosed in an
identical building. These were of the same general design as the
others at ANP, differing slightly in dimensions and the size of
the flat-roofed projection from the main building.
Each building had a pitched roof, with the gable ends sided
with horizontal wood shiplap. Gable facades were east and west.
The walls below the gables were pumice block. A 24-inch-throat
gravity roof ventilator with chain-operated damper sat atop the
roof ridge. TAN-632, which served Water Well No. 1, was 12' 8" by
25' 4" long (east/west axis). Its flat-roofed annex was 6 feet
wide and contained the hollow metal entry door on the south side.
This section contained chlorination equipment and storage for
chlorine tanks. The larger room under the gable roof contained a
space heater mounted on the wall and the pump, which was to be
installed "by government." A double door gave access on the east
facade. Concrete pads were poured outside each door. 
TAN-639 served Water Well No. 2. This building was smaller,
at 10 feet wide by 19' 4" long (north/south axis). The gable ends
were on the north and south sides. It had no annex or evident
storage space for chlorination equipment. One entry, via double
door, was on the east side. In other respects, the design was
identical to TAN-632, with pumice block walls, a roof ventilator,
and louvered ventilators in at least one wall.213
Exhaust Stack
While an aircraft was inside the Hanger, the plan was to
attach the jet nozzle to a steel duct at the Coupling Station,
filter the exhaust, and send it up a stack located to the rear of
the Hangar. The duct, supported by braces on the Hangar floor,
would expand from a diameter of 9' 8" to more than 20 feet as it
curved upward and entered the stack, a distance of about 130
feet. The ANP program was canceled before the duct, the stack,
and several other advanced features of the FET were installed.
PART FOURTEEN
THE LOSS-OF-FLUID TEST PROGRAM
Of all the nuclear reactor research conducted anywhere in
the United States, studies featuring the total and deliberate
destruction of nuclear reactors were unique to the NRTS. NRTS
scientists began blowing up reactors in the 1950s when they
started investigating the types of accidents and malfunctions
that might interfere with the safe operation of a reactor.
One possible malfunction was an "excursion," a sudden and 
unplanned rapid rise in the rate of fission and a concomitant 
rise in the temperature of the fuel. A series of reactor
experiments named "BORAX" (Boiling Water Reactor Experiment) took
place at the NRTS in the 1950s to dissect in minute detail the
process of such events. The only way to discover the operating
limits of a reactor was to...push the reactor to its limits. At
the time, this was the best way to gather empirical data about
excursions and how to prevent them. 
The first BORAX test took place in a hole in the ground. The
reactor was placed in a tank filled with water and open to the
sky. Earth shielding surrounded part of the tank. Operators
placed a control trailer some distance from the reactor. Before
the ultimate destruction of the reactor, they conducted hundreds
of data-gathering experiments first. 
This simple model was repeated over and over again at the
NRTS for another thirty years. As the commercial power industry
grew larger and larger, safety questions became more
sophisticated. Test facilities became more elaborate and more
permanent, but the sequestering of a reactor some safe distance
away from a control room became an established pattern for the
buildings and facilities erected to conduct destructive tests.
Because of its BORAX experiment, the NRTS was ready with an
idea to help the AEC develop standards for the placement of small
"swimming pool" reactors in university settings. The AEC knew
that if a commercial nuclear power industry were to succeed, it
would require well-trained nuclear physicists, engineers, and
chemists. The AEC wished to promote nuclear education. But,
placing reactors in the hands of graduate students presented
risks of its own. The Phillips Petroleum Company, the AEC's
operating contractor at the NRTS, proposed to conduct another
series of destructive tests. Named SPERT (Special Power Excursion
Reactor Test), these answered the necessary questions about
university reactors and many others. Eventually, the AEC would be
issuing commercial licenses for nuclear power plants. SPERT tests
helped define the safety requirements for these reactors.
Beginning in 1963, the AEC achieved its goal of fostering a
nuclear power industry, a time sometimes referred to as the
"great scale-up." Companies, particularly Westinghouse and
General Electric, began to apply for licenses to build power
reactors operating at 1,000 megawatts and more. These reactors
each used tons of fuel. The size of the plants far exceeded most
of the experimental reactors at the NRTS and elsewhere. Most
significantly, they were to be located in or near large cities,
heavily populated load centers. How could these be engineered to
be safe? What conditions and requirements should the AEC place on
their operating licenses?
The BORAX and SPERT programs had explored the inner life of
reactor fuel as it heated up in an excursion. They had helped
discover how to design fuel elements so that the chain reaction
shut down naturally if they became too hot. However, the fission
products inside the fuel elements continued to generate the heat
of radioactive decay. This heat was only five percent to seven
percent of the heat from a fissioning reactor. But when the pile
of fuel was of commercial scale, this was a substantial amount of
heat -- and hazard.
The new reactors, therefore, had to be engineered not only
with coolant to remove the heat of fission and decay heat, but
also with backup systems that worked without fail in case the
system broke down for some reason. Most commercial reactors were
kept cool with pumped water that flowed past the fuel to collect
heat. If a pump failed or a pipe broke, what then? 
The First LOFT Reactor Concept 
An event involving the sudden failure of the coolant to
reach the reactor was called a "loss of fluid" or "loss of
coolant accident," LOCA, for short. Although power plant
designers were proposing a variety of backup systems, the AEC
regulators were not convinced that they would work. The systems
had not been tested. The many variables interacting in such large
reactors might behave quite differently than they did in
small-scale reactors.
In 1962, the AEC initiated the Safety Test Engineering
Program (STEP) to explore and answer its questions. In 1963,
Phillips Petroleum proposed to build a special reactor at the
NRTS to explore LOCAs. The AEC agreed. Construction began in
1964. The idea was to place a 50-megawatt reactor -- scaled down
proportionately from a commercial-sized plant -- inside a
containment building, rig it with instrumentation, operate the
reactor, and then test the performance of commercial cooling
systems. Phillips called it the Loss of Fluid Test (LOFT)
Reactor. In a departure from the usual practice at the NRTS,
where reactor components were typically given individual
attention, the cooling system components were to come from
commercial vendors, the same who supplied General Electric and
Westinghouse. Phillips could run each set of components --
emergency sprays, pressure suppression devices, and the like --
through its paces. In the end, they could simulate a LOCA to "see
what happens."214
Commercial reactor vessels and containment buildings also
were subjects of doubt. How much heat and pressure could they
survive in a LOCA? The Phillips tests would find out how much
pressure each could endure as heat and steam built up during a
LOCA experiment. After the preliminary tests, the scientists
would "break" the coolant pipe, delay inserting the control rods,
cut off the cooling water, and disconnect the emergency backup
systems. Instrumented in every detail, the reactor would reveal
the precise history and nature of the "accident." They would
extrapolate the results to larger-scale reactors. The AEC
regulators would have empirical data guiding their license
requirements. Phillips estimated that the last test would take
place in the winter of 1968.215 At least, this was the plan as
Phillips engaged Kaiser Engineers to build the containment
building. Nuclear engineers began to design the reactor.
Siting and Layout of the Loss of Fluid Reactor
The LOFT program might be considered the champion of all
science programs in adapting and re-using facilities originally
designed for previous experiments. Phillips decided to reuse
several vacant ANP facilities at Test Area North. The control
building (TAN-630) next to the FET hangar was easily adapted for
the control building. It supplied that essential accessory for
destructive tests, namely a shielded control room at a safe
distance from the test.
The LOFT containment building went east of the control room.
The hangar was recruited to shelter the power and emergency power
system: a diesel generator, banks of wet cell batteries, two
motor generator sets, and the requisite switchgear. The tunnels
connecting the hangar to the control building could provide LOFT
personnel an escape route if ever needed. 
Other familiar ANP assets were also reused: the four-rail
tracks, the heavy-duty dollies, the shielded locomotive, the
turntable, and the movable aluminum building (TAN-624). These
transport facilities connected the LOFT site with the analytical
capabilities of the A&M building, TAN-607: the Hot Shop, Cold
Shop, Radioactive Materials Laboratory, mechanical shops, and
storage pool. LOFT took over the actuator building, TAN-615, as
its "clean" area for assembling and storing reactor fuel
elements. It used the cells of TAN-633, the Hot Cell Annex for
analytical work with hot items.216
The designers envisioned placing the reactor and/or test
components on a dolly and moving it back and forth between its
containment building and the Hot Shop as needed. The movable
building would, as it had for the HTRE reactors, shelter against
the weather. Since the Hot Shop door was 33 feet high, the dolly
and reactor assembly could be no higher than 33 feet.217 Likewise
the opening in the containment had to clear 33 feet. See HAER
Photo No. ID-33-E-380. 
The craft skills accumulated during the ANP days were called
upon again. The LOFT program would require remote handling, heavy
lifting, decontamination, and instrumentation of every
conceivable parameter to record water and reactor behavior during
the "accident."
As the program evolved, the STEP program engaged other TAN
facilities as well. Scientists required some method of examining
the entire range of behavior of the coolant. Under pressure in a
reactor (to keep from boiling), a break in a coolant pipe would
suddenly release pressure, water would flash to steam, and...what
exactly? The dynamics of water as it transitioned between its
liquid and gas phases needed closer study. Phillips designed a
"non-nuclear" reactor called Semiscale. Reactor-like heat could
be supplied conventionally; the object of study was the water.
Simulated breaks in coolant pipes were called "blowdowns." The
old Jet Engine Test pad (TAN-609) once more housed noisy
experiments. The cells at the Low Power Test (TAN-640) building
likewise saw new duty. Workers began using the new name, WRRTF
(Water Reactor Research Test Facility) instead of "Susie" or "Low
Power Test Area," and the old ANP names went out of use. 
NRTS facilities beyond Test Area North also contributed to
this highly interrelated set of programs. Fuel pins went for
irradiation to the NRTS Test Reactor Area, where they were
subjected to normal and transient conditions. A computerized Fuel
Rod Analysis Program was developed with the help of the Power
Burst Facility, the most advanced reactor in the SPERT group. All
of these complex NRTS resources aimed simply to find out, "Will
this emergency cooling system actually cool the fuel elements in
a pressurized water reactor?" and "Can computer models predict
results?"218
The LOFT Containment Building (TAN-650)
The Containment Building surrounded the LOFT reactor chamber
and the vessel in which it operated. "Containment" was a safety
concept aimed at preventing the fission products that had
accumulated in reactor fuel from getting into the environment
accidentally. The cladding around the fuel element was the first
line of defence. The next was the reactor vessel; the dome-topped
building was the third. It was to withstand a variety of
explosive, pressure-building, and flooding accidents in the event
that the first two containers failed. As a reactor headed for
destruction, the LOFT system had to imitate accidents, but not
their hazardous consequences.
LOFT went under construction in 1964. The reactor was a
pressurized water reactor, its engineering providing for five
major systems: primary coolant, reactor, blowdown suppression,
emergency core cooling, and secondary coolant. 
Commercial reactors were built so that each quadrant of fuel
within the reactor was cooled independently -- a "four-loop"
system. LOFT consisted of one "intact" loop to simulate three
unbroken loops in a commercial reactor and another loop to be
"broken" for the accident. This loop contained pumps and valves
to imitate the sudden blowdown of a pipe break. The "emergency"
coolant could be injected at any of several locations, depending
on where the "break" had occurred.219
Figure 16. Configuration of the LOFT reactor for one of its
tests. One system represented intact loop, while special valves,
and piping were rigged to simulate a "break." Steam and water
escaped to a "suppression vessel" to avoid contaminating the
floor of the LOFT building. Source: The OECD LOFT Project, p. 54.
One possible consequence of a loss of coolant was a complete
fuel meltdown. The cladding and structural support of the fuel
assemblies could collapse at the bottom of the reactor vessel.
Absent heat removal, the reactor vessel could likewise melt, and
the fission products escape that second container. Continuing,
the heat buildup could melt the concrete floor in the basement of
the containment building. In that case, the fission products
could be dispersed into the environment when the heat reached
ground water and turned it explosively to steam.220
The LOFT containment building had two operating levels, the
main floor and a basement. The reactor was situated in the middle
of a circular, domed building 70 feet in diameter. The basement
contained various pumps and equipment rooms. The space directly
beneath the reactor was a circular "catch basin" designed to
resist a further breach should a fuel melt reach that far. This
feature is observed in early construction photos. See HAER Photo
No. ID-33-E-355.
In visualizing the architecture of the LOFT building, it is
helpful to think of the central dome with a major feature
projecting from each of the four cardinal directions. The "front
door" with rail access was to the south. To the north was a long
narrow wing with five levels above grade (and a broader basement
area below). This wing could be thought of as the reactor's
coupling station. Penetrations through the dome connected to
instrumentation, sampling, electricity, piping, and other
equipment here. Early plans referred to it as the "pre-amp"
tower. Projecting east was another service wing for receiving
highly radioactive liquids. Approximately opposite, the west side
featured the airlock door and a corridor to the earth-covered
control building next door.221
The reactor entered the chamber through the "railroad door,"
which weighed 200 tons and was a significant part of the
building's total cost. This one-of-a-kind item was engineered to
be air tight, necessary to do its part in dome pressure tests and
in retaining fission products inside the building. This was
achieved with a complex air-inflatable rubber seal.222 The
motorized door, curved to match the curve of the building, rolled
on rails to open and close. Outside, a metal shroud protected it
from the weather. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-357.
Inside, two air-lock doors provided a similar air-tight
function. One was on the main floor, the other in the basement.
The system involved a pair of doors enclosing an air-control
chamber between them. The chambers were well-lit and supplied
with telephones, ventilation, and pressure equalization.
The containment building was 70 feet in diameter. It had a
double wall, each made of concrete, poured in place. In the
basement, the inside wall was about four feet thick. The air
space between it and the outer shell wall was 2.5 feet thick. The
outer wall was 2 feet thick. Portions of the wall, such as where
it separated equipment service rooms from the reactor, were 7
feet thick. 
The LOFT engineers made use of the old ANP shielded roadway.
The tunnel extended 700 feet east of the containment dome. This
and all entries to the premises, shielded or not, were under
administrative control during LOFT operations.223
In adapting the TAN-630 Control Building for LOFT, the
engineers found that the ANP earth shielding calculations and
other planning would work for LOFT. The upper level contained the
control room, visitor center, data rooms, offices, and other
support rooms. The ANP's old "emergency kitchen" became a
lunchroom for everyday use. The basement, or lower level, housed
fire protection equipment, boilers, a diesel electric generator
set, electrical and other equipment. Fuel oil pumps for the
boilers and generators were separated from the rest of the
building by a fire barrier wall. Other fire-rated walls enhanced
the safety of operations in the control and visitor rooms.224
The connecting structure between the containment and control
buildings was irregular in shape. To the north, the basement
level projected 45 feet beyond the north edge of the shielded
roadway, or about 79 feet from the outer containment shell.
Depending on their particular function, the interior walls of the
basement were built of concrete ranging between two feet to four
feet thick. This level covered a larger footprint than did the
ground floor and other levels above it. At grade level, earth
shielding covered part of the basement.
To the east, the waste-related wing projected about 75 feet
from the outer shell. It contained four heavily shielded filter
chambers, vaults intended to receive air containing fission
products and other radioactive particles. See HAER Photo No.
ID-33-E-376, where these vaults were numbered B-223, -223A,
-223B, -223C, and -223D.
On the west side, the distance between the outer shell and
the control building was about 46 feet. Equipment functions, such
as electricity, heating, and some ventilating, that did not
involve radioactive liquids or other wastes were located in this
area. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-373.
In the reactor chamber, four rails from the A&M turntable
crossed the threshold to a set of bumpers arranged for parking
the reactor at the center of the chamber. The most visually
arresting scene inside the chamber (absent the reactor itself)
was the north wall, where a bank of large holes provided pathways
for cables to enter the "pre-amp" wing and its rooms 211 and 213. 
Around the floor near the inner wall was a grated trench for
collecting water should any spill during an experiment. The floor
also contained two hatches. One was a personnel escape hatch, and
the other was in the center to receive certain equipment
projecting downward from the reactor dolly. Four hold-downs
installed in the floor secured the reactor during experiments.
The airlock door for personnel was on the west. People entering
the chamber walked through a maze, the major shield wall for
which was seven feet thick. The space between the inner and outer
shells was filled with removable concrete shielding blocks.
Around the top of the chamber, about 62 feet from the floor, a
rail accommodated a circular bridge crane. 
The pre-amp wing projecting to the north (beyond the
holes)was 41 feet wide and about 80 feet long (north/south axis).
The concrete walls were 2.5 feet thick. Shielded windows provided
a view into rooms 211, the "piping labyrinth," and 213, a
"conduit tunnel." The walls surrounding these rooms were concrete
four feet thick. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-374. This floor
contained heat exchange equipment for the reactor's secondary
coolant system. 
Figure 17. Views inside pre-amp wing. Spaces were too cramped for
HAER photographer to use large-format film. Top: Access door to
Room 217, partly closed and open. Sign says, "Notice: No eating,
drinking, or smoking in this area." Bottom: Camera within Room
217 faces penetrations in containment dome's north side. Sampling
tubes project from opening at left. See HAER Photo No.
ID-33-E-375. Source: INEEL Photo HD-39-12, frames 15, 19, 22.
Figure 18. Borated water tank, on top floor of pre-amp building.
Bottom view shows concrete foundation for tank. See construction
views in HAER Photo Nos. ID-33-E-359, -360, and -364. Source:
INEEL Photo No. HD-39-12.
Figure 19. Compressor building, TAN-637, and LOFT stack. Hot
liquid waste was piped to A&M area for treatment. Top: Along road
to LOFT, camera facing west. Bottom: Two views of LOFT's metal
stack, before demolition. Source: INEEL Photo HD-39-7.
The pre-amp wing had three additional levels. The first two
held cable tray labyrinths for the cables entering from the
containment building and shielded accordingly. Work platforms and
monorail installations were available for setting up cable
bundles and their courses. A tank containing borated water sat on
the top floor. When LOFT was first built, this tank was exposed
to the sky. Later, a weather enclosure and roof covered it. The
tank was a key part of the emergency core cooling system,
employed to help quench any reactivity continuing in the core.
See HAER Photo Nos. ID-33-E-375 and ID-33-E-377.
The air filter vaults in the eastern projection were covered
with hatch covers best seen in aerial photographs. The retaining
wall around them was about four feet high. The air to be filtered
came from a duct that exited the reactor chamber and ran down the
outer wall of the building. The duct was sheltered from the
weather by a corrugated metal shroud not unlike the one
protecting the door in front. Should someone have to examine or
repair the duct, access was via ladders and platforms inside the
metal shroud. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-376.
The foundation of the LOFT reactor chamber consisted of
heavily reinforced concrete. In some areas, such as directly
below the reactor, it was as much as 48 feet thick. 
The domed roof of the containment building was made of
steel. Its tangent with the walls was just above the bridge crane
rails. The dome center rose another 35 feet to its apex. See HAER
Photo No. ID-33-E-376. Outside of the dome, a platform on the
apex could be reached by a ladder and "bosun's chair." An alarm
siren was located here. See HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-377.
LOFT Adapts other FET Support Buildings 
Other ANP structures were revitalized for LOFT. The water
storage system used the water tank (TAN-733) located several
hundred feet east of the shielded roadway entrance. The tank
building TAN-632 housed the well and pump for Well No. 1. Well
No. 2 pumps were in TAN-639. Closer and just south of the LOFT
control room, tank building TAN-631 stored two demineralized
water tanks and instrument air.
New buildings were required to handle liquid and gaseous
wastes. Tank building TAN-626 contained a holding tank to store
radioactive liquids produced during operations and blowdown
tests. After an experiment, the wastes were pumped from the tank
and sent elsewhere at NRTS for processing. A disposal pond was
used for low-level wastes. An exhaust stack and a small
monitoring shack took ventilated air likely to contain
radioactivity. The stack was 150 feet east of the reactor
building, and at 150 feet high, tall enough to help disperse
contaminants. An injection well disposed of "cold" wastes.225 See
HAER Photo No. ID-33-E-367 for an overall aerial view.
Semiscale
Kaiser Engineers completed the LOFT containment building
after 1970. But a LOFT reactor was nowhere in sight. Events far
beyond Idaho had overwhelmed Phillips' early goals for conducting
LOFT experiments by 1968. Ideas had changed about the reactor,
and ideas about the proposed experiments had changed, too. 
The new commercial reactors began to use fuel clad in a
material known as zircaloy instead of stainless steel. In 1965,
Phillips had to acknowledge this change in order to keep the LOFT
reactor consistent with commercial products. It was no small
thing, as reactor designers had to re-evaluate the safe operating
parameters of the LOFT reactor and adjust accordingly. Producing
new safety reports and procedures delayed the effective start
date for the project. 
As the inventory of large commercial reactors grew
throughout the 1960s, the regulatory staff at the AEC began to
doubt that Phillips' LOFT program would produce useful
information about large-scale engineered systems. They were not
sure that the small LOFT reactor test results could meaningfully
be applied to large commercial systems. The matter was debatable,
and the debate wore on for quite some time without coming to a
definite conclusion.226
Milton Shaw, AEC director of Reactor Development and
Technology, who had been instrumental in canceling the EBOR
project, also had doubts about the LOFT reactor. He feared that
quality and performance standards for reactor components, if
weak, could result in test results that could neither be
replicated nor relied upon. In 1967, he ordered that design work
on the reactor be suspended in order to "regroup and do the job
right."227 Further, he was not convinced that a detailed
investigation into reactor meltdowns (the so-called "China
Syndrome") was a useful effort. Resources, he felt, should go
into the engineering of foolproof preventatives. Funds for LOFT
shriveled up. LOFT employees were laid off. The containment
building sat empty.
Meanwhile, using what resources they could pull together,
managers at the NRTS developed computer models (called codes)
predicting the behavior of coolant during a LOCA. These required
some sort of empirical validation. Repeated iterations comparing
Semiscale blowdown test results with prior predictions produced
constantly more accurate codes. Semiscale tests conducted at the
Low Power Test area between 1970 and 1971 demonstrated that after
certain types of accidents, steam pressure in the coolant pipes
prevented emergency water from entering the core to cool it. 
The test findings challenged the then-current belief that
certain emergency systems were adequate. Margins of safety that
had been assumed would now need to be revised. The issue was
highly controversial because it meant that commercial licenses
would be more costly to obtain. Nevertheless, after the AEC held
hearings on the matter, it adopted a more stringent set of
"interim criteria" for emergency systems.228
Thus, the non-nuclear Semiscale tests had a significant
impact on reactor safety long before the LOFT building had found
a new mission. 
A New Mission for LOFT 
New management arrived at the AEC in 1974. Dixie Lee Ray,
the new chair of the AEC, removed safety research from the
control of Milton Shaw. Money for LOFT began to flow. It had
become clear that merely testing off-the-shelf reactor components
and then destroying the reactor was too limited a mission for
LOFT. The program was re-directed so that the reactor would be a
research tool capable of simulating many LOCAs, not just one.
To this end, LOFT engineers refined the reactor's water
management system substantially. To avoid flooding and
contaminating the reactor chamber repeatedly, they designed a
special holding tank for blowdown water. When the coolant loop
"broke," water would flow into this tank without damaging the
reactor. Some of the valves and pumps were scrounged from the 
N.S. Savannah, the Maritime Administration's demonstration
merchant ship, at that time being scrapped.229 The blowdown tank
and its elaborate piping was in the reactor chamber.
The introduction of the blowdown tank and the complexity of
the piping and other systems around the reactor, which had to be
well anchored, changed earlier plans to move the reactor back and
forth to the A&M. The reactor was larger than the one initially
planned, and the piping and other systems did not lend themselves
to easy disconnects. Once it began operating, the reactor never
moved outside the containment building. The mobile aluminum
building, which had been parked in front of the door, acted as a
kind of sheltered vestibule, and remained in place until it was
schedule for demolition in the general "accelerated cleanup."230
The first nuclear test took place on December 10, 1978. It
simulated a "double-ended guillotine break." Coolant flooded from
both ends of a suddenly "broken" pipe. A major purpose of the
test was to compare actual results with the predictions of the
computer codes. The codes had predicted, among other things, that
the core would heat up to a temperature of 1,350 degrees F., and
that the emergency cooling system would become effective within
90 seconds of the break. The system performed better than the
predictions: coolant arrived within 44 seconds, and the
temperature of the core rose no higher than 1,000 degrees F.231
Plans continued for more tests. Then on March 28, 1979, a
loss of coolant accident occurred at the Three Mile Island (TMI)
nuclear power plant (Unit No. 2) in Pennsylvania. INEL scientists
became involved when it was feared that chemical reactions inside
the reactor were creating hydrogen gas with the potential to
explode and blow open the containment building. Semiscale was
quickly modified to replicate the known situation at TMI-2. A
test was run, and INEL scientists concluded that a hydrogen
explosion was unlikely, a finding that relieved TMI operators
(and the country) of considerable anxiety.232
In the lexicon of reactor coolant accidents, the TMI-2 event
was regarded as a "small" leak because the initial cause had been
a stuck pressure-relief valve. The LOFT and Semiscale facilities
immediately turned to the problem of analyzing such "small"
events in a variety of accident scenarios. The objective was the
same as before, to develop and verify computer codes with
accurate predictive power. By the end of 1980, LOFT managers
prepared to conduct a series of tests to simulate the TMI-2
accident. These tests were initially sponsored and financed by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which since 1974 had been an
agency independent from the AEC, since named the Department of
Energy. Twenty-six nuclear tests were run.233
The test results were of great interest to nuclear power
utility companies all over the world. In 1983, sponsorship of
LOFT experiments shifted to a group of ten countries organized as
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. They
planned a series of eight final LOFT tests, which concluded in
1985. The first six focused on thermal-hydraulic issues. None of
these produced core temperatures hot enough to rupture the
cladding around the fuel. The last two tests modeled this
possibility, exploring the path of release for the fission
products that would leach into the coolant fluid. The last test
was deliberately severe, completely melting the fuel bundle
inside the LOFT reactor. The post-test analysis traced the
movement of the fission products that had escaped in the melt.
Scientists concluded that the worst scenarios that had been
imagined for the China Syndrome were unlikely.234
The Significance of LOFT
The Department of Energy (DOE) decommissioned the LOFT
facility in 1986, a procedure that had risen in cost because the
final test needed substantial cleanup. The OECD extended its own
program through 1989 to study the melted LOFT fuel and test
assembly in minute detail, aiming for as complete an
understanding as possible of the fuel-melt event. The study
helped interpret the TMI-2 accident as well.235
LOFT tests improved the conformity between computer codes
and empirical evidence. Its accident scenarios, many inspired by
the TMI-2 accident, revealed where the codes needed more
refinement. The simulations also helped determine how to recover
a reactor to a safe condition immediately after an accident.
The STEP/LOFT program informed the licensing requirements
for commercial reactors, not only in the United States, but in
many other countries (not including the Soviet Union). It
relieved certain overly conservative assumptions that had been
established in the early years of the nuclear power industry. The
other side of that coin was the technical improvements it had
inspired in safety engineering. 
One of the participants in the OECD/LOFT program wrote:
The fact that it was possible to conduct the experiments,
particularly the last and most severe, in a controlled
manner is a measure of the understanding of accident
behavior which now exists.236
With LOFT, the NRTS/INEL ended its honorable history in the
destruction of nuclear reactors. The sequence from BORAX through
SPERT (including the Power Burst Reactor) and LOFT had created a
body of knowledge about the most intimate processes of change
within a reactor due to temperature transients and loss of
coolant. It had conducted these tests without any loss of life or
undue hazards to downwind populations. The nuclear reactor
industry in the United States has an operational safety record
unmatched by any other electric utility.
PART FIFTEEN
CONCLUSION: TEST AREA NORTH AFTER LOFT
The LOFT reactor was the last reactor built at the INEEL. It
symbolizes the end of the historically significant "reactor
testing era" in the United States. The Idaho site had birthed the
commercial power industry in 1951 with the electric lighting of
four bulbs at Experimental Breeder Reactor-1. It seems fitting
that the "last" reactor was one that passed a baton from
empirical testing to computer safety modeling. Because of the
former, the latter was made feasible. Because of the latter, the
former is no longer deemed necessary. 
Three Mile Island contributed one final legacy to Test Area
North. After INEL scientists predicted the condition of the
melted fuel in the TMI-2 reactor vessel (using the Power Burst
Facility, elsewhere at the INEEL), DOE decided to send the fuel
debris to the A&M, TAN-607, for analysis and storage. 
This undertaking spawned a number of INEEL activities,
including accessing the debris from the TMI-2 reactor vessel
(with a "core bore" drill devised at INEL), performing
cask-handling tests, transporting the debris to Idaho, examining
it, and storing it in the A&M fuel storage pool. The project took
ten years. It was done safely. The last shipment arrived at TAN
in 1990. After negotiation with the State of Idaho, the fuel has
recently been moved to a dry storage facility at INTEC, a move
that contributed to the diminished mission for Test Area North.
The TMI-2 activities made use of the many and varied
laboratories and buildings built originally for manhandling a
nuclear airplane. They had been designed for the heavy work of
developing the propulsion plant. Those heavy-enough requirements
had been made heavier still by the shielding safeguards brought
to the enterprise by mobile nuclear reactors and their offspring:
spent fuel, fission products, and wastes of all kinds.
The ANP shield designs and remote-control innovations were
sound enough to be relied on well beyond 1961 as other programs
adapted them to new projects. The cells of the Low Power Test
facility were home to a series of critical experiment reactors.
(See Appendix E for a list of reactors that operated at TAN.) The
Shield Test Facility pools were drained for the sake of EBOR. The
IET revived for the Space Program. LOFT made use of the
earth-covered control room next to the Hanger -- and the Hangar
itself.
A variety of non-nuclear programs came and went in the other
facilities, but the heart of TAN has always been the A&M
building, TAN-607. The Hot Shop was apparently the largest hot
cell in the United States. Despite occasional slow times, TAN-607
has always enjoyed "beneficial use." Despite slow times, it has
never closed, stood vacant, or been without a mission. Some
activity has always required one of its shops, shielded for high,
moderate, or no radioactivity.
The significance of the ANP program was discussed more fully
in HAER Report ID-33-A. The airplane was never built, but later
generations with environmental and anti-nuclear sensibilities now
wonder about the nuclear bomber promoters and ask "What were they
thinking?" In the 1950's Cold War era, "they" were thinking about
the possible consequences if the enemy obtained the weapon first.
Or was it that simple? After a world war during which the United
States government financed private industry to produce the atomic
bomb, private industry continued to have a stake in the arms
race. Historians will be arguing the true nature of the arms race
for a long time to come: Was it patriotic self-defence? or the
self-interested manipulation by large well-connected corporate
interests to obtain lucrative government contracts?
As an architectural remnant of the period, Test Area North
is a tribute to the ingenuity and innovation of its creators.
Shielding was their theme and urgent necessity. In confronting
for the first time the problem of mobile reactors of enormous
size and scope -- under test -- they produced a tour-de-force in
shield techniques: high-density concretes, viewing windows,
"swimming pools," labyrinthine mazes, shadow shields, blast
doors, Z-shaped conduit pathways, remote manipulators of all
kinds, blankets of earth, glove boxes, exclusion fences, shielded
locomotive, shielded escape hatches, shielded tunnels, shielded
driveways, "quick connect" coupling stations, shielded periscopes
and cameras, transport casks, positive/negative air pressure; not
to mention the exploitation of open space and distance in the
desert for radioactive attenuation, and layered combinations of
lead, steel, aluminum, air, water, concrete, and earth.
Their architectural creations were, perforce, the first of
their kind, unique: the IET, the Hot Shop, the Hangar. If their
earth-covered control rooms lacked an aesthetic principle, they
made up for it in functional elegance. 
Had an airplane flown and spawned a successful industry
based on nuclear flight, these structures would have become
honored vessels of a proud technological history. At the INEEL
thus far, only the EBR-1 reactor has enjoyed this kind of
recognition: no less a personage than the president of the United
States declared EBR-1 a national historical monument. But then,
commercial nuclear power became a "winner" in history; the
nuclear airplane did not.
Figure 20. The shielded driveway leading to the Flight Engine
Test/LOFT control building. Source: INEEL Photo HD-39-12.
APPENDIX A
VICINITY MAP: TEST AREA NORTH AT NRTS/INEL/INEEL
APPENDIX B-1
GENERAL PLOT PLAN OF TEST AREA NORTH
(Including post-ANP area names)
WRRTF: Water Reactor Research Test Facility = Low Power Test Area
TSF: Technical Support Facility = Assembly and Maintenance and
Administrative Areas
SMC/CTF: Specific Manufacturing Capability (tank armor) and
Contained Test Facility = Flight Engine Test/LOFT facility
APPENDIX B-2
PLOT PLAN FOR IET, 1995
APPENDIX B-3
PLOT PLAN FOR A&M AND ADMIN AREAS, 1995
APPENDIX B-4
PLOT PLAN FOR LOW POWER TEST AREA, 1995
APPENDIX B-5
PLOT PLAN FOR FET/LOFT AREA, 1995
APPENDIX C
HTRE AND RELATED ANP REACTOR TESTS
HTRE Runs Test Location was the IET. Bracketed dates should not




























Fuel Element Burn Tests Test location was "Grid III" at the NRTS
(not at the IET). These were tests of fuel elements deliberately











* President John F. Kennedy canceled the ANP program on March 28,
1961. The bracketed date of March 30, 1961, may or may not be
accurate.
Sources:
INEL Historical Dose Evaluation, Volume 1, DOE/ID-12119
(Idaho Falls: INEL, 1991), Table A-19, pages A-52 to A-55.
Susan M. Stacy, Proving the Principle, A History of the
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory
(Idaho Falls: Department of Energy, 2000), Chapter 15, "The
Triumph of Political Gravity Over Nuclear Flight" for an
account of Fuel Element Burn Tests, also known as "Operation
Wiener Roast."
APPENDIX D
LOFT EXPERIMENT PROGRAM 
APPENDIX E
REACTORS AT TEST AREA NORTH
Name Acronym Location
Cavity Reactor Critical Experiment CRCE LPT
Critical Experiment Tank CET LPT
Experimental Beryllium Oxide Reactor EBOR STF
(never loaded with fuel)
630 A (Critical experiment reactor) 630 A LPT
Heat Transfer Reactor Experiment No. 1 HTRE-1 IET
Heat Transfer Reactor Experiment No. 2 HTRE-2 IET
Heat Transfer Reactor Experiment No. 3 HTRE-3 IET
Hot Critical Experiment HOTCE LPT
Loss of Fluid Test Reactor LOFT FET
Shield Test Pool Facility Susie STF
Spherical Cavity Reactor Critical Experiment SCRCE LPT
Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power 10 A/2
Transient No. 1     SNAPTRAN-1 IET
Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power 10 A/2  SNAPTRAN-2 IET
Transient No. 2
Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power 10 A/2  SNAPTRAN-3 IET
Transient No. 3
Thermal Reactor Idaho Test Station THRITS LPT
Note: Semiscale was a non-nuclear apparatus that simulated the
heat of a nuclear reactor to study thermal-hydraulic phenomena
during postulated loss of fluid accidents. It was located at LPT.
IET Initial Engine Test Area
LPT Low Power Test Facility 
STF Shield Test Facility
Source:
Susan M. Stacy, Proving the Principle, A History of the
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory
(Idaho Falls: Department of Energy, 2000), p.259-268.
APPENDIX F
SHIELDING MATERIALS
Until the early 1950s, the accumulated technical knowledge
of shielding materials and techniques that had been built up
during the previous decade resided mainly in the realm of secret
documents.
As the AEC considered its goal that the nation develop a
nuclear power industry, it took steps to assure that the industry
would have trained nuclear engineers. The AEC collaborated with
the American Society for Engineering Education to produce
unclassified sourcebooks and textbooks. 
One of the products of this collaboration was Samuel
Glasstone's, Principles of Nuclear Reactor Engineering. Much of
the information in this book came from lecturers at the Oak Ridge
School of Reactor Technology. This book codified for public use
the engineering basics as they were understood and employed in
the early 1950s. 
The following is a brief summary of characteristics of
common shielding materials.
Lead
Use: As a gamma shield, it has a high density and high atomic
number. Lighter weight than steel or concrete of equal gamma-ray
attenuation. Useful for wrapping around a source.
Considerations: If it is close to heat, it might need to be
cooled. Should be pure, not scrap. Won't readily activate. When
used in bricks, the cracks between the bricks have to be
shielded. Should scan for hot spots.
Disadvantages: Expensive, low melting point, soft, low strength,
tends to creep. Needs bonding to or reinforcement by steel.
Iron and Steel
Use: Strong. As neutron shield, can be exposed to high
temperatures. Resists radiation damage and activation. Often used
in combination with water and/or concrete. Iron ores such as
magnetite and iron punchings or shot are mixed with Portland
cement to make heavy concretes, which improve gamma attenuation
over ordinary concrete.
Considerations: May be clad in stainless steel, plated, or
painted to protect from rusting. Self-supporting, may support
other components. Castings and seams of welded plates need
inspection for hot spots and flaws.
Disadvantages: A significant source of capture gamma rays and
inelastic scattering gamma rays. It needs additional gamma
shielding or a thicker shield overall to attenuate gamma rays.
Concrete
Use: Neutron shield. Concrete contains water, the hydrogen atoms
in which slow down neutrons. Is not damaged by radiation. 
Considerations: Thinner shields can be made with dense aggregates
such as magnetite, limonite iron ore, barytes (barium ore), and
iron punchings. As concrete cures and ages, it gradually loses
water. Making the shield thicker can compensate for this. Boron
can be added to the mix to suppress production of capture gamma
rays.
Disadvantages: Low density and low atomic number are drawbacks
for gamma shielding. Heavy concrete is expensive to make and to
install. High heat can cause cracking.
Note: Ordinary concrete is made from a mixture of Portland
cement, coarse aggregate (crushed rock or gravel), sand, and
water: 1 part cement, 2 parts sand, 4 parts aggregate, and about
6 gallons of water per 94 pounds of cement.
It is best to cast concrete in one continuous pour, with
reinforcing bars and penetrations already in place. If parts must
be poured and allowed to set, the join should be rebated to
prevent neutron streaming.
 _________
Rebated joint:   ________/          \_________
Water
Use: An excellent neutron shield because of its high
concentration of hydrogen atoms, which absorb neutrons. In
sufficient thickness, will attenuate gamma rays. Pure water will
not become radioactive.
Considerations: Has relatively low density and low atomic number,
which is why water shields must be thick to attenuate gamma rays.
Water is transparent and fluid, good for cooling. Impurities in
water may activate under radiation and often must be removed.
Disadvantages: Water containers with excellent leak-proof
qualities may be costly. Water is mildly corrosive, adding to
cost of containers. Low boiling point precludes use at high
temperatures (unless it is pressurized). Impurities in water may
need to be removed.
Air and Soil
Use: Air is not a material, but contributes to attenuation due to
gradual loss of energy generated by the source. It is a low
density mixture of gases, including nitrogen, oxygen, and argon,
with traces of water and carbon dioxide.
Soil can shield against radionuclides that are deposited on
the surface. As its composition is variable, depth of soil for
shield may vary.
Paraffin (organic polyethylene)
Use: Neutron shield. Has higher concentration of hydrogen than
water.
Considerations: Can be shaped as sheets, slabs, bars, and
pellets. Easy to extrude or mold. Boron can be added to suppress
capture-gamma ray production.
Disadvantages: Has very little resistance to heat and radiation.
At relatively low temperature, will creep; needs structural
support. Combustible.
Penetrating a Shield
Shields may be penetrated by: conduit for electric cables,
piping, mechanical devices, holes with removable plugs, tunnels
for personnel, collimators, and beam ports. Shield effectiveness
is diminished if the material filling a duct is a poorer
attenuator (or generates secondary gamma rays) than the bulk of
the shield. Air is a poor attenuator. Holes easily destroy the
effectiveness of a shield near the penetration.
A straight duct permits line-of-sight exposure: radiation
that penetrated the shield can enter the duct; neutrons or
primary gamma rays may scatter from the duct wall or generate
secondary gamma rays from neutrons incident on the wall.
One way to manage penetrations is to introduce steps or
bends to avoid direct streaming of radiation down the duct, and
by reinforcing the shield with thicker or more effective material
around the penetration. 
Holes and ports may be closed with plugs or doors. There is
usually a gap between the plug and hole due to allowance for
thermal expansion, clearance for movement, or manufacturing
tolerances. Thus, plug and hole should have at least one step to
block line of sight component and reduce radiation streaming down
the gap.
    ________________
Source--> ______|              |
Source-->|______               |    Stepped cylindrical plug   
Source-->  |______________|     (one step)
Some radiation can still stream down the gap, although not
in a line-of-sight path. Radiation that bounces along the walls
can proceed around the step. Thermal neutrons can produce
secondary gamma rays deep within the shield.
When a hole cannot be plugged, such as in a gas-filled
cooling pipe or personnel tunnel, the duct should be constructed
with one (L-shaped duct) or more bends in bent ducts, labyrinths,
or mazes. Three-legged ducts (U-shaped mazes or Z shaped ducts)
can do even better.
Electrical cables and small diameter cooling pipes are often
twisted into a helix. Diameter of the helix should be a few times
the diameter of the conduit or pipe. Pitch should be fairly large
to facilitate pulling the cable or reducing pressure drop in the
pipe, and to minimize volume of shield material replaced.
Sources:
A. Edward Profio. Radiation Shielding and Dosimetry. New
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1979. See pages 409-421; 467-468.
Samuel Glasstone. Principles of Nuclear Reactor Engineering.
Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1955. See Chapter X,
"Shielding of Nuclear Reactor Systems."
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Many drawings documented below display the stamp, "Official Use
Only." INEEL's Classification Office requested, in light of the
fact that Internet views of the drawings are shown together with
their captions, that each such caption indicate that the drawing
was approved for public release. Other stamps, such as
"classified" or "secret" were removed from original Aircraft
Nuclear Propulsion (ANP) drawings many years ago (date not
known). These removals appear as blackout or burn marks on the
drawing images.
The following large-format photos, historical photos, and photos
of architectural drawings are arranged in five groups, each group
representing one of five complexes at Test Area North (TAN). The
first set of large-format photos, historic photos, and drawings
are of the Initial Engine Test Area (IET). In order, the next
groups are the Assembly and Test Area (A&M), the Administration
Area (ADM), the Low Power Test Area (LPT), and the Flight Engine
Test (FET)/Loss of Fluid Test (LOFT) Area.
For additional narrative and photographic documentation for the
Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion Project, the Flight Engine Test Area,
and its Hangar (Building TAN-629), please refer to HAER Report
ID-33-A. See also the narrative for this report on Test Area
North, HAER Report ID-33-E.
All of the drawings photographed for this index were made from
aperture cards (a microfilm medium) because INEEL destroyed the
original drawings several years ago. Thus, the "negative" images
are black-on-white. The prints are white-on-black. A reader may
find it more convenient to examine drawings by looking at the
negatives instead of the prints.
INITIAL ENGINE TEST COMPLEX
HAER photographs ID-33-E-1 through ID-33-E-30 were taken of the
IET facility prior to or during demolition. Interior views were
taken January 22, 1998, by Mike Crane; exterior, on April 13,
1998 by Ron Paarmann. 
Note: Large-format photographs of TAN-624, which served as the
Mobile Test Building in the ANP program and as the Containment
Entry in the LOFT program, will be found with LOFT photographs.
ID-33-E-1 IET DISTANT CONTEXTUAL VIEW OF COUPLING STATION,
RETAINING WALL, AND SHIELDED CONTROL BUILDING
(TAN-620). CAMERA FACING NORTHEASTERLY. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. HD-21-7-4.
ID-33-E-2 IET DISTANT CONTEXTUAL VIEW OF SHIELDED CONTROL
BUILDING (TAN-620). CAMERA FACING SOUTHWESTERLY. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-8-3. 
ID-33-E-3 IET DISTANT CONTEXTUAL VIEW OF EARTH COVERING OVER
SHIELDED ROADWAY. CAMERAL FACING SOUTH. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. HD-21-9-1. 
ID-33-E-4 IET CONTEXTUAL VIEW OF COUPLING STATION, TRACKS, AND
RETAINING WALL. EXPERIMENT SHACK ON LEFT SIDE OF
COUPLING STATION REMAINS FROM SNAPTRAN TESTS. CAMERA
FACING NORTHERLY. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-7-3. 
ID-33-E-5 IET CONTEXTUAL VIEW OF ENTRANCE TO SHIELDED ROADWAY.
CAMERAL FACING WEST. STACK AND OTHER BUILDINGS HAVE
BEEN REMOVED. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-7-2. 
ID-33-E-6 IET CONTEXTUAL VIEW OF TAN-620, SHIELDED CONTROL
BUILDING. CAMERA FACING NORTHWESTERLY. NON-IET-RELATED
MONITORING DEVICE IN FOREGROUND. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-21-8-2.
ID-33-E-7 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). AIR INTAKE STRUCTURE.
CAMERA FACING NORTH. PART OF WING WALL HAS BEEN
DAMAGED. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-7-1. 
ID-33-E-8 IET FUEL TRANSFER PUMP BUILDING (TAN-625). CAMERA
FACING SOUTH. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-8-1.
ID-33-E-9 IET CONTEXTUAL VIEW. CAMERA FACING SOUTHERLY. REAR OF
COUPLING STATION AT RIGHT OF VIEW. CONTROL BUILDING
(TAN-620) TO ITS LEFT. EXHAUST STACK AND DUCT HAVE BEEN
REMOVED. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-9-2.
ID-33-E-10 IET PERSONNEL TUNNEL. ELECTRICAL AND OTHER CONDUIT
RUNS ALONG CEILING. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-3-3.
ID-33-E-11 IET ENTRANCE TO CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620) FROM
SHIELDED ROADWAY. CAMERA FACING WEST. NOTE
CORRUGATED STEEL WALL, CURBS ALONG ROADWAY,
DRAINAGE GRATE. ROOM BEYOND IS TURNAROUND AREA.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-6-1.
ID-33-E-12 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620) TURNAROUND AREA.
CAMERA PROBABLY FACING NORTHERLY. VENTILATION
DUCTS NEAR CEILING. SIGN SAYS, "PARKING POSITION
NO. 3, USE THIS SPACE LAST." POURED CONCRETE
WALLS. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-5-4.
ID-33-E-13 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). INTERIOR SERVICE
ROOM. PIPING. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-1-3.
ID-33-E-14 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). INTERIOR SERVICE
ROOM, DETAIL OF PIPING. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-21-2-1.
ID-33-E-15 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). INTERIOR PERSONNEL
SERVICE ROOM. SIGN NEXT TO SHOWER STALL SAYS,
"FIGHT ATHLETE'S [FOOT] WITH SANI-MIST." INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-1-1.
ID-33-E-16 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). INTERIOR ROOM.
CONCRETE WALLS, FLOOR, CEILING. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-21-1-4.
ID-33-E-17 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). INTERIOR ROOM.
SIGN SAYS, "EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT FOR METAL FIRES."
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-1-2.
ID-33-E-18 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). INTERIOR SERVICE
ROOM. GENERAL ELECTRIC CONTROL PANEL AND RELATED
PIPING. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-2-3.
ID-33-E-19 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). INTERIOR SERVICE
AREA. AIR DUCT. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-2-4.
ID-33-E-20 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). REMAINS OF
PERISCOPE CONNECTIONS AND CONTROL CONSOLE AT FAR
WEST WALL OF CONTROL ROOM. CAMERA FACING WESTERLY.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-2-2.
ID-33-E-21 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). INTERIOR SERVICE
AREA. EQUIPMENT ON CONCRETE PADS. LIQUID PUMP AND
VALVES ON RIGHT. CONTROL PANEL AT CENTER OF VIEW,
BLOWER AT LEFT. PIPING FOR VENT AND SANITARY
SEWER. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-3-1.
ID-33-E-22 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). INTERIOR SHOP
AREA. REMAINS OF ELECTRIC-DRIVEN HOIST. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-3-2.
ID-33-E-23 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). CONTROL ROOM.
CAMERA FACING EASTERLY. WINDOWS ON EAST END OF
CONTROL ROOM WITH DATA ROOM BEYOND. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. HD-21-3-4.
ID-33-E-24 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). CONTROL ROOM.
CAMERA FACING NORTHERLY. CONTROL CONSOLES HAVE
BEEN REMOVED. OPENINGS IN FLOOR WERE COMMUNICATION
AND CONTROL CONDUITS. PERISCOPE CONTROLS AT CENTER
LEFT. (SEE ALSO HAER NO. ID-3-E-20.) INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-3-1.
ID-33-E-25 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). CONTROL ROOM.
CAMERA FACING EASTERLY. INSTRUMENT RACKS ALONG
NORTH WALL. GLAZING ON EAST WALL. LAYOUT OF
CONTROL CONSOLES EVIDENT BY OPENINGS IN FLOOR.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-4-2.
ID-33-E-26 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). SPECIALIZED
ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT IN BUILDING SERVICE ROOM.
NAMEPLATE: WORTHINGTON. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-21-4-4.
ID-33-E-27 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). EQUIPMENT REMOVED.
LUBE OIL AND WASTE PIPING AT UPPER RIGHT. FIRE
DOOR AT RIGHT. REBAR EXPOSED IN CONCRETE OF
CEILING. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-5-3.
ID-33-E-28 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). CAMERA SHOOTING
ALONG EAST/WEST AXIS, EQUIPMENT ROOM. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-5-2.
ID-33-E-29 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). CAMERA PROBABLY
FACING WEST IN EQUIPMENT ROOM. NAME BRAND: P&H
HEAVI-LIFT. NOTE DOORWAY AND CORRIDOR AT LEFT OF
VIEW. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-5-3.
ID-33-E-30 IET CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). SWITCH PANELS.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-21-5-1.
Photos ID-33-E-31 through ID-33-E-56 are historical photographs
of the IET from the INEEL photo collection. When known, date,
photographer, and camera position are noted.
ID-33-E-31 IET. AERIAL VIEW OF PROJECT, 95 PERCENT COMPLETE.
CAMERA FACES EAST. LEFT TO RIGHT: STACK, DUCT,
MOBILE TEST CELL BUILDING (TAN-624), FOUR-RAIL
TRACK, DOLLY. RETAINING WALL BETWEEN MOBILE TEST
BUILDING AND SHIELDED CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620)
JUST BEYOND. NORTH OF CONTROL BUILDING ARE TANK
BUILDING (TAN-627) AND FUEL-TRANSFER PUMP BUILDING
(TAN-625). GUARD HOUSE AT UPPER RIGHT ALONG
EXCLUSION FENCE. CONSTRUCTION VEHICLES AND
TEMPORARY WAREHOUSE IN VIEW NEAR GUARD HOUSE.
DATE: JUNE 6, 1955. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 55-1462.
ID-33-E-32 IET. COUPLING STATION AND TRACK FOUNDATIONS UNDER
CONSTRUCTION. CAMERA FACING NORTHERLY. FOUR-RAIL
TRACK FOUNDATIONS LEAD TO COUPLING STATION.
SERVICE LEADS FROM HTRE WILL GO THROUGH OPENING
FOR "QUICK CONNECTS" BELOW. RETAINING WALL UNDER
CONSTRUCTION WILL SEPARATE EARTHEN SHIELDING OF
CONTROL BUILDING (OUT OF VIEW TO RIGHT) FROM
COUPLING STATION AND TRACK. DATE: OCTOBER 20,
1954. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 12550.
ID-33-E-33 IET. FOUR-RAIL TRACK AND RAILROAD CREW. CAMERA
FACING NORTHERLY. COUPLING STATION AT END OF
TRACK. SHIELDING ABOVE CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620)
AT RIGHT OF VIEW. AIR INTAKE STRUCTURE PROJECTS
FROM CONTROL BUILDING. DATE: NOVEMBER 19, 1954.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 12997.
ID-33-E-34 IET. PERSONNEL ACCESS CORRIDOR UNDER CONSTRUCTION.
DATE: JULY 19, 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 11334.
ID-33-E-35 IET. CONSTRUCTION VIEW OF CONTROL BUILDING
(TAN-620). CAMERA FACES EAST, TOWARDS WEST WALL OF
CONTROL BUILDING. STRUCTURE AT LEFT SHOWS PROGRESS
FORMING THE PERSONNEL TUNNEL THAT WILL CONNECT
CONTROL BUILDING TO COUPLING STATION. NOTE TWO
ROUND OPENINGS FOR PERISCOPES NEAR LADDER AT
 RIGHT. DATE: AUGUST 20, 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
11709.
ID-33-E-36 IET. DIESEL ENGINE FOR EMERGENCY GENERATOR IS
HEADED FOR INSTALLATION IN SHIELDED CONTROL
BUILDING (TAN-620). DATE: SEPTEMBER 21, 1954.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 12145.
ID-33-E-37 IET. COUPLING STATION. MAN HOLDS FLEXIBLE COUPLERS
TO REACTOR DOLLY AND HTRE RIG. DATE: APRIL 22,
1955. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 55-1010.
ID-33-E-38 IET. PERISCOPES. MEN ARE IN CONTROL ROOM OF
CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620). CAMERA FACING WEST.
NOTE CONDUIT HOLES IN FLOOR AT LOWER LEFT. DATE:
MAY 20, 1955. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 55-1299.
ID-33-E-39 IET. CONTROL ROOM IN CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620).
TERMINAL PANELS FOR INSTRUMENTATION WIRING. NOTE
ALARM HORN AND EMERGENCY LIGHT AT RIGHT EDGE OF
VIEW. CABLE REEL COMES FROM COLLIER, PAWTUCKET,
R.I. DATE: FEBRUARY 1955. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
55-362.
ID-33-E-40 IET. JET FUEL TANK BEING LOWERED INTO POSITION
BELOW GRADE. TWO TANKS ALREADY IN PLACE. DATE:
OCTOBER 18, 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 12535.
ID-33-E-41 IET. AERIAL VIEW DURING CONSTRUCTION, CAMERA
FACING SOUTHWEST. CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-620) IN
CENTER. RETAINING WALL IN PLACE ON WEST SIDE. TANK
BUILDING (TAN-627) AND FUEL-TRANSFER PUMP BUILDING
(TAN-625) NORTH OF CONTROL BUILDING. SHIELDED
ROADWAY NOT YET BUILT. FOUNDATION OF STACK AT
RIGHT EDGE OF VIEW. DATE: NOVEMBER 24, 1954. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. 13198.
ID-33-E-42 IET. EXHAUST STACK FOUNDATION UNDER CONSTRUCTION.
REINFORCED CONCRETE FOOTINGS FOR DUCT AT RIGHT OF
STACK. FOUNDATION IS IN OCTAGONAL SHAPE. DATE:
OCTOBER 29, 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 12711.
ID-33-E-43 IET. STACK INTERIOR. MASONS LAY FIRE BRICK LINER,
LEAVING AIR LAYER BETWEEN BRICKS AND CONCRETE
WALL. DATE: MAY 20, 1955. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
55-1306.
ID-33-E-44 IET. EXCLUSION GUARD HOUSE, 71.8 PERCENT COMPLETE.
CAMERA FACES NORTHERLY. PUMICE BLOCK WALLS, CANOPY
OVER CONCRETE SLABS. DATE: OCTOBER 20, 1954. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. 12541.
ID-33-E-45 IET. WEATHER INSTRUMENTATION TOWER, LOCATED SOUTH
OF CONTROL BUILDING. CAMERA FACES WEST. DATE:
AUGUST 17, 1955. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 55-2414.
ID-33-E-46 IET. MOBILE TEST CELL BUILDING (TAN-624). CAMERA
FACES SOUTHERLY. NOTE FOLDING DOOR PANELS, TRAVEL
RAILS ON EACH SIDE. PART OF STRUCTURAL ALUMINUM
FRAMEWORK IS VISIBLE INSIDE. DATE: APRIL 22, 1955.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 55-1012.
ID-33-E-47 IET. COUPLING STATION UNDER PREPARATION FOR FIRST
TEST. CAMERA FACING NORTH. BANK OF LIGHTS AND
PERISCOPE SHIELDS AT EACH SIDE OF COUPLING
STATION. NOTE VIEW OF STACK AND TWIN (DIVIDED)
DUCT CONNECTIONS THROUGH TRANSOM OPENING OF
COUPLING STATION. DRAINS TRANSVERSE TO TRACKS.
RETAINING WALL AT RIGHT OF VIEW. DATE: JUNE 22,
1955. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 55-1698.
ID-33-E-48 IET. AERIAL VIEW OF SNAPTRAN DESTRUCTIVE
EXPERIMENT IN 1964. CAMERA FACING NORTHERLY. TEST
CELL BUILDING (TAN-624) IS POSITIONED AWAY FROM
COUPLING STATION. WEATHER TOWER IN RIGHT
FOREGROUND. DIVIDED DUCT JUST BEYOND COUPLING
STATION. AIR INTAKE STRUCTURE ON SOUTH SIDE OF
SHIELDED CONTROL ROOM. EXPERIMENT IS ON DOLLY AT
COUPLING STATION. DATE: 1964. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
64-1736.
ID-33-E-49 SNAPTRAN-2 EXPERIMENT MOUNTED ON DOLLY BEING
HAULED BY SHIELDED LOCOMOTIVE FROM IET TOWARD A&M
TURNTABLE. NOTE LEADS FROM EXPERIMENT GATHERED AT
COUPLING BAR IN LOWER RIGHT OF VIEW. ANOTHER DOLLY
IN VIEW AT LEFT. CAMERA FACING SOUTHEAST.
PHOTOGRAPHER: PAGE COMISKEY. DATE: AUGUST 25,
1965. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 65-4503.
ID-33-E-50 IET. SNAPTRAN-2 EXPERIMENT. PROJECT PHOTOGRAPHER
WORKING ON "STATION C" CAMERA. PHOTOGRAPHER: PAGE
COMISKEY. DATE: SEPTEMBER 22, 1965. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. 65-4949.
ID-33-E-51 IET. SNAPTRAN PHOTOGRAPHER ADJUSTING MIRRORS AT
CAMERA STATION FOR RECORDING SNAPTRAN TEST.
PHOTOGRAPHER: PAGE COMISKEY. DATE: SEPTEMBER 22,
1965.
ID-33-E-52 IET. SNAPTRAN. FLYING A KITE IN THE SERVICE OF
SCIENCE. DOUG WENZEL AND JON HURD OBTAIN WEATHER
DATA ON EAST SIDE OF IET AS PART OF SNAPTRAN
EXPERIMENT. TANK BUILDING (TAN-627) AND MOVABLE
BUILDING (TAN-624) AT LEFT. STACK AND ANP DUCT AT
RIGHT. PHOTOGRAPHER: FARMER. DATE: SEPTEMBER 27,
1965. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.65-4986.
ID-33-E-53 IET. SNAPTRAN REACTOR PACKAGE INSIDE MOVABLE
BUILDING (TAN-624). CAMERA FACING SOUTHWEST. HOSES
AT RIGHT OF VIEW LEAD TO COUPLING STATION PLUG.
PHOTOGRAPHER: PAGE COMISKEY. DATE: AUGUST 11,
1965. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 65-4027.
ID-33-E-54 IET. INSIDE THE COUPLING STATION DURING SNAPTRAN
TESTS. SNAPTRAN 2/10A-1 PLUG AND FLEXIBLE HOSES
MAKE CONNECTIONS WITH EXPERIMENT ON OTHER SIDE.
PHOTOGRAPHER: PAGE COMISKEY. DATE: AUGUST 11,
1965. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 65-4060.
ID-33-E-55 IET. TYPICAL DETAIL DURING SNAPTRAN REACTOR
EXPERIMENTS. SHIELDING BRICKS PROTECT ION CHAMBER
BENEATH REACTOR ON DOLLY. PHOTOGRAPHER: PAGE
COMISKEY. DATE: AUGUST 11, 1965. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. 65-4039.
Photos ID-33-E-56 through ID-33-E-70 are of architectural
drawings of IET buildings constructed at TAN during the Aircraft
Nuclear Propulsion program. 
ID-33-E-56 IET AREA PLOT AND UTILITIES PLAN. INCLUDES
DRAINAGE. RALPH M. PARSONS 902-4-ANP-U-310. DATE:
FEBRUARY 1954. APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION
OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL CODE NO.
035-0100-00-693-106898.
ID-33-E-57 IET. MOVABLE TEST CELL BUILDING (TAN 624). PLANS,
SECTIONS, AND ELEVATIONS SHOW TRAPEZOIDAL SHAPE OF
FRONT/REAR ELEVATIONS, VERTICAL SLIDING DOOR
PANELS, WHEELS, PERISCOPE AND CAMERA LOCATIONS,
FIXED CONCRETE WALL, AND RELATIONSHIP TO COUPLING
STATION (TAN-620) AND RAIL TRACK. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-4-ANP-624-A 329. DATE: FEBRUARY 1954. APPROVED
BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 035-0624-00-693-106911. 
ID-33-E-58 IET. COUPLING STATION (TAN-620), PLANS AND
SECTIONS. CONCRETE SHIELDING WALLS AND BORON
SURFACE TREATMENT. ELEVATION SHOWS TWO FLOOR
LEVELS, POSITION OF PERISCOPES, AND STAIRWAYS.
RALPH M. PARSONS 902-4-ANP-620-A 325. DATE:
FEBRUARY 1954. APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION
OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
035-0620-00-693-106910.
ID-33-E-59 IET. PERISCOPE SHIELDING AND INSTALLATION DETAILS.
SHOWS RANGE OF SCANNING HEAD, REMOVABLE CONCRETE
CAP, CONCRETE SHIELDING. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-4-ANP-620-A 324. DATE: FEBRUARY 1954. APPROVED
BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 035-0620-00-693-106909.
ID-33-E-60 IET. COUPLING STATION (TAN-620) AND SERVICE ROOM
SECTIONS AND DETAILS. INTERIOR ELECTRICAL FEATURES
INSIDE COUPLING STATION. CABLE TERMINAL ASSEMBLY
FOR PATCH PANEL FOR PLUG. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-4-ANP-620-E 401. DATE: FEBRUARY 1954. APPROVED
BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 035-0620-10-693-106958.
ID-33-E-61 IET EXHAUST GAS DUCT, SYSTEM LAYOUT, PLAN, AND
SECTION. SHOWS MOUNTING BRACKETS, CONCRETE BRACES,
DIVIDED PORTION OF DUCT, OTHER DETAILS. RALPH M.
PARSONS 902-5-ANP-712-S 429. DATE: MAY 1954.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
035-0712-60-693-106980.
ID-33-E-62 IET EXHAUST GAS STACK. SECTION, WEST ELEVATION,
FOUNDATION PLAN, ACCESS LADDER, AIRPLANE WARNING
LIGHT. RALPH M. PARSONS 902-5-ANP-712-S 433. DATE:
MAY 1954. APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE
FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
035-0712-60-693-106984.
ID-33-E-63 IET. CONTROL AND EQUIPMENT BUILDING (TAN-620)
FLOOR PLAN. SCHEDULE OF FURNITURE AND EQUIPMENT.
RALPH M. PARSONS 902-4-ANP-A 320. DATE: FEBRUARY
1954. APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR
PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
035-0620-00-693-106905.
ID-33-E-64 IET. CONTROL AND EQUIPMENT BUILDING (TAN-620)
SECTIONS. DEPTH AND PROFILE OF EARTHEN SHIELD,
TUNNELS. RALPH M. PARSONS 902-4-ANP-620-A-321.
DATE: FEBRUARY 1954. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
035-0620-00-693-106906.
ID-33-E-65 IET. CONTROL AND EQUIPMENT BUILDING (TAN-620).
DETAILS AND ROOM FINISH SCHEDULE. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-4-ANP-620-A 322. APPROVED BY INEEL
CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL
INDEX CODE NO. 035-0629-00-693-106907.
ID-33-E-66 IET. EXCLUSION GUARD HOUSE (TAN-621) AND UNIT
SUBSTATION (TAN-622). ELEVATIONS AND FLOOR PLAN.
ALSO SHOWS CONCRETE PAD FOR SUBSTATION. RALPH M.
PARSONS 902-4-ANP-621-622-A&S 411. DATE: FEBRUARY
1954. APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR
PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
035-0621-60-693-106968.
ID-33-E-67 IET. CONTROL AND EQUIPMENT BUILDING (TAN-620).
BLAST DOOR DETAILS. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-4-ANP-620-A-323. DATE: FEBRUARY 1954. APPROVED
BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 035-620-00-693-106908.
ID-33-E-68 IET. TANK BUILDING (TAN-627). PLANS, ELEVATION,
DETAILS. SHOWS POSITION OF TANKS WITHIN BUILDING
AND CONCRETE SUPPORTS. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-4-ANP-627-A&S 420. DATE: FEBRUARY 1954.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
035-0627-00-693-106975.
ID-33-E-69 IET. FUEL TRANSFER PUMPING BUILDING (TAN-625).
ELEVATIONS, FOUNDATION. DETAIL OF ACCESS STAIRWAY
TO COUPLING STATION. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-4-ANY-620-625-A&S 414. DATE: FEBRUARY 1954.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
035-0625-00-693-106971.
ASSEMBLY AND MAINTENANCE COMPLEX
Photos ID-33-E-70 through ID-33-E-110 were taken of buildings at
the ANP Assembly and Maintenance area prior to demolition.
HAER-quality large-format photos have not been taken of the
Assembly and Maintenance Building (TAN-607), the Hot Shop, as it
has not been scheduled for demolition as of the date of this
report. However, historic photographs and architectural drawings
are documented in this report. Photographer is Mike Crane, unless
otherwise indicated.
ID-33-E-70 A&M. HOT CELL ANNEX (TAN-633) CONTEXTUAL VIEW ALSO
SHOWING EAST FACADE. CAMERA FACING WEST. NOTE
CORRIDOR CONNECTING ANNEX TO POOL AREA OF TAN-607.
PUMICE BLOCK WALLS. DATE: MARCH 2004. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-2-2.
ID-33-E-71 A&M. HOT CELL ANNEX (TAN-633) NORTH FACADE. GABLED
CANOPY SHELTERS NORTH END OF MONORAIL. HIGH BAY OF
HOT SHOP BEYOND. DATE: MARCH 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. HD-39-2-4.
ID-33-E-72 A&M. HOT CELL ANNEX (TAN-633) WEST FACADE. CAMERA
FACING EAST. DEMOLITION EQUIPMENT IN FOREGROUND.
MONORAIL AT LEFT OF VIEW. DATE: MARCH 2004. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-2-1.
ID-33-E-73 A&M. HOT CELL ANNEX (TAN-633) INTERIOR OF
OPERATING GALLERY. CAMERA PROBABLY FACING SOUTH.
AT EACH SIDE OF VIEWING WINDOWS ARE "MASTER"
MANIPULATORS WHICH CONTROL "SLAVES" WITHIN HOT
CELL. DATE: MARCH 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-39-2-3.
ID-33-E-74 A&M. SHIELDED LOCOMOTIVE (TAN-807), PARKED AND
INACTIVE ON TRACK WEST OF A&M BUILDING. CAMERA
FACING NORTHEAST. DATE: MARCH 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. HD-39-10-1.
ID-33-E-75 A&M. SHIELDED LOCOMOTIVE (TAN-807). CAMERA FACING
WEST. DATE: MARCH 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-39-10-2.
ID-33-E-76 A&M. SHIELDED LOCOMOTIVE (TAN-607). CAMERA FACING
SOUTHWEST. DATE: MARCH 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-39-10-3.
ID-33-E-77 A&M. CONTEXTUAL VIEW OF TURNTABLE CONTROL SHACK
(TAN-661, BUILT IN 1970) AND RADIOACTIVE PARTS
SECURITY STORAGE AREA. CAMERA FACING NORTHWESTERLY
AND SHOOTING ACROSS TURNTABLE. DOOR TO SHACK IS TO
RIGHT. JANUARY 29, 2003. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-33-2-1.
ID-33-E-78 A&M. TURNTABLE CONTROL SHACK (TAN-661). OBLIQUE
VIEW, CAMERA FACING EASTERLY. DOOR. DATE: JANUARY
29, 2003. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-33-2-4.
ID-33-E-79 A&M. TURNTABLE CONTROL SHACK (TAN-661) INTERIOR
DETAIL. TAKEN FROM DOOR INTO SWITCH PANEL. DATE:
JANUARY 29, 2003. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-33-3-2. 
ID-33-E-80 A&M. OUTDOOR TURNTABLE. CAMERA FACING EAST TOWARD
HOT SHOP (TAN-607). VIEW TAKEN JUST BEFORE
DEMOLITION BEGAN. CRANE IN VIEW. DATE: FEBRUARY 3,
2003. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-37-5-1.
ID-33-E-81 A&M. OUTDOOR TURNTABLE. WORKINGS AND DESIGN
EXPOSED DURING DEMOLITION. TURNTABLE PLATFORM
TRAVELED ON CONCENTRIC CIRCULAR RAILS, THIS ONE
THE INNER RAIL. RADIOACTIVE PARTS STORAGE AREA IN
BACKGROUND. DATE: FEBRUARY 3, 2003. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. HD-37-2-2.
ID-33-E-82 A&M. OUTDOOR TURNTABLE. WORKINGS AND DESIGN
EXPOSED DURING DEMOLITION. DETAIL OF PLATFORM
WHEELS AND STRUCTURAL STEEL BEAMS RESTING UPON
WHEEL. WOOD DECK ABOVE STEEL BEAMS. DATE: FEBRUARY
3, 2003. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-37-4-1.
ID-33-E-83 A&M. OUTDOOR TURNTABLE. WORKINGS AND DESIGN
EXPOSED DURING DEMOLITION. DETAIL OF RADIALLY
PLACED STEEL BEAMS SUPPORTING ROTATING PLATFORM.
PART OF SHIELDED LOCOMOTIVE AT UPPER RIGHT. DATE:
FEBRUARY 3, 2003. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-37-1-3.
ID-33-E-84 A&M. OUTDOOR TURNTABLE. WORKINGS AND DESIGN
EXPOSED DURING DEMOLITION. OUTER EDGE OF TURNTABLE
SHAPED BY CONCRETE. OUTER WHEEL AND RAIL. DATE:
FEBRUARY 3, 2003. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-37-1-2.
ID-33-E-85 A&M. OUTDOOR TURNTABLE. WORKINGS AND DESIGN
EXPOSED DURING DEMOLITION. VIEW BETWEEN TWO OF THE
FOUR RAILS OF THE TRACK. NOTE MOTOR AND ELECTRICAL
CONDUIT. DATE: FEBRUARY 3, 2003. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. HD-37-1-1.
ID-33-E-86 A&M. OUTDOOR TURNTABLE DURING DEMOLITION. CONCRETE
FOUNDATION SUPPORTS INNER RAIL OF TURNTABLE. DATE:
FEBRUARY 3, 2003. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-37-1-4.
ID-33-E-87 A&M. OUTDOOR TURNTABLE DURING DEMOLITION. CONCRETE
STRUCTURAL SUPPORTS RADIATE FROM CENTER TOWARDS
OUTER EDGE OF TURNTABLE. DETAIL OF WHEEL. DATE:
FEBRUARY 3, 2003. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-37-3-2.
ID-33-E-88 A&M. GUARD HOUSE (TAN-638), CONTEXTUAL VIEW. BUILT
IN 1968. CAMERA FACES SOUTH. GUARD HOUSE
CONTROLLED ACCESS TO RADIOACTIVE WASTE STORAGE
TANKS BEYOND AND TO LEFT OF VIEW. DATE: FEBRUARY
4, 2003. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-33-4-1. 
ID-33-E-89 A&M. GUARD HOUSE (TAN-638), CONTEXTUAL VIEW WITH
CAMERA FACING NORTHEASTERLY TOWARDS TAN-607. DATE:
FEBRUARY 4, 2003. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-33-4-2.
ID-33-E-90 A&M. GUARD HOUSE (TAN-638). OBLIQUE VIEW OF NORTH
AND WEST FACADES. (DOOR IN WEST FACADE). CAMERA
FACING SOUTHERLY. DATE: FEBRUARY 4, 2003. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-33-4-3.
ID-33-E-91 A&M. GUARD HOUSE (TAN-638). OBLIQUE VIEW OF EAST
AND SOUTH FACADES. CAMERA FACING NORTHERLY. DATE:
FEBRUARY 4, 2003. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-33-4-4.
ID-33-E-92 A&M. GUARD HOUSE (TAN-638). DETAIL OF WEST FACADE
AND FRONT DOOR. FLOOD LIGHT BENT BELOW EAVE.
TRAFFIC CONTROL SIGNAL IN VIEW. CAMERA FACING
EAST. DATE: FEBRUARY 4, 2003. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-33-6-3.
ID-33-E-93 A&M. GUARD HOUSE (TAN-638). DETAIL OF WINDOW GRILL
ON FRONT DOOR (WEST FACADE). DATE: FEBRUARY 4,
2003. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-33-6-4.
ID-33-E-94 A&M. GUARD HOUSE (TAN-638). INTERIOR. PARTITIONED
AREA IN FRONT OF VIEW IS TOILET ENCLOSURE. DATE:
FEBRUARY 4, 2003. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-33-7-1.
ID-33-E-95 A&M. GUARD HOUSE (TAN-638). INTERIOR DETAIL.
TURNSTILE AND VIEW TO DOOR. DATE: FEBRUARY 4,
2003. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-33-7-2.
ID-33-E-96 A&M. GUARD HOUSE (TAN-638). INTERIOR DETAIL OF
CORNER AND WINDOWS. DATE: FEBRUARY 4, 2003. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-33-7-3.
ID-33-E-97 A&M. HOT LIQUID WASTE TREATMENT BUILDING
(TAN-616). CONTEXTUAL VIEW, CAMERA FACING
SOUTHERLY. WALL OF HOT SHOP (TAN-607) WITH HIGH
BAY AT LEFT OF VIEW. LOWER-ROOFED BUILDING AT LEFT
EDGE OF VIEW IS TAN-633, HOT CELL ANNEX. COMPLEX
AT CENTER OF VIEW IS TAN-616. TALL METAL BUILDING
WITH GABLE ROOF IS TAN-615. PHOTOGRAPHER: RON
PAARMANN. DATE: SEPTEMBER 22, 1997. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. HD-20-2-2.
ID-33-E-98 A&M. HOT LIQUID WASTE TREATMENT BUILDING
(TAN-616). CAMERA FACING SOUTHWEST. OBLIQUE VIEW
OF EAST AND NORTH WALLS. NOTE THREE CORRUGATED
PIPES AT LOWER LEFT INDICATING LOCATION OF
UNDERGROUND HOT WASTE STORAGE TANKS. PHOTOGRAPHER:
RON PAARMANN. DATE: SEPTEMBER 22, 1997. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-20-1-4.
ID-33-E-99 A&M. HOT LIQUID WASTE TREATMENT BUILDING
(TAN-616), SOUTH SIDE. CAMERA FACING NORTH.
PERSONNEL DOOR AT LEFT SIDE OF WALL. PARTIAL VIEW
OF OUTDOOR STAIRWAY TO UPPER LEVEL PLATFORM. NOTE
CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION. PHOTOGRAPHER: RON PAARMANN.
DATE: SEPTEMBER 22, 1997. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-20-1-3.
ID-33-E-100 A&M. HOT LIQUID WASTE TREATMENT BUILDING
(TAN-616). CAMERA FACING NORTH. DETAIL OF
PERSONNEL ENTRANCE DOOR, STOOP, AND STAIRWAY.
PHOTOGRAPHER: RON PAARMANN. DATE: SEPTEMBER 22,
1997. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-20-2-1.
ID-33-E-101 A&M. HOT LIQUID WASTE TREATMENT BUILDING
(TAN-616). CAMERA FACING NORTHEAST. SOUTH WALL
WITH OBLIQUE VIEWS OF WEST SIDES OF STRUCTURE.
PHOTOGRAPHER: RON PAARMANN. DATE: SEPTEMBER 22,
1997. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-20-1-2.
ID-33-E-102 A&M. HOT LIQUID WASTE TREATMENT BUILDING
(TAN-616). CAMERA FACING EAST, SHOWING WEST
FACADES OF STRUCTURE. PHOTOGRAPHER: RON PAARMANN.
DATE: SEPTEMBER 22, 1997. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-20-1-1.
ID-33-E-103 A&M. RADIOACTIVE PARTS SECURITY STORAGE
WAREHOUSES: TAN-648 ON LEFT, AND DOLLY STORAGE
BUILDING, TAN-647, ON RIGHT. CAMERA FACING SOUTH.
THIS WAS THE FRONT ENTRY FOR THE WAREHOUSE AND THE
REAR OF THE DOLLY STORAGE BUILDING. DATE: AUGUST
6, 2003. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-36-2-2.
ID-33-E-104 A&M. RADIOACTIVE PARTS SECURITY STORAGE WAREHOUSE
(TAN 648) ON LEFT; TAN-647 AT RIGHT. CAMERA FACING
SOUTHWEST. DETAIL OF PERSONNEL DOOR TO DOLLY
STORAGE BUILDING. DATE: AUGUST 6, 2003. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-36-2-4.
ID-33-E-105 A&M. DOLLY STORAGE BUILDING (TAN-647), INTERIOR.
CAMERA FACING SOUTH. NOTE FOUR-RAIL TRACK IN
GRAVEL FLOOR. SOUTHERN 3/4THS OF FLOOR IS GRAVEL.
NORTHERN 1/4TH IS CONCRETE. DATE: AUGUST 6, 2003.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-36-2-3.
ID-33-E-106 A&M. DOLLY STORAGE BUILDING (TAN-647), INTERIOR
DETAIL. CAMERA FACING NORTHEAST. METAL FRAME,
METAL WALLS, METAL DOOR. DATE: AUGUST 6, 2003.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-36-2-1.
ID-33-E-107 A&M. DOLLY STORAGE BUILDING (TAN-647). CAMERA
FACING WEST. DATE: AUGUST 6, 2003. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. HD-36-1-1.
ID-33-E-108 A&M. DOLLY STORAGE BUILDING (TAN-647). OBLIQUE
VIEW, CAMERA FACING NORTHWEST. DATE: AUGUST 6,
2003. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-36-1-2.
ID-33-E-109 A&M. DOLLY STORAGE BUILDING (TAN-647). CAMERA
FACING SOUTH. PHOTOGRAPHER: MIKE CRANE. DATE:
AUGUST 6, 2003. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-36-1-3.
ID-33-E-110 A&M. DOLLY STORAGE BUILDING (TAN-647). CAMERA
FACING NORTH. RAIL TRACKS CURVE INTO BUILDING.
TAN-648 ON RIGHT. DATE: AUGUST 6, 2003. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-36-1-4.
Photos ID-33-E-111 through ID-33-E-156 are historical photographs
of buildings at the ANP Assembly and Maintenance area.
Photographer names and dates are indicated when known.
ID-33-E-111 A&M. AERIAL VIEW OF TURNTABLE AND A&M BUILDING
(TAN-607). POOL, HOT SHOP, COLD SHOP, AND MACHINE
SHOP ARE COMPLETED. TRACK LEADING TO LEFT EDGE OF
VIEW GOES TO THE IET. ANCIENT LAKE SHORELINE AND
BERM BEYOND A&M BUILDING. CAMERA FACING EAST.
ADMINISTRATION BUILDINGS BEYOND BERM. DATE:
NOVEMBER 24, 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 13205.
ID-33-E-112 A&M. A&M BUILDING (TAN-607). CAMERA FACING EAST.
FROM LEFT TO RIGHT, POOL SECTION, HOT SHOP, COLD
SHOP, AND MACHINE SHOP. BIPARTING DOORS TO HOT
SHOP ARE IN OPEN POSITION BEHIND SHROUD. FOUR-RAIL
TRACKS LEAD TO HOT SHOP AND COLD SHOP. DATE:
AUGUST 20, 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 11706.
ID-33-E-113 A&M. SPECIAL SHIELDING MATERIALS. STOCKPILE OF
MAGNETITE, USED FOR MAKING HIGH-DENSITY CONCRETE,
AND LOADING CONVEYOR NEAR TAN-607 CONSTRUCTION
SITE. DATE: SEPTEMBER 25, 1953. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
8710.
ID-33-E-114 A&M. TAN-607. DETAIL OF FUEL STORAGE POOL UNDER
CONSTRUCTION. CAMERA IS ON BERM AND FACING
NORTHWEST. NOTE DEPTH OF EXCAVATION. FORMWORK
UNDERWAY FOR FLOOR AND CONCRETE WALLS OF POOL;
WALL BETWEEN POOL AND VESTIBULE. AT CENTER LEFT OF
VIEW, FOUNDATION FOR LIQUID WASTE TREATMENT PLANT
IS POURED. DATE: AUGUST 25, 1953. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. 8541.
ID-33-E-115 A&M. TAN-607. CONSTRUCTION DETAIL SHOWING SOUTH
SHIELDING WALL OF HOT SHOP. PORTS HAVE BEEN LEFT
FOR VIEWING WINDOWS. SPACE ON EAST SIDE OF WALL
WILL BE ENCLOSED TO PROVIDE OPERATING GALLERY NEXT
TO VIEWING WINDOWS AND THEN THE COLD SHOP. DATE:
NOVEMBER 25, 1953. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 9233
ID-33-E-116 A&M. TAN-607. CONSTRUCTION VIEW. CAMERA FACING
SOUTHWEST. AT UPPER LEFT OF VIEW, NORTH-WALL
EQUIPMENT AND OPERATING GALLERIES TAKE SHAPE ON
HOT SHOP. PUMICE-BLOCK SIDE OF STORAGE POOL
SECTION IN CENTER LEFT OF VIEW. WATER FILTER
BUILDING (TAN-608) NEXT TO NORTH WALL OF POOL. HOT
LIQUID WASTE BUILDING (TAN-616) AT RIGHT OF VIEW.
NOTE CONCRETE CONSTRUCTION OF TAN-608 AND -616.
DATE: JANUARY 18, 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 9604.
ID-33-E-117 A&M. TAN-607. CONSTRUCTION DETAIL SHOWING
STRUCTURAL STEEL FRAMEWORK WITH REINFORCING STEEL
IN PLACE PRIOR TO POURING CONCRETE FOR BIPARTING
DOORS BETWEEN HOT SHOP AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT
SERVICE (SES) ROOM. CAMERA FACING NORTH. HOT SHOP
TO LEFT, SES ROOM TO RIGHT. SLOT FOR NORTH HALF OF
DOOR SHOWS AT UPPER LEFT OF VIEW. DATE: MAY 21,
1954. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 10548.
ID-33-E-118 A&M. TAN-607. WORKERS PLACE CONCRETE ROOF SLABS
OVER HOT SHOP SECTION. DATE: FEBRUARY 23, 1954.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 9791.
ID-33-E-119 A&M. TAN-607. DETAIL OF INSTALLED HOT SHOP VIEWING
WINDOW ALMOST COMPLETE. CABLE CHANNEL IS STILL
EXPOSED, LACKING COVER. NOTE BOTTLE IN UPPER LEFT
CORNER CONTAINING SPARE ZINC BROMIDE IN EVENT OF
LEAK FROM WINDOW. DATE: OCTOBER 20, 1954. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. 12560.
ID-33-E-120 A&M. TAN-607. INTERIOR VIEW OF OPERATING GALLERY
IN HOT SHOP. SHIELDED VIEWING WINDOWS ARE ALONG
RIGHT SIDE OF CORRIDOR. CABINET ON WHEELS AT LEFT
OF CORRIDOR IS OPERATING CONSOLE FOR HOT SHOP
MANIPULATORS. WHEN IN USE, IT IS STATIONED AT
WINDOW STATION AND CONNECTED TO APPROPRIATE
CONTROL CABLES. NOTE RESERVE BOTTLES OF ZINC
 BROMIDE ABOVE EACH STATION. DATE: JANUARY 3, 1955.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 55-0072.
ID-33-E-121 A&M. TAN-607. INTERIOR OF HOT SHOP FACING EAST
WALL AND BIPARTING DOORS ABOVE IT, IN PLACE AND
OPENED. NOTE WHITING AND EDERER CRANES,
MANIPULATOR INSTALLED ALONG NORTH WALL. DATE:
OCTOBER 13, 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 12506.
ID-33-E-122 A&M. TAN-607. INTERIOR VIEW TAKEN INSIDE HOT SHOP
FACING DOOR ON WEST SIDE OF BUILDING. NOTE TWO
TURNTABLES INSTALLED IN FLOOR. MANIPULATORS ON
WALL AT LEFT OF VIEW. DATE: JANUARY 3, 1955. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. 55-0073.
ID-33-E-123 A&M. TAN-607. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT SERVICES ROOM.
WORKERS ARE FILLING VIEWING WINDOW WITH ZINC
BROMIDE THROUGH TUBE PENETRATING CONCRETE SHIELD
WALL. DATE: AUGUST 16, 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
11689.
ID-33-E-124 A&M. TAN-607. DETAIL OF CONTROL GALLERY FOR
SPECIAL SERVICES CUBICLE (HOT CELL) AT "100
PERCENT COMPLETE." COVER HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
CABLE CHANNEL AT MIDDLE WINDOW. DATE:JANUARY 24,
1955. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 55-0140.
ID-33-E-125 A&M. TAN-607. INTERIOR DETAIL OF COMPLETED STORAGE
POOL. NOTE PARAPET AROUND POOL, 15-TON BRIDGE
CRANE ON PARAPET RAIL, AND WATER IN POOL, EXPOSED
STRUCTURAL ROOF BEAMS. DATE: JANUARY 24, 1955.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 55-0141.
ID-33-E-126 A&M. TAN-607. DETAIL OF INTERIOR OF MACHINE SHOP.
CAMERA FACING SOUTHEAST. NOTE PUMICE BLOCK WALL,
RAIL FOR BRIDGE CRANE. DATE: AUGUST 20, 1954.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 11707.
ID-33-E-127 A&M. TAN-607. SOUTHERN SECTIONS ADDED IN EXPANSION
PROJECT OF 1957. CAMERA FACING NORTHWEST. CONCRETE
DECONTAMINATION SECTION ON LEFT END. PHOTOGRAPHER:
JACK L. ANDERSON. DATE: OCTOBER 23, 1957. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. 57-5337.
ID-33-E-128 A&M. TAN-607. INTERIOR OF DECONTAMINATION ROOM.
CAMERA FACING EAST FROM OUTSIDE DOOR. ACID AND
NEUTRALIZER TANKS ON RIGHT WALL. PHOTOGRAPHER:
LOWIN. DATE: APRIL 21, 1965. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
65-2240.
ID-33-E-129 A&M. TAN-607. INTERIOR OF DECONTAMINATION ROOM.
SANDBLASTING IS PART OF DECONTAMINATION OPERATION
IN SPECIAL ENCLOSURE. NOTE OPERATOR DRESSED IN
PROTECTIVE GEAR. PHOTOGRAPHER: LOWIN. DATE: APRIL
21, 1965. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 65-2238.
ID-33-E-130 A&M. TAN-607. INTERIOR OF DECONTAMINATION ROOM.
OVERALL VIEW LOOKING DOWN FROM 30 FEET. CAMERA
FACING WEST FROM PERSONNEL LADDER. OPERATION IN
PROGRESS WITH HOOK ABOUT TO LIFT CABINET.
PHOTOGRAPHER: LOWIN. DATE: APRIL 21, 1965. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. 65-2239,
ID-33-E-131 A&M. TAN-607 EXPANSION OF 1957. CAMERA FACING
SOUTHWEST. COMPONENTS TEST LAB. DOOR TO SPECIAL
SOURCE VAULT IN REAR OF ROOM AT RIGHT OF VIEW.
PHOTOGRAPHER: JACK L. ANDERSON. DATE: NOVEMBER 21,
1957. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 57-5883.
ID-33-E-132 A&M. HOT LIQUID WASTE HOLDING TANKS. CAMERA FACES
SOUTHEAST. LOCATED IN VICINITY OF TAN-616, HOT
LIQUID WASTE TREATMENT PLANT. DATE: NOVEMBER 13,
1953. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 9159.
ID-33-E-133 A&M. JET ENGINE TEST PAD AND CONTROL BUILDING
(TAN-609). CAMERA FACING WESTERLY. ENGINE PAD AT
LEFT, CONTROL SECTION (PUMICE BLOCK) ON RIGHT.
DATE: SEPTEMBER 19, 1955. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
55-2766.
ID-33-E-134 A&M. TAN-609. JET ENGINE TEST PAD AND CONTROL
BUILDING. CAMERA FACING SOUTHEAST. DATE: JULY 19,
1954. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 11344.
ID-33-E-135 A&M. INTERIOR OF JET ENGINE TEST PAD CONTROL ROOM
(TAN-609). DATE: OCTOBER 29, 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. 12701.
ID-33-E-136 A&M. JET ENGINE TEST BUILDING (TAN-609). EXTERIOR.
EQUIPMENT INSIDE ROLL-UP DOOR IS BLOWDOWN TEST
FACILITY, PART OF LOFT/SEMISCALE PROGRAM. NOTE
WIDTH OF CENTRAL SECTION SERVING AS BLAST
PROTECTION FOR OPERATOR ON LEFT SIDE.
PHOTOGRAPHER: CAHOON. DATE: JULY 22, 1965. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. 65-3703.
ID-33-E-137 A&M. TAN-609. LOOP APPARATUS INSIDE TEST BUILDING
BEING PREPARED FOR TEST. PHOTOGRAPHER: CAHOON.
DATE: JULY 22, 1965. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 65-3700.
ID-33-E-138 A&M. JET ENGINE TEST PAD (TAN-609) WAS USED IN
1968 FOR SEMISCALE TEST APPARATUS. VIEW OF
BLOWDOWN TEST WITH ROLLUP DOOR OPEN. WHEN BREAK IN
PRESSURIZED COOLANT LOOP IS SIMULATED, STEAM IS
RELEASED SUDDENLY. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 68-3179.
ID-33-E-139 A&M. RADIOACTIVE PARTS SECURITY STORAGE AREA UNDER
CONSTRUCTION. CAMERA FACING SOUTHERLY. BUILDING ON
LEFT IS TAN-648, WAREHOUSE FOR RADIOACTIVE PARTS.
STEEL FRAMEWORK IS VISIBLE. BUILDING ON RIGHT IS
TAN-647, DOLLY STORAGE WAREHOUSE. NOTE FIBERGLASS
WINDOWS IN SIDE WALL. PHOTOGRAPHER: M. HOLMES.
DATE: NOVEMBER 23, 1959. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
59-6083.
ID-33-E-140 A&M. RADIOACTIVE PARTS SECURITY STORAGE AREA.
CAMERA FACING NORTH. FOUR-RAIL TRACK LEADS TO
SOUTH END (FRONT DOOR) OF TAN-647. DOLLY IS LOADED
WITH TRANSPORT CASK AND LINER. TO ITS RIGHT, VIEW
SHOWS BACK END OF TAN-648, WHICH IS ACCESSED BY
ROAD ON ITS NORTH SIDE. PHOTOGRAPHER: M. HOLMES.
DATE: DECEMBER 21, 1959. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO.59-6080.
ID-33-E-141 A&M. RADIOACTIVE PARTS SECURITY STORAGE AREA.
CAMERA FACING NORTHWEST. OUTDOOR STORAGE OF
CONCRETE STORAGE CASKS. PHOTOGRAPHER: M. HOLMES.
DATE: NOVEMBER 21, 1959. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
59-6081.
ID-33-E-142 A&M. OUTDOOR TURNTABLE UNDER CONSTRUCTION. WELL
FOR OUTER RAIL IS BEING FORMED. MOTOR WORKS ON
RIGHT. DATE: AUGUST 25, 1953. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
8537.
ID-33-E-143 A&M. OUTDOOR TURNTABLE. FOUNDATION SUPPORTS BEING
FORMED. DATE: SEPTEMBER 25, 1953. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. 8694.
ID-33-E-144 A&M. OUTDOOR TURNTABLE. FOUNDATIONS COMPLETE.
CENTER PIVOT IN PLACE. DATE: NOVEMBER 20, 1953.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 9184.
ID-33-E-145 A&M.OUTDOOR TURNTABLE. STEEL RAIL SUPPORTS GO IN
PLACE. DATE: JUNE 22, 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
11017.
ID-33-E-146 A&M. OUTDOOR TURNTABLE. AERIAL VIEW OF TRACKAGE AS
OF 1954. CAMERA FACES NORTHEAST ALONG LINE OF
TRACK HEADING FOR THE IET. UPPER SET OF EAST/WEST
TRACKS HEAD FOR THE HOT SHOP; THE OTHER, FOR THE
COLD SHOP. DATE: NOVEMBER 24, 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. 13203.
ID-33-E-147 A&M. HOT CELL ANNEX (TAN-633). CAMERA FACING EAST.
CONSTRUCTION VIEW OF NORTH AND WEST WALLS.
PHOTOGRAPHER: JACK L. ANDERSON. DATE: OCTOBER 23,
1957. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 57-5336.
ID-33-E-148 A&M. HOT CELL ANNEX (TAN-633) INTERIOR UNDER
CONSTRUCTION. HOT CELLS AND THEIR DOORS ARE ALONG
CONCRETE WALL. NOTE SIDE WALL OF PUMICE BLOCK.
PHOTOGRAPHER: JACK L. ANDERSON. DATE: OCTOBER 28,
1957. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 57-5335.
ID-33-E-149 A&M. HOT LIQUID WASTE BUILDING (TAN-616) UNDER
CONSTRUCTION. CAMERA FACING NORTHEAST. DATE:
NOVEMBER 25, 1953. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 9232.
ID-33-E-150 A&M. HOT LIQUID WASTE BUILDING (TAN-616). INTERIOR
OF EVAPORATOR CONTROL ROOM. DATE: 1962. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. 62-6824.
ID-33-E-151 A&M. TAN-607, INTERIOR OF HOT SHOP. PROJECT
UNDERWAY IN HOT SHOP. NOTE FESTOON WIRING,
MANIPULATORS, APPARATUS FOR SHIELDING. DATE: 1966.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 66-6309.
ID-33-E-152 A&M. CONTROL ROOM, ROOM 6 AT TAN-607. DATE: 1962.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 62-6843. 
ID-33-E-153 A&M. MACHINE SHOP AT TAN-607. CAMERA LOOKS DOWN
UPON FLOOR FROM ABOVE. DATE: 1962. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. 62-6836
ID-33-E-154 A&M. RADIOACTIVE CHEMISTRY LAB AT TAN-607. DATE:
1962. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 62-6847.
ID-33-E-155 A&M. COMPONENT TEST AREA AT TAN-607. ROOM 127.
DATE: 1962. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 62-6826.
ID-33-E-156 A&M. VIEW OF EAST SIDE (REAR) OF TAN-607 AND
SHORELINE RIDGE/BERM. CAMERA FACING NORTH.
ADMINISTRATIVE AREA IS OUT OF VIEW TOWARD RIGHT.
DATE: 1962. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 62-6829.
Photographs ID-33-E-157 through ID-33-E-186 are of architectural
drawings of the ANP Assembly and Maintenance buildings.
ID-33-E-157 A&M. GRADING AND DRAINAGE PLAN. SHOWS NATURAL
GROUND ELEVATION OF THE (PRESUMED) DRY LAKE-BED
SHORE AND THE BERM SHIELDING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
AREA FROM THE HOT SHOP AREA. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-2&3-ANP-U 4. DATE: DECEMBER 1953. APPROVED BY
INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL CODE NO. 032-0000-OO-693-106691.
ID-33-E-158 A&M. TAN-607 FLOOR PLANS. SHOWS THREE FLOOR LEVELS
OF POOL, HOT SHOP, AND WARM SHOP. INCLUDES VIEW OF
POOL VESTIBULE, PERSONNEL LABYRINTH, LOCATION OF
FLOOR RAILS, AND ROOM NUMBERS OF OFFICE AREAS,
LABS, INSTRUMENT ROOMS, AND STAIRWAYS. THIS
DRAWING WAS RE-DRAWN TO SHOW AS-BUILT FEATURES IN
1993. RALPH M. PARSONS 902-3-ANP-607-A 96. DATE OF
ORIGINAL: DECEMBER 1952. APPROVED BY INEEL
CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL
INDEX CODE NO. 034-0607-00-693-106748.
ID-33-E-159 A&M. TAN-607 FLOOR PLAN FOR FIRST FLOOR. SHOWS
STEPPED DOOR PLUG DESIGN FROM HOT SHOP INTO
SPECIAL SERVICES CUBICLE, CUBICLE WINDOWS, AND
OTHER DETAILS. THIS DRAWING WAS RE-DRAWN TO SHOW
AS-BUILT CONDITIONS IN 1985. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-3-ANP-607-A 99. DATE OF ORIGINAL: JANUARY
1955. APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR
PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
034-0607-00-693-106751.
ID-33-E-160 A&M. TAN-607 FIRST FLOOR PLAN FOR COLD ASSEMBLY
AREA. SHOWS SPECIAL SOURCE VAULTS, X-RAY ROOM,
INSTRUMENT SHOPS, AND POSITIONS OF LARGE MACHINES
IN COMPONENT TEST LABORATORY. THIS DRAWING WAS
RE-DRAWN TO SHOW CONDITIONS IN 1994.  RALPH M.
PARSONS 902-3-ANP-607-A 100. DATE OF ORIGINAL:
DECEMBER 1952. APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION
OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
034-060-00-693-106752
ID-33-E-161 A&M. TAN-607 SECOND FLOOR PLAN FOR COLD ASSEMBLY
AREA. METALLURGICAL LAB, CHEMISTRY LAB, NUCLEAR
INSTRUMENT LAB, EQUIPMENT ROOMS. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-ANP-607-A 102. DATE: DECEMBER 1952. APPROVED
BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 034-0607-693-106754.
ID-33-E-162 A&M. TAN-607 SECOND FLOOR PLAN FOR HOT SHOP. ROOF
OF POOL. VIEWING WINDOW LOCATIONS. SPECIAL
EQUIPMENT ROOM. THIS DRAWING WAS RE-DRAWN TO SHOW
CONDITIONS IN 1994. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-3-ANP-607-A 101. DATE: DECEMBER 1952. APPROVED
BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. O34-060-00-693-106753.
ID-33-E-163 A&M. TAN-607. THIRD FLOOR PLAN FOR HOT SHOP. CRANE
CONTROL ROOMS AND THEIR SHIELDING WINDOWS. PLENUM.
WALL RACK FOR MANIPULATORS IN HOT SHOP. RALPH M.
PARSONS 902-3-ANP-607-A 103. DATE: DECEMBER 1952.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX NO. 034-0607-00-693-106755.
ID-33-E-164 A&M. TAN-607 SECTIONS. SECTION A SHOWS VARIABLE
ROOF LINES, VARIABLE THICKNESS OF HOT SHOP SHIELD
WALLS, RELATIONSHIP OF SUBTERRANEAN POOL TO GRADE.
SECTION B SHOWS RELATIVE HEIGHTS OF HOT SHOP FLOOR
AND ITS CONTROL GALLERY, POSITION OF BRIDGE CRANES
AND MANIPULATOR RAILS. LOCOMOTIVE SERVICE PIT.
REFERENT DRAWING IS ID-33-E-158 ABOVE. RALPH M.
PARSONS 902-3-ANP-607-A 105. DATE: DECEMBER 1952.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
034-0607-00-693-106757.
ID-33-E-165 A&M. TAN-607. SECTIONS. SECTION C CUTS HOT SHOP ON
ITS 160-FOOT EAST/WEST LINE. SHOWS TAPERED SHIELD
WALL ON EAST AND WEST FACADES OF BUILDING.
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOT SHOP AND SPECIAL
EQUIPMENT SERVICE ROOM, CABLE TRACKS FOR OVERHEAD
BRIDGE CRANE, LOCATION OF WELL. CONCRETE ROOF
BEAMS. SECTION D SHOWS SIMILAR EAST/WEST OF COLD
ASSEMBLY ROOM 115 AND ITS BRIDGE CRANE RAIL. SHOWS
HEAVY SHIELDING AROUND SPECIAL SERVICES CUBICLE
AND HEIGHT OF VIEWING WINDOWS ON EAST AND WEST
SIDES. REAR OF BUILDING IS SHOWN IN RELATIONSHIP
TO THE RIDGE EAST OF THE BUILDING. REFERENT
DRAWING IS ID-33-E-158 ABOVE. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-3-ANP-607-A 106. DATE: DECEMBER 1952. APPROVED
BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX NO. 034-0607-00-693-106758.
ID-33-E-166 A&M. TAN-607. SECTION VIEWS OF HOT SHOP. SECTION E
SHOWS EQUIPMENT AREAS ALONG REAR WALL. SECTION F
SHOWS STORAGE POOL CUT ALONG EAST/WEST LINE. ROOF
TRUSSES, SHELVES ALONG SIDES OF POOL, DRAIN, AND
SUMP. SECTION G CUTS ALONG NORTH/SOUTH TO SHOW
CENTERLINE OF TURNTABLES, MANIPULATOR ARMS, O-MAN
BRIDGE, CRANE BRIDGE. REFERENT DRAWING IS
ID-33-E-158 ABOVE. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-3-ANP-607-A 107. DATE: DECEMBER 1952, BUT
AS-BUILT IN 1982. APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION
OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
034-0607-00-693-106759.
ID-33-E-167 A&M. TAN-607. ELEVATIONS FOR SECOND-PHASE
EXPANSION OF A&M BUILDING. WORK AREAS SOUTH OF THE
CARPENTRY SHOP. HIGH-BAY SHOP, DECONTAMINATION
ROOM AT SOUTH-MOST END. APPROVED BY INEEL
CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. RALPH M.
PARSONS 1299-5-ANP/GE-3-607-A 106. DATE: AUGUST
1956. INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 034-0607-00-693-107166.
ID-33-E-168 A&M. TAN-607. SECTIONS FOR SECOND PHASE EXPANSION:
ENGINE MAINTENANCE, MACHINE, AND WELDING SHOPS;
HIGH BAY ASSEMBLY SHOP, CHEMICAL CLEANING ROOM
(DECONTAMINATION). DETAILS OF SLIDING DOOR HOODS.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. RALPH M. PARSONS 1299-5-ANP/GE-3-607-A
109. DATE: AUGUST 1956. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
034-0607-00-693-107169.
ID-33-E-169 A&M. TAN-607. SHIELD WALL SECTIONS AND DETAILS
AROUND HOT SHOP AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT ROOM,
SHOWING TAPER, CRANE RAIL ELEVATIONS, AND
ELEVATION FOR BIPARTING DOOR (DOOR NO. 301) IN
WALL BETWEEN HOT SHOP AND SPECIAL EQUIPMENT ROOM.
RALPH M. PARSONS 902-3-ANP-607-S 138. DATE:
DECEMBER 1952. APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION
OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
034-0607-62-963-106782.
ID-33-E-170 A&M. TAN-607. SPECIAL SERVICE CUBICLE (HOT CELL).
DETAILS INCLUDE Z-PIPE AND STEPPED PLUG
PENETRATIONS THROUGH SHIELDING WALL. RALPH M.
PARSONS 902-3-ANP-607-A116. DATE: DECEMBER 1952.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 034-0607-693-106767.
ID-33-E-171 A&M. TAN-607. FOUNDATION PLAN FOR HOT SHOP FLOOR
AND POOL. TUNNELS TO TURNTABLE. MOTOR PIT. RALPH
M. PARSONS 902-3-ANP-607-S128. DATE: DECEMBER
1952. APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR
PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
034-0607-62-693-106772.
ID-33-E-172 A&M. TAN-607. STRUCTURAL SUPPORTS FOR BIPARTING
DOOR ON EAST WALL OF HOT SHOP. SPECIAL SERVICES
CUBICLE SHIELDING. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-3-ANP-607-S141. DATE: DECEMBER 1952. APPROVED
BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 034-0607-60-693-106785.
ID-33-E-173 A&M. TAN-607. BIPARTING DOOR ON EAST WALL OF HOT
SHOP. STEEL FORM DETAILS. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-3-ANP-607-S148. DATE: DECEMBER 1952. INEEL
INDEX CODE NO. 034-0607-61-693-106792.
ID-33-E-174 A&M. TAN-607. STORAGE POOL VESTIBULE WALL.
SECTIONS AND STRUCTURAL DETAILS. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-3-ANP-607-S137. DATE: DECEMBER 1952. INEEL
INDEX CODE NO. 034-0607-62-693-106781.
ID-33-E-175 A&M. TAN-607. PROCESS EXPERIMENTAL PILOT PLANT
(PREPP) IN NORTH MACHINE SHOP OF TAN-607. FIRST
FLOOR PLAN SHOWS KILN AREA, INTERNAL ROOM
DIVIDERS, AIR LOCKS, AND OTHER FEATURES INTEGRATED
WITHIN TAN-607. RALPH M. PARSONS A-2. DATE:
FEBRUARY 1984. INEEL INDEX NO.
034-0607-00-693-147021.
ID-33-E-176 A&M. HOT CELL ADDITION (TAN-633). FLOOR PLAN,
ELEVATIONS. ARRANGEMENT OF MONORAIL ALONG
CORRIDOR, FOUR HOT CELLS, PLUG ACCESS OPENINGS,
VIEWING WINDOWS, PHOTO DARKROOM. RALPH M. PARSONS
1229-13-ANP/GE-3-633-A-1. DATE: DEC 1956 AS
REDRAWN IN AUGUST 1998. APPROVED BY INEEL
CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL
INDEX CODE NO. 034-0633-00-693-107315.
ID-33-E-177 A&M. TAN-633. UTILITIES PLAN AND PROFILES. LAYOUT
OF TAN-633 IN RELATION TO NEIGHBORING BUILDINGS:
ACTUATOR BUILDING, POOL BUILDING, WATER FILTER
BUILDING, LIQUID WASTE TREATMENT PLANT, AND BURIED
STORAGE TANKS. RALPH M. PARSONS
1229-13-ANP/GE-3-301-U-1. DATE: DECEMBER 1956.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 034-0301-00-693-107311.
ID-33-E-178 A&M. TAN-633. SECTIONS SHOW VIEW OF HOT CELL
CASK-ENTRY DOORS, MANIPULATORS IN EACH CELL,
DRAINAGE TRENCHES, DOOR AND ROOM DETAILS. RALPH M.
PARSONS 1229-13-ANP/GE-3-633-A-2. DATE: DECEMBER
1956. APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR
PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
034-0633-00-693-107316.
ID-33-E-179 A&M. TAN-633. HOT CELL FLOOR PLANS, ELEVATIONS,
SECTIONS. HOLE SCHEDULE (PENETRATIONS THROUGH
CONCRETE.) SWING-DOOR DETAILS. RALPH M. PARSONS
1229-13-ANP/GE-3-633-A-3. DATE: DECEMBER 1956.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
034-0633-00-693-107317.
ID-33-E-180 A&M. DEMINERALIZATION PLANT, TAN-649. FLOOR PLAN,
ELEVATION, DETAILS. RALPH M. PARSONS
1480-4-ANP/GE-3-649-A-1. DATE: OCTOBER 1958.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
034-0649-00-693-107439.
ID-33-E-181 A&M. DEMINERALIZATION PLANT (TAN-649). STEEL DOOR.
RALPH M. PARSONS 1480-L/ANP/GE-3-649-MS-1. DATE:
OCTOBER 1958. APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION
OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
034-0649-40-693-107443.
ID-33-E-182 A&M. RADIOACTIVE PARTS SECURITY STORAGE AREA,
TAN-647 AND TAN-648. PLOT PLAN, FENCING DETAILS.
RELATIONSHIP TO HOT SHOP AND RAILROAD TURNTABLE.
RALPH M. PARSONS 1480-7-ANP/GE-3-102. DATE:
NOVEMBER 1958. APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION
OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL INDEX NO.
034-0100-00-693-107447.
ID-33-E-183 A&M. RADIOACTIVE PARTS SECURITY STORAGE AREA, HEAT
REMOVAL STORAGE CASKS. PLAN, SECTION, AND DETAILS.
RALPH M. PARSONS 1480-7 ANP/GE-3-720-S-1. DATE:
NOVEMBER 1958. APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION
OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL INDEX NO.
034-0720-60-693-107459.
ID-33-E-184 A&M. ACTUATOR BUILDING, TAN-615. FLOOR PLAN,
ELEVATIONS, SECTIONS. TEST AND DECONTAMINATION
AREAS. PITS. CHANGE ROOM. GENERAL ELECTRIC
IDA-615-1070. DATE: DECEMBER 1956. INEEL INDEX NO.
034-0615-00-309-217511.
ID-33-E-185 A&M. LIQUID WASTE TREATMENT PLANT, TAN-616. PLAN,
ELEVATIONS, SECTIONS, AND DETAILS. EVAPORATOR PIT.
PUMP ROOM. ROOM NAMES AND NUMBERS. RALPH M.
PARSONS 902-3-ANP-616-A 297. DATE: DECEMBER 1952.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX NO. 034-0616-00-693-106889.
ID-33-E-186 A&M. OUTSIDE TURNTABLE, TAN-705. STRUCTURAL PLAN
AND DETAILS. RALPH M. PARSONS 902-3-ANP-705-S 149.
DATE: JANUARY 1953. APPROVED BY INEEL
CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL
INDEX CODE NO. 034-0705-60-693-106793. 
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLEX
Photos ID-33-E-187 through ID-33-E-194 were taken of ANP
Administrative and Service (ADM) area building TAN-628 prior to
demolition. Photographer Mike Crane took photos in March 2004.
ID-33-E-187 ADM. WAREHOUSE BUILDING (TAN-628). CAMERA FACING
WEST. OBLIQUE VIEW OF WEST AND NORTH FACADES.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-8-2.
ID-33-E-188 ADM. WAREHOUSE BUILDING (TAN-628) WEST FACADE.
CAMERA FACING EAST. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-8-1.
ID-33-E-189 ADM. WAREHOUSE BUILDING (TAN-628) SOUTH FACADE.
CAMERA FACING WEST. CHANGE HOUSE (TAN-607) IN
BACKGROUND. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-8-3.
ID-33-E-190 ADM. WAREHOUSE BUILDING (TAN-628) NORTH FACADE.
CAMERA FACING SOUTH. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-8-4.
ID-33-E-191 ADM. WAREHOUSE BUILDING (TAN-628) EAST FACADE.
CAMERA FACING WEST. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-9-2.
ID-33-E-192 ADM. WAREHOUSE BUILDING (TAN-628) DETAIL OF
LOADING DOCK AT SOUTHEAST CORNER. CAMERA FACING
WEST. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-9-3.
ID-33-193 ADM. WAREHOUSE BUILDING (TAN-628) INTERIOR OF
RECEIVING OFFICE AND HOLDING AREA. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. HD-39-9-1.
ID-33-E-194 ADM. WAREHOUSE BUILDING (TAN-628) INTERIOR DETAIL
OF RECEIVING AREA. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-9-4.
Photos ID-33-E-195 through ID-33-E-211 are historic pictures of
ANP Administrative buildings. Dates are noted.
ID-33-E-195 ADM. AERIAL VIEW OF ADMINISTRATION AREA. CAMERA
FACING WESTERLY. FROM LEFT TO RIGHT IN FOREGROUND:
SUBSTATION (TAN-605), WAREHOUSE (TAN-628), GATE
HOUSE (TAN-601), ADMINISTRATION BUILDING
(TAN-602). LEFT TO RIGHT MIDDLE GROUND: SERVICE
BUILDING (TAN-603), WAREHOUSE (LATER KNOWN AS
MAINTENANCE SHOP OR CRAFT SHOP, TAN-604), WATER
WELL PUMP HOUSES, FUEL TANKS AND FUEL PUMP HOUSES,
AND WATER STORAGE TANKS. CHANGE HOUSE (TAN-606) ON
NEAR SIDE OF BERM. LARGE BUILDING BEYOND BERM IS
A&M BUILDING, TAN-607. RAILROAD TRACKS BEYOND LEAD
FROM (UNSEEN) TURNTABLE TO THE IET. DATE: JUNE 6,
1955. INEEL NEGATIVE NUMBER 13201. 
ID-33-E-196 ADM. TANKS: FROM LEFT TO RIGHT: FUEL OIL TANK,
FUEL PUMP HOUSE (TAN-611), ENGINE FUEL TANK, WATER
PUMP HOUSE, WATER STORAGE TANK. CAMERA FACING
NORTHWEST. NOTE EDGE OF SHIELDING BERM AT LEFT OF
VIEW. DATE: NOVEMBER 25, 1953. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
9217.
ID-33-E-197 ADM. WATER SYSTEM PUMP HOUSE (TAN-610) AND TANK AS
COMPLETE. DATE: OCTOBER 10, 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. 12580.
ID-33-E-198 ADM. PUMP HOUSE (TAN-612) FOR WELL NO. 1 AS
COMPLETED. IT IS IDENTICAL TO PUMP HOUSE (TAN-613)
FOR WELL NO. 2,WHICH IS NOT SHOWN IN THIS REPORT.
DATE: OCTOBER 19, 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 12576.
ID-33-E-199 ADM. FUEL TANKS AND FUEL PUMP HOUSE (TAN-611) AS
COMPLETE. DATE: OCTOBER 29, 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. 12704.
ID-33-E-200 ADM. WAREHOUSE (TAN-628) AS IT LOOKED WHEN NEARLY
COMPLETE. EAST AND NORTH FACADES. DATE: DECEMBER
20, 1955. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 55-3557.
ID-33-E-201 ADM. SERVICE BUILDING (TAN-603) AS COMPLETED.
CAMERA FACING WESTERLY. DATE: OCTOBER 19, 1954.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 12578.
ID-33-E-201 ADM. SERVICE BUILDING (TAN-603) INTERIOR.
CAFETERIA. DATE: OCTOBER 19, 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. 12581.
ID-33-E-203 ADM. SERVICE BUILDING (TAN-603) INTERIOR.
DISPENSARY. DATE: OCTOBER 19, 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. 12579.
ID-33-E-204 ADM. WAREHOUSE (TAN-604). CONSTRUCTION VIEW OF
STRUCTURAL STEEL BEING PLACED FOR ROOF. DATE:
OCTOBER 1, 1953. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 8950.
ID-33-E-205 ADM. WAREHOUSE (TAN-604) AS COMPLETED. CAMERA
FACING NORTHWEST. DATE: OCTOBER 19, 1954. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. 12577.
ID-33-E-206 ADM. SUBSTATION (TAN-605) AS COMPLETE. DATE:
NOVEMBER 23, 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 13009.
ID-33-E-207 ADM. CHANGE HOUSE (TAN-606) AS COMPLETED. CAMERA
FACING NORTHERLY. NOTE PROXIMITY TO SHIELDING
BERM. PART OF HOT SHOP (A&M BUILDING, TAN-607) AT
LEFT OF VIEW BEYOND BERM. DATE: OCTOBER 29, 1954.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 12705.
ID-33-E-208 ADM. CHANGE HOUSE (TAN-606) INTERIOR. MEN'S SHOWER
AND LOCKER ROOM. DATE: OCTOBER 29, 1954. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. 12698.
ID-33-E-209 ADM. ADMINISTRATION BUILDING (TAN-602) UNDER
CONSTRUCTION. ROOF DECK BEING PLACED. WATER TANK
BEYOND AT RIGHT. DATE: 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
8982.
ID-33-E-210 ADM. ADMINISTRATION BUILDING (TAN-602) INTERIOR.
DRAFTING ROOM IN USE. DATE: JULY 12, 1954. INEEL
NEGATIVE NUMBER 11346.
ID-33-E-211 ADM. GATE HOUSE (TAN-601) INTERIOR. TELEPHONE DIAL
EQUIPMENT. DATE: JUNE 22, 1954. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
11019.
Photos ADM-dr-1 through ADM-dr-10 are architectural drawings of
the ANP Administrative and Service area. 
ID-33-E-212 ADM. SERVICE BUILDING (TAN-603). ELEVATIONS OF ALL
FACADES WITH DOOR DETAILS AND DETAIL OF KITCHEN.
SECTION THROUGH GARAGE AREA SHOWS SECOND LEVEL OF
STEEL DECKING. EQUIPMENT AND LABORATORY FURNITURE
SCHEDULE. RALPH M. PARSONS 902-2-ANP-603-A 44.
DATE: DECEMBER 1952. APPROVED BY INEEL
CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL
INDEX CODE NO. 033-0603-00-693-106719.
ID-33-E-213 ADM. SERVICE BUILDING (TAN-603). FLOOR PLAN. NAMES
OF FUNCTIONAL AREAS. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-2-ANY-603-A 43. DATE: DECEMBER 1952. APPROVED
BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 033-0603-00-693-106718.
ID-33-E-214 ADM. WAREHOUSE (TAN-604). FLOOR PLAN. GENERAL
WAREHOUSE AND CHEMICAL STORAGE. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-2-ANP-604-A 55. DATE: DECEMBER 1952. APPROVED
BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 035-0604-00-693-106727.
ID-33-E-215 ADM. WAREHOUSE (TAN-604). ELEVATIONS AND SECTIONS.
RALPH M. PARSONS 902-2-ANP-604-A 56. DATE:
DECEMBER 1952. APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION
OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
035-0604-00-693-106728.
ID-33-E-216 ADM. CHANGE HOUSE (TAN-606). ELEVATIONS AND FLOOR
PLAN. ROOM NAMES. RALPH M. PARSONS 902-2-ANP-606-A
65. DATE: DECEMBER 1952. INEEL APPROVED BY INEEL
CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INDEX
CODE NO. 035-0606-00-693-106733.
ID-33-E-217 ADM. WATER SYSTEM PUMP HOUSE (TAN-610).
ELEVATIONS, PLAN, AND SECTIONS. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-2-ANP-610-A 74. DATE: FEBRUARY 1952. APPROVED
BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 035-0610-00-693-106739.
ID-33-E-218 ADM. FUEL PUMP HOUSE (TAN-611). ELEVATIONS, FLOOR
PLAN. DRAWING INCLUDES ELEVATION AND PLANS FOR
"H.M." STRUCTURES (HOSE STORAGE?). RALPH M.
PARSONS 902-2-ANP-611-A 78. DATE: DECEMBER 1952.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
035-0611-00-693-106741.
ID-33-E-219 ADM. WATER WELL PUMP HOUSES (TAN-612 AND TAN-613).
PLANS, ELEVATIONS, FLOOR AND OTHER DETAILS. RALPH
M. PARSONS 902-2-ANP-612-613-A S & P 82. DATE:
DECEMBER 1952. APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION
OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
035-0612-00-693-106743.
ID-33-E-220 ADM. ADMINISTRATION BUILDING (TAN-602). EARLY ROOM
LAYOUT, DOOR AND ROOM SCHEDULES. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-2-ANP-602-A 31. DATE: DECEMBER 1952. APPROVED
BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 033-O602-00-693-106710.
ID-33-E-221 ADM. ADMINISTRATION BUILDING (TAN-602).
ELEVATIONS, SECTIONS, DETAILS. SHOWS AREAS THAT
WERE SOON REMODELED OR ADDED ONTO. RALPH M.
PARSONS 902-2-ANP-602-A 32. DATE AUGUST 1955.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
033-0602-00-693-106711.
ID-33-E-222 A&M. TECHNICAL SERVICE LABORATORY IN
ADMINISTRATION BUILDING (TAN-602). FLOOR PLAN,
RECEPTION DESK, DOOR AND FINISH SCHEDULES. RALPH
M. PARSONS 1480-12-ANP/GE-3-602-A-1. INEEL INDEX
CODE NO. 033-0602-00-693-107488.
ID-33-E-223 A&M. GATE HOUSE (TAN-601). PLAN, ELEVATIONS,
SECTIONS, DETAILS. SHOWS EXPANDED BUILDING AS
ATTACHED TO TAN-602. RALPH M. PARSONS
902-2-ANP-601-A 22. DATE: DECEMBER 1952. INEEL
INDEX CODE NO. 033-0602-00-693-106704.
ID-33-E-224 A&M. WAREHOUSE (TAN-628). FLOOR AND FOUNDATION
PLAN. ELEVATIONS. RALPH M. PARSONS
772-ANP-628-A-S-1. DATE JULY 1955. INEEL INDEX
CODE NO. 033-0628-00-693-106683.
ID-33-E-225 A&M. PLOT PLAN OF ADMINISTRATION AND A&M AREAS.
SHOWS RELATIONSHIPS AMONG ADMINISTRATION BUILDINGS
AND TO A&M BUILDING (TAN-607), RAILROAD TURNTABLE.
RALPH M. PARSONS 902-2&3-ANP-U 3. DATE: DECEMBER
1952. INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 032-0100-00-693-106690.
LOW POWER TEST COMPLEX
Photos ID-33-E-226 through ID-33-E-256 are of the ANP Low Power
Test Facility and Shield Test Facility prior to demolition in
2004. Both were part of the Low Power Test (LPT) Complex. They
were taken by photographer Mike Crane in March 2004.
ID-33-E-226 LPT. LOW POWER ASSEMBLY AND TEST BUILDING
(TAN-640). CAMERA FACING WEST. ROLLUP DOORS TO
EACH TEST CELL FACE EAST. CONCRETE WALLS POURED IN
PLACE. APPARATUS AT RIGHT OF VIEW WAS PART OF A
POST-ANP PROGRAM. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-1-1.
ID-33-E-227 LPT. LOW POWER ASSEMBLY AND TEST BUILDING
(TAN-640). CAMERA FACING WEST. DETAIL OF ROLLUP
DOORS. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-1-4.
ID-33-E-228 LPT. LOW POWER ASSEMBLY AND TEST BUILDING
(TAN-640) SOUTH FACADE. CAMERA FACING NORTH. NOTE
ONE-STORY PUMICE BLOCK CORRIDOR, WHICH PROVIDED
INSIDE ACCESS BETWEEN CONTROL BUILDING (AT LEFT
EDGE OF VIEW) AND TEST CELL. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-40-1-2.
ID-33-E-229 LPT. LOW POWER ASSEMBLY AND TEST BUILDING
(TAN-640) OBLIQUE OF NORTH AND EAST FACADES.
OUTDOOR SEMISCALE TANKAGE IN FOREGROUND. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-1-3.
ID-33-E-230 LPT. LOW POWER TEST CELL IN TAN-640. INTERIOR OF
NORTH CELL. CAMERA FACES SOUTHWEST. CORNER SHOWS
SOUTH AND WEST WALLS. MEZZANINE PROVIDED ACCESS TO
EXPERIMENTS. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-2-1.
ID-33-E-231 LPT. LOW POWER TEST CELL IN TAN-640. INTERIOR OF
NORTH CELL. CAMERA FACING NORTHWEST. CORNER SHOWS
WEST AND NORTH WALLS. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-40-2-2.
ID-33-E-232 LPT. LOW POWER TEST CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-641)
CONTEXTUAL VIEW. OBLIQUE VIEW OF WEST AND SOUTH
FACADES. ACCESS CORRIDOR ALONG SOUTH SIDE. NOTE
STEPPED CONCRETE WALL OF TEST CELL BUILDING. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-3-1.
ID-33-E-233 LPT. LOW POWER TEST CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-641).
CLOSER VIEW OF SOUTH FACADE ACCESS CORRIDOR AND
STEPPED CONCRETE WALL. CAMERA FACING NORTHEAST.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-3-3.
ID-33-E-234 LPT. LOW POWER TEST CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-641)
EAST FACADE. SIGN SAYS " ENERGY AND SYSTEMS
TECHNOLOGY LABORATORY, INEL" (POST-ANP USE).
CAMERA FACING WEST. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-3-2.
ID-33-E-235 LPT. LOW POWER TEST CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-641)
NORTH FACADE. CAMERA FACING SOUTH. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. HD-40-3-4.
ID-33-E-236 LPT. LOW POWER TEST CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-641)
SOUTH FACADE AND ACCESS CORRIDOR TO TEST CELL.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-4-2.
ID-33-E-237 LPT. LOW POWER TEST CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-641)
INTERIOR. CAMERA FACING WEST. OFFICE AREA. (OPEN)
DOOR TO SPECIAL SOURCE VAULT AT CENTER OF VIEW.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-4-1.
ID-33-E-238 LPT. LOW POWER TEST CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-641)
INTERIOR. CAMERA FACING NORTHEAST AT WHAT REMAINS
OF CONTROL ROOM CONSOLE. CUT IN WALL AT RIGHT OF
VIEW SHOWS WEST WALL OF NORTHERN TEST CELL. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-4-4.
ID-33-E-239 LPT. LOW POWER TEST CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-641)
INTERIOR. CAMERA FACING EAST INTO EQUIPMENT ROOM.
FLOORING HAS BEEN REMOVED. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-40-4-3.
ID-33-E-240 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY CONTEXTUAL VIEW OF POOL
ROOM (TAN-646) WEST FACADE. CAMERA FACING EAST.
FROM LEFT TO RIGHT: WATER STORAGE TANK; HIGH BAY
POOL ROOM; EQUIPMENT AND EQUIPMENT EXTENSION ON
LOWER LEVEL; HELIUM WING AND STACK. NOTE EXCLUSION
FENCE IN FOREGROUND. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-8-2.
ID-33-E-241 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY ASSEMBLY AND TEST
BUILDING (TAN-646). CAMERA FACING NORTHWEST FOR
OBLIQUE VIEW. FROM LEFT TO RIGHT: EAST FACADE OF
EBOR COOLING STACK AND HELIUM WING; SOUTH FACADE
OF POOL FACILITY; SOUTH FACADE OF CONTROL BUILDING
(TAN-645). INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-7-2.
ID-33-E-242 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY ASSEMBLY AND TEST
BUILDING (TAN-646). EAST FACADE OF EBOR HELIUM
WING ADDITION. CAMERA FACING WEST. NOTE
ASBESTOS-CEMENT SIDING ON STAIR ENCLOSURE AND
UPPER-LEVEL. CONCRETE SIDING AT LOWER LEVEL. METAL
STACK. MONORAIL PROTRUDES FROM UPPER LEVEL OF
SOUTH WALL AT LEFT OF VIEW. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-40-7-4.
ID-33-E-243 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY ASSEMBLY AND TEST
BUILDING (TAN-646), SOUTH FACADE. CAMERA FACING
NORTH. HIGH-BAY SECTION IS POOL ROOM. SINGLE-STORY
SECTION AT RIGHT IS CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-645).
SMALL METAL BUILDING IS POST-1970 ADDITION. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-7-3.
ID-33-E-244 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY ASSEMBLY AND TEST
BUILDING (TAN-646), SOUTH END OF EBOR HELIUM WING.
CAMERA FACING NORTH. MONORAIL PROTRUDES FROM
UPPER-LEVEL DOOR. RUST MARKS ON CONCRETE WALL ARE
FROM STACK. METAL SHED IS POST-1970 ADDITION.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-8-1.
ID-33-E-245 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY ASSEMBLY AND TEST
BUILDING (TAN-646), NORTH FACADE. CAMERA FACING
SOUTH. NOTE INSULATED ASBESTOS CEMENT SIDING. AT
LEFT, NOTE DOOR RAIL FOR DOOR (NOT IN VIEW) TO
POOL ROOM. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-8-2.
ID-33-E-246 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY ASSEMBLY AND TEST
BUILDING (TAN-646), WEST FACADE. CAMERA FACING
NORTHEAST. LOW POWER TEST FACILITY IN BACKGROUND
AT RIGHT OF VIEW. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-8-4.
ID-33-E-247 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY TEST BUILDING INTERIOR
(TAN-646). LOOKING THROUGH DOORWAY INTO OFFICE
AREA. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-9-2.
ID-33-E-248 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY TEST BUILDING INTERIOR
(TAN-646). CAMERA FACING SOUTH. DISTANT POOL
CONTAINED EBOR REACTOR; NEAR POOL WAS INTENDED FOR
FUEL ROD STORAGE. OTHER POST-1970 ACTIVITY
EQUIPMENT REMAINS IN POOL. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-40-9-4.
ID-33-E-249 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY TEST BUILDING INTERIOR
(TAN-646). CAMERA IS FACING NORTH AND LOOKING DOWN
INTO NORTHERN POOL. SPACE BEYOND IS ASSEMBLY AREA.
NOTE DOOR TO OUTSIDE ON WALL AT RIGHT OF VIEW.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-9-3.
ID-33-E-250 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY TEST BUILDING INTERIOR
(TAN-646). CAMERA POINTS DOWN INTO INTERIOR OF
NORTH POOL. EQUIPMENT ON WALL IS ELECTRICAL BUS
USED FOR POST-1970 EXPERIMENT. PERSONNEL LADDER AT
RIGHT. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-9-1.
ID-33-E-251 LPT. SHIELD TEST CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-645), SOUTH
FACADE. CAMERA FACING NORTH. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-40-5-1.
ID-33-E-252 LPT. SHIELD TEST CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-645), EAST
ELEVATION. CAMERA FACING WEST. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-40-5-2.
ID-33-E-253 LPT. SHIELD TEST CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-645), NORTH
FACADE. CAMERA FACING SOUTH. OBSOLETE SIGN DATING
FROM POST-1970 PROGRAM SAYS "ENERGY AND SYSTEMS
TECHNOLOGY EXPERIMENTAL FACILITY, INEL." INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-5-4.
ID-33-E-254 LPT. SHIELD TEST CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-645), WEST
SIDE DETAIL OF DOORWAY INTO POOL SECTION. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-5-3.
ID-33-E-255 LPT. SHIELD TEST CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-645).
TYPICAL INTERIOR OF OFFICE/CONFERENCE AREA. CAMERA
FACING NORTHEAST. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-6-1.
ID-33-E-256 LPT. SHIELD TEST CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-645).
INTERIOR OF OFFICE AND EQUIPMENT ROOM. CAMERA
FACING WEST. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-40-6-2.
Photos ID-33-E-257 through ID-33-E-289 are historical photographs
of the Low Power Test facility (TAN-640 and TAN-641); and the
Shield Test Facility and its later adaption for the Experimental
Beryllium Oxide Reactor (EBOR, TAN-645 and TAN-646). Date and
photographers are noted.
ID-33-E-257 LPT. AERIAL OF LOW POWER TEST (TAN-640 AND -6416)
AND SHIELD TEST (TAN-645 AND -646) FACILITIES.
CAMERA FACING SOUTHWEST. ROAD AT UPPER RIGHT LEADS
TO ADMINISTRATIVE AREA. PHOTOGRAPHER: JACK L.
ANDERSON. DATE: MARCH 27, 1959. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
59-1644.
ID-33-E-258 LPT. AERIAL OF LOW POWER TEST FACILITY (TAN-640
AND -641) AND SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-645 AND
-646). CAMERA FACING SOUTH. LOW POWER REACTOR
CELLS AT LEFT, THEN ONE-STORY CONTROL BUILDING;
DIAGONAL FENCE; SHIELD TEST CONTROL BUILDING, THEN
(HIGH-BAY) POOL ROOM. IN FOREGROUND ARE ELECTRICAL
PAD, WATER TANKS AND GUARD HOUSE. PHOTOGRAPHER:
LOWIN. DATE: FEBRUARY 24, 1965. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
65-987.
ID-33-E-259 LPT. AERIAL OF LOW POWER TEST (TAN-640 AND -641)
AND SHIELD TEST (TAN-645 AND -646) FACILITIES.
CAMERA FACING NORTHWEST. LOW POWER TEST FACILITY
AT RIGHT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY AT LEFT. FLIGHT
ENGINE TEST AREA IN BACKGROUND AT CENTER LEFT OF
VIEW. ADMINISTRATIVE AND A&M AREAS AT RIGHT.
PHOTOGRAPHER: LOWIN. DATE: FEBRUARY 24, 1965.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 65-991.
ID-33-E-260 LPT. LOW POWER TEST FACILITY (TAN-640). CAMERA
FACING NORTHWEST. PERSONNEL CORRIDOR ON LEFT.
DOORS TO TEST CELLS HAVE NOT YET BEEN INSTALLED.
PHOTOGRAPHER: JACK L. ANDERSON. DATE: OCTOBER 23,
1957. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 57-5338.
ID-33-E-261 LPT. LOW POWER TEST (TAN-640) INTERIOR. BASEMENT
LEVEL. CAMERA FACING NORTH. CABLE TRAYS AND
CONDUIT CROSS TUNNEL BETWEEN CRITICAL EXPERIMENT
CELL AND CRITICAL EXPERIMENT CONTROL ROOM.
CONSTRUCTION 93 PERCENT COMPLETE. PHOTOGRAPHER:
JACK L. ANDERSON. DATE: OCTOBER 23, 1957. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. 57-5339.
ID-33-E-262 LPT. LOW POWER TEST (TAN-640) INTERIOR OF CELL
102. CAMERA LOOKING WEST TOWARD REAR OF CELL.
FIVE-TON BRIDGE CRANE (MOFFETT, 10,000 LB.) AND
BANKS OF LIGHTS AT TOP OF CELL. PHOTOGRAPHER: JACK
L. ANDERSON. DATE: DECEMBER 19, 1957. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. 57-6200.
ID-33-E-263 LPT. LOW POWER TEST INTERIOR OF CONTROL BUILDING
(TAN-641). CAMERA FACING NORTH ACROSS ROOMS 105,
104, AND 103. PHOTOGRAPHER: JACK L. ANDERSON.
DATE: OCTOBER 23, 1957. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
54-5341.
ID-33-E-264 LPT. LOW POWER TEST (TAN-641) INTERIOR OF
MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM. AIR COMPRESSORS IN LEFT
FOREGROUND. EVAPORATIVE CONDENSER IN RIGHT
BACKGROUND. CONSTRUCTION 93 PERCENT COMPLETE.
PHOTOGRAPHER: JACK L. ANDERSON. DATE: OCTOBER 23,
1957. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 57-5340.
ID-33-E-265 LPT. LOW POWER TEST (TAN-641) INTERIOR. BOILER
ROOM WITH BOILERS INSTALLED. PHOTOGRAPHER: JACK L.
ANDERSON. DATE: NOVEMBER 21, 1957. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. 57-5884.
ID-33-E-266 LPT. LOW POWER TEST (TAN-641) INTERIOR. HEATING
AND VENTILATING PNEUMATIC AND ELECTRIC CONTROL
PANEL. CONTRACT NEARLY COMPLETE. PHOTOGRAPHER:
JACK L. ANDERSON. DATE: DECEMBER 19, 1957. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. 57-6198.
ID-33-E-267 LPT. LOW POWER TEST (TAN-641) INTERIOR. CAMERA IS
INSIDE SPECIAL SOURCE VAULT AND FACING SOUTHEAST.
INTERIOR GRILL DOOR IS CLOSED; OUTER STEEL DOOR IS
OPEN. PHOTOGRAPHER: JACK L. ANDERSON. DATE:
DECEMBER 19, 1957. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 57-6197.
ID-33-E-268 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-646) INTERIOR. POOL
ROOM NEARLY COMPLETE. FIFTY-TON BRIDGE CRANE IS
READY FOR OPERATION. WATER FILLS FOREGROUND POOL.
PHOTOGRAPHER: M. HOLMES. DATE: JUNE 23, 1959.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 59-3263.
ID-33-E-269 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-646) INTERIOR OF
POOL ROOM. CAMERA FACING SOUTH. NOTE STEEL BEAMS
ALONG SIDE WALLS. PHOTOGRAPHER: JACK L. ANDERSON.
DATE: APRIL 21, 1959. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 59-2130.
ID-33-E-270 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-646) INTERIOR.
CONSTRUCTION WORKER APPLIES CAULKING COMPOUND TO
JOINT BETWEEN STAINLESS STEEL WEIR AND CONCRETE.
PHOTOGRAPHER: JACK L. ANDERSON. DATE: MARCH 6,
1959. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 59-1099.
ID-33-E-271 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-646) INTERIOR.
WATER TREATMENT ROOM CONTAINS WATER SOFTENERS,
DEIONIZERS, AND DISPLAY PANEL. NOTE METAL CEILING
AND WALLS. PHOTOGRAPHER: JACK L. ANDERSON. DATE:
FEBRUARY 20, 1959. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 59-856
ID-33-E-272 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-645) INTERIOR.
MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM WITH AIRWASHER AND
REFRIGERATION COMPRESSOR. PHOTOGRAPHER: JACK L.
ANDERSON. DATE: FEBRUARY 20, 1959. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. 59-855.
ID-33-E-273 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-645) INTERIOR.
MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT ROOM WITH SWITCHGEAR AND
CONTROL BOARDS. PHOTOGRAPHER: JACK L. ANDERSON.
DATE: FEBRUARY 20, 1959, INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
59-858.
ID-33-E-274 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-645) INTERIOR.
BOILER ROOM SHOWS ONE BOILER, DIESEL ELECTRIC
STAND UNIT, AND RELATED EQUIPMENT. PUMICE BLOCK
WALLS. PHOTOGRAPHER: JACK L. ANDERSON. DATE:
JANUARY 19, 1959. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 59-286.
ID-33-E-275 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-646) EXTERIOR, AS
MODIFIED FOR EBOR. CAMERA FACING NORTHEAST. HEAT
EXCHANGE FANS, HELIUM STORAGE TANKS, AND COMPLETED
EBOR PERIMETER ROAD. PHOTOGRAPHER: PAGE COMISKEY.
DATE: CIRCA AUGUST 20, 1965. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
65-4328.
ID-33-E-276 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-645) INTERIOR
REMODEL FOR EBOR. ROOM 122 COMPLETE. CAMERA FACING
WEST. PHOTOGRAPHER: PAGE COMISKEY. DATE: CIRCA
AUGUST 20, 1965. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 65-4330.
ID-33-E-277 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-646) BEING MODIFIED
FOR EBOR. CAMERA FACING SOUTH IN ROOM 123. HELIUM
PIPING. PHOTOGRAPHER: PAGE COMISKEY. DATE: CIRCA
AUGUST 20, 1965. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 65-4327.
ID-33-E-278 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-645) INTERIOR
REMODEL FOR EBOR. ROOM 124 COMPLETE, CAMERA FACING
NORTH. PHOTOGRAPHER: PAGE COMISKEY. DATE: CIRCA
AUGUST 20, 1965. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 65-4331.
ID-33-E-279 LPT. EBOR INTERIOR. INSIDE ROOM B 105. CAMERA
FACING NORTHWEST FROM SOUTHEAST CORNER OF ROOM.
TYPICAL VIEW OF SAMPLE TUBE PANELS. PHOTOGRAPHER:
COMISKEY. DATE: FEBRUARY 19, 1965. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. 65-934.
ID-33-E-280 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-646) INTERIOR.
ADDITION OF THIRD STEAM GENERATOR. BURNER END.
CAMERA FACING SOUTHWEST. PHOTOGRAPHER: COMISKY.
DATE: JANUARY 20, 1965. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 65-242.
ID-33-E-281 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-646) INTERIOR.
CAMERA FACING NORTHWEST. PHOTOGRAPHER: COMISKY.
DATE: JANUARY 20, 1965. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 65-240.
ID-33-E-282 LPT. EBOR (TAN-646) INTERIOR, INSTALLING REACTOR
IN STF POOL ("VAULT"). PRESSURE VESSEL SHOWS CORE
BARREL AND OUTLET NOZZLE (NEXT TO MAN BELOW) TO
INNER DUCT WELD, WHICH IS PREPARED AND IN POSITION
FOR STRESS RELIEVING. CAMERA FACING SOUTHEAST.
PHOTOGRAPHER: COMISKEY. DATE: JANUARY 20, 1965.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 65-239.
ID-33-E-283 LPT. EBOR (TAN-646) REACTOR VESSEL, FLOW
DISTRIBUTION TANK. OUTLET NOZZLE ON SIDE OF VESSEL
WILL BE CONNECTED TO COOLANT DUCT. PHOTOGRAPHER:
LOWIN. DATE: JANUARY 20, 1965. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
65-237.
ID-33-E-284 LPT. EBOR (TAN-646) REACTOR VESSEL, DISTRIBUTION
TANK. VIEW OF TOP OF TANK, WITH COOLANT PORT
BELOW. PHOTOGRAPHER: LOWIN. DATE: JANUARY 20,
1965. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 65-236.
ID-33-E-285 LPT. EBOR REACTOR VESSEL IN TAN 646. PRESSURE
VESSEL HEAD BEING INSTALLED IN VAULT. REFUELING
PORT EXTENSION (RIGHT) AND CONTROL ROD NOZZLES
(CENTER). CAMERA FACING NORTHWEST. PHOTOGRAPHER:
COMISKEY. DATE: JANUARY 20, 1965. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. 65-241.
ID-33-E-286 LPT. EBOR (TAN-646) REACTOR VESSEL. TOP VIEW OF
REFLECTOR SUPPORT TANK. PHOTOGRAPHER: COMISKEY.
DATE: JANUARY 20, 1965. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 65-234.
ID-33-E-287 LPT. EBOR (TAN-646) REACTOR VAULT. CONCRETE BLOCKS
FOR REACTOR SHIELDING GOING INTO SHIELD TEST
FACILITY POOL. PHOTOGRAPHER: COMISKEY. DATE:
FEBRUARY 19, 1965. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 65-933.
ID-33-E-288 LPT. EBOR (TAN-646) INTERIOR. CAMERA FACING WEST
AND DOWN INTO REACTOR VAULT. SHOWS SHUT-DOWN
STRUCTURAL STEEL SUPPORT AND PRESSURE VESSEL HEAD.
PHOTOGRAPHER: COMISKEY. DATE: APRIL 20, 1965.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 65-2192.
ID-33-E-289 LPT. EBOR (TAN-646) INTERIOR. CAMERA IS FACING
NORTH AND DOWN INTO REACTOR VAULT. VIEW SHOWS
PORTION OF THE LEAD SHUTDOWN SHIELD, PRESSURE
VESSEL THIMBLES, AND REFUELING PORTS MOUNTED ON
PRESSURE VESSEL HEAD. CONCRETE SHIELDING BELOW.
PHOTOGRAPHER: FARMER. DATE: MAY 24, 1965. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. 65-2739.
Photos ID-33-E-290 through ID-33-E-307 are architectural drawings
of the Low Power Test and Shield Test Facility buildings
constructed during the Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion program. This
group also includes modification drawings of the Shield Test
Facility for the EBOR project.
ID-33-E-290 LPT. PLOT PLAN AND SITE LAYOUT. INCLUDES SHIELD
TEST POOL/EBOR FACILITY (TAN-645 AND -646) LOW
POWER TEST BUILDING (TAN-640 AND -641), WATER
STORAGE TANKS, GUARD HOUSE (TAN-642), PUMP HOUSE
(TAN-644), DRIVEWAYS, WELL, CHLORINATION BUILDING
(TAN-643), SEPTIC SYSTEM. RALPH M. PARSONS 1229-12
ANP/GE-7-102. NOVEMBER 1956. APPROVED BY INEEL
CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL
INDEX CODE NO. 038-0102-00-693-107261.
ID-33-E-291 LPT. ELEVATIONS OF LOW POWER TEST BUILDING
(TAN-640 AND -641). WEST AND SOUTH ELEVATIONS SHOW
STEPPED SHIELD WALL. SOUTH AND EAST ELEVATIONS
SHOW PUMICE BLOCK PASSAGEWAY ON SOUTH SIDE.
REACTOR CELL WALLS ARE CONCRETE. ONE-STORY PARTS
ARE PUMICE BLOCK. METAL ROLLUP DOORS. RALPH M.
PARSONS 1229-12 ANP/GE-7--640-A-2. NOVEMBER 1956.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
038-0640-00-693-107275.
ID-33-E-292 LPT. LOW POWER TEST (TAN-640 AND -641) FLOOR PLAN.
CELLS 101 AND 102, CONTROL ROOMS, SHIELDED
COUNTING ROOM, GENERATOR ROOM, LIST OF ROOM
NUMBERS AND NAMES. DOOR DETAILS. RALPH M. PARSONS
1229-12 ANP/GE-7-640-A-1. NOVEMBER 1956. APPROVED
BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 038-0640-00-693-107274.
ID-33-E-293 LPT. LOW POWER TEST (TAN-640 AND -641) SECTIONS.
REFERENT DRAWING IS HAER NO. ID-33-E-292. SECTION
A SHOWS CABLE TUNNEL BETWEEN REACTOR CELLS AND
CONTROL ROOM. BRIDGE CRANE, ROOF, LADDER DETAILS.
RALPH M. PARSONS 1229-12 ANP/GE-7-640-A-3.
NOVEMBER 1956. APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION
OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
038-0640-00-693-107276.
ID-33-E-294 LPT. GUARD HOUSE (TAN-642). ELEVATIONS, FLOOR
PLAN, SECTIONS, DETAILS. RALPH M. PARSONS 1229-12
ANP/GE-7-642-A-S-H7V-1. NOVEMBER 1956. APPROVED BY
INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 038-0642-00-693-107306.
ID-33-E-295 LPT. CHLORINATION BUILDING (TAN-643) AND WATER
WELL PUMPHOUSE (TAN-644). PLANS, ELEVATIONS,
SECTIONS, AND DETAILS. RALPH M. PARSONS 1229-12
ANP/GE-7-643-A-S-H&V-1. NOVEMBER 1956. APPROVED BY
INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 038-0643/0644-00-693-107307.
ID-33-E-296 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-645 AND -646).
FLOOR PLAN AND ROOM NAMES. RALPH M. PARSONS
1229-17 ANP/GE-6-645-A-1. APRIL 1957. APPROVED BY
INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 037-0645/0646-00-693-107347.
ID-33-E-297 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-645 AND -646).
ELEVATIONS SHOW THREE TYPES OF SIDING: ASBESTOS
CEMENT, PUMICE BLOCK, CONCRETE. RALPH M. PARSONS
1229-17 ANP/GE-6-645-A-3. APRIL 1957. APPROVED BY
INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 037-0645/0646-00-693-107349.
ID-33-E-298 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-645 AND -646).
BASEMENT AND SUB-BASEMENT PLAN. STAIRWAY PLANS AND
DETAILS. RALPH M. PARSONS 1229-17
ANP/GE-6-645-A-2. APRIL 1957. APPROVED BY INEEL
CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE. INEEL
INDEX CODE NO. 037-0645/0646-00-693-107348.
ID-33-E-299 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-645 AND -646).
SECTIONS SHOW RELATIONSHIPS AMONG CONTROL ROOMS,
COUPLING STATION, COUNTING ROOMS, POOLS, EQUIPMENT
ROOMS, DATA ROOM AND OTHER AREAS. RALPH M. PARSONS
1229-17 ANP/GE-6-645-A-4. APRIL 1957. APPROVED BY
INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 037-0645/0646-00-693-107350.
ID-33-E-300 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-645 AND -646).
CALIBRATION LAB SHIELD DOOR. RALPH M. PARSONS
1229-17 ANP/GE-6-645-MS-1. APRIL 1957. APPROVED BY
INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 037-0645-40-693-107369.
ID-33-E-301 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-646). FLOOR PLAN
FOR WATER TREATMENT ROOM ON WEST FACADE, TANK AND
FILTER LOCATIONS IN BASEMENT ALONG SERVICE TUNNEL
AND IN COUPLING STATION. RALPH M. PARSONS 1229-17
ANP/GE-6-646-P-2. APRIL 1957. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
037-0645/0646-51-693-107387.
ID-33-E-302 LPT. SHIELD TEST FACILITY (TAN-646). SECTIONS AND
DETAILS OF WATER MANAGEMENT AREAS. RALPH M.
PARSONS 1229-17 ANP/GE-6-646-P-3. APRIL 1957.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
037-0646-51-693-107388.
ID-33-E-303 LPT. EBOR PROJECT (TAN-645 AND -646). NEW
PUMPHOUSE BUILT IN 1965 AS TAN-652. FLOOR PLAN,
ELEVATIONS, DETAILS. KAISER ENGINEERS
EBOR/GA-646-A-104. DATE: MAY 1963. INEEL INDEX
CODE NO. 037-0652-00-486-119053.
ID-33-E-304 LPT. EBOR (TAN-646). FLOOR PLAN FOR NEW HELIUM
MANAGEMENT WING. DETAIL OF SAMPLE VAULT AND
BASEMENT SWITCH ROOM. KAISER ENGINEERS
EBOR/GA-646-A-101. DATE: MAY 1963. INEEL INDEX
CODE NO. 037-0646-00-486-119115.
ID-33-E-305 LPT. EBOR (TAN-646). REACTOR VAULT AND POOL
ARRANGEMENT. STEPPED ARRANGEMENT OF SHIELDING
BLOCKS. FLOOR PLAN, ELEVATION OF REACTOR, AND
DETAILS. KAISER ENGINEERS EBOR/GA-646-P-102. DATE:
MAY 1963. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
037-0646-00-486-119116.
ID-33-E-306 LPT. EBOR (TAN-646). ELEVATIONS. CONCRETE HELIUM
WING. EXHAUST STACK. MONORAIL DOOR 42. KAISER
ENGINEERS EBOR/GA-646-A-102. DATE: MAY 1963. INEEL
INDEX CODE NO. 037-0646-00-486-119051.
ID-33-E-307 LPT. EBOR (TAN-646). SECTIONS. REACTOR SHIELDING
PROFILE. BELOW-GRADE PIPE TUNNEL, DUCTS, ROOMS.
KAISER ENGINEERS EBOR/GA-646-A-103. DATE: MAY
1963. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
037-0646/0645-00-486-119052.
FLIGHT ENGINE TEST COMPLEX
Photographs ID-33-E-308 through ID-33-E-315 are drawings of the
Control and Equipment Building (TAN-630) and other buildings
associated with the ANP Hangar (TAN-629) at the Flight Engine
Test (FET) Complex. Large-format photos, historic photos, and
drawings of the ANP Hangar (TAN-629) can be found in HAER Report
ID-33-A. Please consult the Photo Index of that report. The
following architectural drawings record facilities that were not
included in HAER Report ID-33-A.
ID-33-E-308 FET. CONTROL AND EQUIPMENT BUILDING, TAN-630. MAIN
FLOOR PLAN. CONTROL ROOM. ROOM NUMBERS AND
FUNCTIONS. RALPH M. PARSONS
1229-2-ANP/GE-5-630-A-2. DATE: MARCH 1957.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
036-0630-00-693-107081.
ID-33-E-309 FET. CONTROL AND EQUIPMENT BUILDING (TAN-630).
BASEMENT FLOOR PLAN. TUNNEL TO HANGAR (TAN-629).
ELECTRICAL AND CHEMICAL SERVICES. RALPH M. PARSONS
1229-2-ANP/GE-5-630-A-1. DATE: MARCH 1957.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
036-0630-00-693-107080.
ID-33-E-310 FET. CONTROL AND EQUIPMENT BUILDING (TAN-630).
SECTIONS. EARTH COVER. SHIELDED ACCESS ENTRIES FOR
PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES. RALPH M. PARSONS
1229-2-ANP/GE-5-630-A-3. DATE: MARCH 1957.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
036-0630-00-693-107082.
ID-33-E-311 FET. CONTROL AND EQUIPMENT BUILDING (TAN-630).
SECTIONS. RALPH M. PARSONS
1229-2-ANP/GE-5-630-A-4. DATE: MARCH 1957.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
036-0630-00-693-107083.
ID-33-E-312 FET. CONTROL AND EQUIPMENT BUILDING (TAN-630).
EAST ELEVATION AND SECTION. SHIELDED ROADWAY AND
PERSONNEL ENTRANCES. RALPH M. PARSONS
1229-2-ANP/GE-5-630-A-5. DATE: MARCH 1957.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
036-0630-00-693-107084.
ID-33-E-313 FET. TANK BUILDING, TAN-631. ELEVATIONS, SECTIONS,
DETAILS. TANK PADS AND SADDLES. RALPH M. PARSONS
1229-2-ANP/GE-5-631-A-1. DATE: MARCH 1957.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
036-0631-00-693-107142.
ID-33-E-314 FET. CHLORINATION BUILDING, TAN-637. ELEVATIONS,
SECTION. RALPH M. PARSONS
1229-2-ANP/GE-5-637-A-S-H&V-1. DATE: MARCH 1957.
APPROVED BY INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
036-0637-00-693-107148.
ID-33-E-315 FET. EXHAUST DUCT AND STACK. PLAN, ELEVATION,
FOUNDATION, DETAILS. RALPH M. PARSONS 1480-10
ANP/GE-5-716-S-3. DATE: FEBRUARY 1959. APPROVED BY
INEEL CLASSIFICATION OFFICE FOR PUBLIC RELEASE.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 036-0716-00-693-107474.
Photos ID-33-E-316 through ID-33-E-354 were taken in 2004 of the
Loss of Fluid Test (LOFT) facility prior to demolition. The
photographer was Mike Crane. Dates were March and May, 2004.
ID-33-E-316 LOFT. CONTEXTUAL VIEW OF SOUTH SIDE OF SHIELDED
ROADWAY (TAN-719). LOFT CONTAINMENT BUILDING
(TAN-650) AND STACK AT LEFT EDGE OF VIEW. CAMERA
FACING NORTHWEST. DATE: MARCH 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. HD-39-3-1.
ID-33-E-317 LOFT. CONTEXTUAL VIEW OF NORTH SIDE OF SHIELDED
ROADWAY (TAN-719) AS IT LOOKED DURING LOFT USE OF
FET FACILITIES. CAMERA FACING SOUTHWEST. SIGN OVER
DOOR SAYS, "CONTAINED TEST FACILITY." NOTE EARTH
SHIELDING. DATE: MARCH 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-39-3-2.
ID-33-E-318 LOFT. ENTRY TO SHIELDED ROADWAY. CAMERA FACING
WEST. NOTE LANDSCAPING WITH ASPENS AND OTHER
NON-DESERT SHRUBS. DATE: MARCH 2004. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-3-3.
ID-33-E-319 LOFT. CONTEXTUAL VIEW OF EXHAUST STACK. CAMERA
FACING NORTHEAST. AT RIGHT OF VIEW IS COMPRESSOR
BUILDING (TAN-637). DATE: MARCH 2004. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-6-1.
ID-33-E-320 LOFT. CONTEXTUAL VIEW OF PERSONNEL ENTRANCE.
CAMERA FACING NORTH. HANGAR (TAN-629) AT FAR LEFT.
SHIELDED CONTROL ROOM (TAN-629) TO LEFT,
CONTAINMENT BUILDING (TAN-650) TO RIGHT. DATE: MAY
2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-19-2.
ID-33-E-321 LOFT. CONTAINMENT BUILDING ENTRY, AN ADAPTED USE
OF TAN-624, WHICH ORIGINATED AS THE MOBILE TEST
BUILDING FOR THE ANP PROGRAM. CAMERA FACING NORTH.
NOTE FOUR-RAIL TRACK ENTERED BUILDING. STACK AT
RIGHT OF VIEW. DATE: MARCH 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. HD-39-4-1.
ID-33-E-322 LOFT. CAMERA FACING NORTHWEST. CONTAINMENT ENTRY
(TAN-624) AND LOFT CONTAINMENT BUILDING (TAN-650).
DATE: MARCH 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-4-2.
ID-33-E-323 LOFT. CAMERA FACING EAST SIDE OF CONTAINMENT ENTRY
(TAN-624) AND ITS ATTACHMENT TO CONTAINMENT
BUILDING (TAN-650). DATE: MARCH 2004. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-4-3.
ID-33-E-324 LOFT. CAMERA FACING WEST SIDE OF CONTAINMENT ENTRY
(TAN-624) AND CONTAINMENT DOME (TAN-650). DATE:
MARCH 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-4-4.
ID-33-E-325 LOFT. OBLIQUE VIEW WITH HANGAR (TAN-629),
CONTAINMENT ENTRY (TAN-624), AND CONTAINMENT DOME
(TAN-650) IN VIEW. CAMERA FACING NORTHWEST. DATE:
MAY 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-19-4.
ID-33-E-326 LOFT. WEST SIDE OF CONTAINMENT BUILDING AND DOME
(TAN-650). CAMERA IS ATOP EARTH-SHIELDED CONTROL
BUILDING (TAN-630), FACING EAST. VERTICAL
STRUCTURE AT RIGHT OF VIEW (WITH LIGHT AFFIXED) IS
WEST END OF RAILROAD DOOR SHROUD. DATE: MAY 2004.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-19-1.
ID-33-E-327 LOFT, TAN-650. CAMERA FACING SOUTHEAST. FROM LEFT
TO RIGHT: STACK IN DISTANCE, PRE-AMP WING, DOME,
NORTH SIDE OF LOFT "SERVICE BUILDING." NOTE POURED
CONCRETE WALL OF PRE-AMP WING ON LOWER SECTION;
PUMICE BLOCK ABOVE. DATE: MAY 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE
NO. HD-39-19-3.
ID-33-E-328 LOFT, TAN-650. CLOSER VIEW OF SERVICE BUILDING
(ALSO CALLED LOFT ENCLOSURE BUILDING). CAMERA
FACING WEST. DATE: MAY 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-39-20-2.
ID-33-E-329 LOFT, TAN-650. CLOSER VIEW OF SERVICE BUILDING AND
EXTERIOR PIPING. CAMERA FACING EAST. DATE: MAY
2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-20-4.
ID-33-E-330 LOFT, TAN-650. VIEW OF PRE-AMP BUILDING, CAMERA
FACING SOUTH. DATE: MAY 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-39-20-1.
ID-33-E-331 LOFT, TAN-650. DETAILS OF HEATING AND VENTILATING
SYSTEM. CAMERA FACING SOUTH. HANGAR AT RIGHT OF
VIEW BEYOND SHIELDED CONTROL BUILDING. DATE: MAY
2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-20-3.
ID-33-E-332 LOFT. INTERIOR VIEW OF ENTRY TO REACTOR BUILDING,
TAN-650. CAMERA IS INSIDE ENTRY (TAN-624) AND
FACING NORTH. AT FAR END OF DOMED CHAMBER ARE
PENETRATIONS IN WALL FOR ELECTRICAL AND OTHER
CONNECTIONS. REACTOR AND OTHER EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN
REMOVED. DATE: MARCH 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-39-5-1.
ID-33-E-333 LOFT. INTERIOR VIEW OF ENTRY (TAN-624) ROLLUP
DOOR. CAMERA IS INSIDE ENTRY BUILDING FACING
SOUTH. ROLLUP DOOR WAS A MODIFICATION OF THE
ORIGINAL ANP DOOR ARRANGEMENT. DATE: MARCH 2004.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-5-2.
ID-33-E-334 LOFT, TAN-650. DETAIL VIEW OF RAILROAD DOOR.
CAMERA FACES EAST AND EDGE OF DOOR. FLOOR SLAB
SLIDES OUT OF THE WAY WHEN DOOR IS TO CLOSE.
TAN-624 IS TO RIGHT; LOFT REACTOR CHAMBER IS TO
LEFT. DATE: MAY 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-39-16-1.
ID-33-E-335 LOFT, TAN-650. DETAIL OF RAILROAD DOOR. CAMERA
FACING NORTHEASTERLY INTO REACTOR CHAMBER. DATE:
MAY 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-16-2.
ID-33-E-336 LOFT, TAN-650. REACTOR CHAMBER DETAIL. CAMERA
FACING SOUTHEASTERLY TOWARD RAILROAD DOOR AND
CONTAINMENT ENTRY (TAN-624). LIGHTS STRUNG ALONG
WALL. DEMOLITION HAS PROGRESSED; MOST EQUIPMENT IS
GONE. REACTOR WAS POSITIONED AT ROUND SPOT AT
RIGHT OF VIEW. DATE: MAY 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-39-17-1.
ID-33-E-337 LOFT, TAN-650. INTERIOR AIRLOCK DOOR ON REACTOR
FLOOR. CAMERA IS ON WEST SIDE OF AIRLOCK AND FACES
SOUTHEAST INTO REACTOR CHAMBER. PHOTO SHOWS BOTH
EDGES OF AIRLOCK. CONTROLS AND PRESSURIZATION
EQUIPMENT ON AIRLOCK WALL. METAL PLATE FLOOR.
DATE: MAY 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-17-2.
ID-33-E-338 LOFT, TAN-650. INTERIOR AIRLOCK DOOR. CAMERA FACES
NORTHEAST TOWARDS REACTOR CHAMBER. BOTH DOORS OF
AIRLOCK ARE OPEN AND IN VIEW. NOTE WOODEN STEPS.
DATE: MAY 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-17-3.
ID-33-E-339 LOFT, TAN-650. INTERIOR TAKEN WITHIN REACTOR
CHAMBER. CAMERA FACING WESTERLY TOWARD AIRLOCK.
DATE: MAY 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-18-2.
ID-33-E-340 LOFT, TAN-650. INTERIOR, REACTOR CHAMBER. DETAIL
VIEW OF CAPPED PENETRATIONS IN NORTH WALL OF
CHAMBER AND PIPING ARRAY. NOTE TERMINUS OF RAIL
TRACK ON FLOOR. DATE: MAY 2204. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-39-18-4.
ID-33-E-341 LOFT, TAN-650. INTERIOR, REACTOR CHAMBER. CAMERA
FACING SOUTHERLY INTO CONTAINMENT ENTRY (TAN-624).
DOOR VERTICAL CLEARANCE IS 33 FEET. RAILROAD DOOR
IS IN OPEN POSITION (IE, UNSEEN) DATE: MAY 2004.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-18-1.
ID-33-E-342 LOFT, TAN-650. INTERIOR, CAMERA FACES UPWARD
TOWARD APEX OF DOME. BRIDGE CRANE RIDES CIRCULAR
RAIL PLACED AT TANGENT WHERE DOME MEETS WALL.
DATE: MAY 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-18-3.
ID-33-E-343 LOFT. INTERIOR, CONTROL ROOM IN CONTROL BUILDING
(TAN-630). CAMERA FACING NORTH. SIGN SAYS, "THIS
CONTROL CONSOLE IS PARTIALLY ACTIVE. DO NOT
OPERATE ANY SWITCH HANDLE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION."
DATE: MAY 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-14-3.
ID-33-E-344 LOFT. CONTROL ROOM DETAIL IN CONTROL BUILDING
(TAN-630). CAMERA FACING NORTHWEST. DATE: MAY
2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-13-2.
ID-33-E-345 LOFT. INTERIOR OF VISITORS' ROOM IN CONTROL
BUILDING (TAN-630), TYPICALLY OCCUPIED DURING
TESTS. INDICATOR DISPLAY ALLOWED OBSERVERS TO
WATCH PROGRESS OF EXPERIMENT. DATE: MAY 2004.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-14-1.
ID-33-E-346 LOFT. INTERIOR DETAIL OF CONTROL BUILDING
(TAN-630) VISITORS' ROOM SHOWING INDICATOR
DISPLAY. "ECC" REFERS TO "EMERGENCY CORE COOLING."
DATE: MAY 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-14-4.
ID-33-E-347 LOFT, TAN-630. INTERIOR DETAIL OF SHIELD DOOR AT
END OF CORRIDOR ON GROUND LEVEL AND WEST OF
CONTROL ROOM. SEPARATES CONTROL BUILDING FROM
HANGAR. CAMERA FACING WEST. DATE: MAY 2004. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-14-2.
ID-33-E-348 LOFT. INTERIOR DETAIL IN BASEMENT LEVEL OF CONTROL
BUILDING (TAN-630). ENTRANCE TO PERSONNEL TUNNEL
WHICH CONNECTS CONTROL AND HANGAR (TAN-629)
BUILDINGS. CAMERA FACING SOUTHEAST. COMPARE WITH
CONSTRUCTION PHOTO NOS. ID-33-E-381 AND
ID-33-E-382. DATE: MAY 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-39-13-1.
ID-33-E-349 LOFT. INTERIOR IN BASEMENT OF CONTROL BUILDING
(TAN-630). FOREGROUND AREA (WITH SQUARE-PATTERN
FLOOR) WAS LOFT BREAKROOM (ANP "EMERGENCY
KITCHEN"). THREE SAMPLE MONITORING STATIONS ON
WALL AT LEFT OF CENTER OF VIEW. CORRIDOR ON RIGHT
FACES EAST. NOTE CONDUIT ALONG WALL ON RIGHT.
DATE: MAY 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-13-3.
ID-33-E-350 LOFT. BOILER ROOM IN LOWER LEVEL OF CONTROL
BUILDING (TAN-630). CAMERA FACES EAST. DATE: MAY
2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-13-4.
ID-33-E-351 LOFT. BASEMENT LEVEL OF LOFT REACTOR BUILDING
(TAN-650), SHOWING AIRLOCK. CAMERA FACES
SOUTHEAST. AIRLOCK LEADS TO HEAVILY SHIELDED AREA
JUST BELOW REACTOR CHAMBER. NOTE RADIATION HAZARD
NOTICES. DATE: MAY 2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
HD-39-15-1.
ID-33-E-352 LOFT. BASEMENT LEVEL (TAN-650). DETAIL IN ROOM 201
OF PIPING ON NORTH WALL. DATE: MAY 2004. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-15-2.
ID-33-E-353 LOFT. BASEMENT LEVEL (TAN-650). VIEW FROM WEST END
OF SHIELDED ROADWAY TOWARDS EAST END (ENTRANCE) OF
ROADWAY. CAMERA IS IN TURNAROUND AREA. DATE: MAY
2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-15-3.
ID-33-E-354  LOFT. DETAIL IN BASEMENT (TAN-650). RADIATION
HAZARD WARNING LIGHTS (RED, AMBER, GREEN) IN
TURNAROUND AREA. CAMERA FACING WEST. DATE: MAY
2004. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. HD-39-15-4.
Photos ID-33-E-355 through ID-33-E-372 are historical photos of
the Loss of Fluid Test (LOFT) facility. Dates are noted. 
ID-33-E-355 LOFT. AERIAL CONTEXTUAL VIEW OF CONTAINMENT
BUILDING (TAN-650) SITE UNDER CONSTRUCTION. CAMERA
FACING WESTERLY. LEFT TO RIGHT: ANP HANGAR
(TAN-629), ANP CONTROL BUILDING UNDER EARTHEN
SHIELD (TAN-630), CIRCULAR EXCAVATION FOR LOFT'S
SUBSURFACE LEVELS AND CATCH BASIN, AND FOUNDATIONS
FOR ACCESSORIES TO LOFT BUILDING WEST, NORTH, AND
EAST OF CIRCULAR CONTAINMENT STRUCTURE. NOTE
EXPOSED PERSONNEL ENTRANCE (JUST LEFT OF CRANE).
DATE: 1967. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 67-2213.
ID-33-E-356 LOFT. AERIAL CONTEXTUAL VIEW OF CONTAINMENT
BUILDING (TAN-650) UNDER CONSTRUCTION. CAMERA
FACING EAST. HANGAR IS AT BOTTOM OF VIEW. NOTE
TEMPORARY REMOVAL OF EARTH SHIELD ON COVERED
ROADWAY AT TOP LEFT OF VIEW. RAILROAD TIES STACKED
UP AT RIGHT EDGE OF VIEW. DATE: 1967. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. 67-5027.
ID-33-E-357 LOFT. CONTAINMENT BUILDING (TAN-650) ON THE DAY
THE RAILROAD DOOR WAS LIFTED INTO PLACE. CAMERA
FACING NORTHEAST. NOTE PERSONNEL ACCESS AT LEFT
EDGE OF VIEW. DATE: 1967. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
70-4141.
ID-33-E-358 LOFT. CONTAINMENT BUILDING (TAN-650) WITH
FOUR-RAIL TRACKS IN PLACE. STACK HAS BEEN ERECTED.
CURVED SHROUD OVER DOORWAY AND TO THE RIGHT IS
WEATHER PROTECTION FOR RAILROAD DOOR SEEN IN HAER
PHOTO ID-33-E-367. MOTOR-OPERATED DOOR ROLLS ON
WHEELS TO OPEN AND CLOSE. SERVICE PORTIONS OF
CONTAINMENT BUILDING CAN BE SEEN AT REAR OF DOME
ON LEFT AND RIGHT. CAMERA FACING NORTH. DATE:
1973. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 73-1600. 
ID-33-E-359 LOFT. CONTAINMENT BUILDING (TAN-650) DETAIL.
CAMERA FACING EAST. SERVICE BUILDING CORNER IS AT
LEFT OF VIEW ABOVE PERSONNEL ACCESS. ROUND FEATURE
AT LEFT OF DOME IS TANK THAT WILL CONTAIN BORATED
WATER. METAL STACK AT RIGHT OF VIEW. DATE: 1973.
INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 73-1085.
ID-33-E-360 LOFT. REAR OF LOFT CONTAINMENT BUILDING (TAN-650).
BORATED WATER TANK IS AT TOP. NOTE LADDER FOR
ACCESS TO TOP OF DOME. CAMERA FACING SOUTHEAST.
DATE: 1973. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 73-1643.
ID-33-E-361 LOFT. REACTOR APPARATUS LEAVES A&M BUILDING
(TAN-607). SHIELDED LOCOMOTIVE HAS AEROJET LOGO,
WHICH REPLACED OLD GENERAL ELECTRIC LOGO, PULLS
REACTOR FROM ASSEMBLY SHOP ON DOLLY. CAMERA FACING
EASTERLY. DATE: 1973. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 73-3700.
ID-33-E-362 LOFT. REACTOR ARRIVES AT CONTAINMENT BUILDING
(TAN-650), NOW BEING PUSHED BY LOCOMOTIVE. CAMERA
FACING NORTHERLY. NOTE "HELLO DOLLY" AND "PWR MTA
NO. 1" (PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR MOBILE TEST
ASSEMBLY) SIGNS. DATE: 1973. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
73-3710.
ID-33-E-363 LOFT. REACTOR SUPPORT APPARATUS INSIDE CONTAINMENT
BUILDING (TAN-650). CAMERA IS ON CRANE RAIL LEVEL
AND FACING NORTHERLY. VIEW SHOWS TOP TWO BANKS OF
ROUND CONDUIT OPENINGS ON WALL FOR ELECTRICAL AND
OTHER CONNECTIONS TO CONTROL ROOM.  LADDERS AND
PLATFORMS PROVIDE ACCESS TO REACTOR
INSTRUMENTATION. NOTE HATCH IN FLOOR AND DRAIN AT
EDGE OF FLOOR NEAR WALL. DATE: 1974. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. 74-219.
ID-33-E-364 LOFT. MOBILE TEST BUILDING (TAN-624) IS RECYCLED
FROM ANP PROGRAM FOR PLACEMENT BEFORE LOFT
CONTAINMENT BUILDING DOOR. IT HAS NOT YET BEEN
CONNECTED TO CONTAINMENT BUILDING. NOTE BORATED
WATER TANK AT RIGHT OF DOME. NARROW, VERTICAL
STRUCTURE AT RIGHT OF DOOR SHROUD IS SHROUD FOR
AIR EXHAUST DUCT. FILTER VAULTS LIE BETWEEN DUCT
SHROUD AND STACK. CAMERA FACING WESTERLY. DATE:
1974. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 74-1072. 
ID-33-E-365 LOFT COMPLEX, CAMERA FACING WEST. MOBILE ENTRY
(TAN-624) IN POSITION NEXT TO CONTAINMENT BUILDING
TAN-650). SHIELDED ROADWAY ENTRANCE IN VIEW JUST
BELOW AND TO RIGHT OF STACK. BORATED WATER TANK
HAS BEEN COVERED WITH WEATHER SHELTER AND IS NO
LONGER VISIBLE. ANP HANGAR (TAN-629) IN VIEW
BEYOND LOFT. DATE: 1974. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
74-4191.
ID-33-E-366 LOFT COMPLEX IN 1975 AWAITS RENEWED MISSION.
AERIAL VIEW. CAMERA FACING SOUTHWESTERLY. LEFT TO
RIGHT: STACK, ENTRY BUILDING (TAN-624), DOOR
SHROUD, DUCT SHROUD AND FILTER HATCHES, DOME
(PAINTED WHITE), PRE-AMP BUILDING, EQUIPMENT AND
PIPING BUILDING, SHIELDED CONTROL ROOM (TAN-630),
AIRPLANE HANGAR (TAN-629). DATE: 1975. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. 75-3690.
ID-33-E-367 LOFT COMPLEX, AERIAL VIEW TAKEN ON SAME ON SAME
DAY AS HAER PHOTO ID-33-E-376. CAMERA FACING
SOUTH. NOTE CURVE OF RAIL TRACK TOWARD HOT SHOP
(TAN-607). EARTH SHIELDING ON CONTROL BUILDING
(TAN-630) IS PARTLY REMOVED, SHOWING EDGE OF
CONCRETE STRUCTURE. GREAT SOUTHERN BUTTE ON
HORIZON. DATE: 1975. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 75-3693.
ID-33-E-368 LOFT. TEST APPARATUS, THE "99 VALVE." DATE: MARCH
10, 1976. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 76-(Not known).
ID-33-E-369 LOFT-RELATED SEMISCALE APPARATUS. SINGLE LOOP TOP
HEAD. DATE: 1969. INEEL NEGATIVE NO. 69-6280.
ID-33-E-370 LOFT-RELATED SEMISCALE TEST SCENE. WATER HAS BEEN
DYED RED. HOT STEAM BLOWDOWN EXITS SEMISCALE AT
TAN-609 AT A&M COMPLEX. EDGE OF BUILDING IS ALONG
LEFT EDGE OF VIEW. DATE: 1971. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
71-376.
ID-33-E-371 LOFT. CONSTRUCTION VIEW OF TUNNEL DURING 1957 TO
COMPARE WITH HAER PHOTO NO. ID-33-E-358 ABOVE.
TUNNEL SECTIONS WERE PRE-CAST, THEN JOINED
TOGETHER. PHOTOGRAPHER DESCRIBED THIS AS
"PERSONNEL AND SERVICE TUNNEL RUNNING EAST-WEST IN
TEST BUILDING OF THE FET." DATE: DECEMBER 19,
1957. PHOTOGRAPHER: JACK L. ANDERSON. INEEL
NEGATIVE NO. 57-6206.
ID-33-E-372 LOFT/FET COMPLEX. CONSTRUCTION VIEW OF ABUTMENT
FOOTINGS FOR ARCHES OF HANGAR (TAN-629). TUNNELS
BETWEEN BASEMENT OF HANGAR AND CONTROL BUILDING
(TAN-630) HAD TO FIT BETWEEN ARCHES. (NOTE
CONCRETE WORK TAKING PLACE AT HOLE AT LOWER EDGE
OF VIEW. THIS PHOTO MAY DOCUMENT UNEXPECTED BUBBLE
IN UNDERLYING LAVA ROCK. IT WAS PUMPED FULL OF
CONCRETE AND A FOOTING MADE. SOURCE: INTERVIEW
WITH JOHN DeCLUE). DATE: DECEMBER 19, 1957.
PHOTOGRAPHER: JACK L. ANDERSON. INEEL NEGATIVE NO.
57-6203.
Photos ID-33-E-373 to ID-33-E-384 are architectural drawings of
Loss of Fluid Test (LOFT) facilities at Test Area North's FET
complex.
ID-33-E-373 LOFT. CONTAINMENT AND SERVICE BUILDING (TAN-650)
BASEMENT FLOOR PLAN. BASEMENT AIR LOCK, SHIELDED
ROADWAY, SERVICE AREAS, CONNECTION TO CONTROL
BUILDING. KAISER ENGINEERS
6413-11-STEP/LOFT-650-A-1. DATE: OCTOBER 1964.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 036-650-00-416-122213.
ID-33-E-374 LOFT. CONTAINMENT AND SERVICE BUILDING (TAN-650)
GROUND FLOOR PLAN. PENETRATIONS IN DOME WALL.
SHIELDED PERSONNEL MAZE AT AIRLOCK DOOR. REACTOR
CHAMBER FLOOR HATCHES AND HOLDDOWNS. RAILS IN
CONCRETE FLOOR. KAISER ENGINEERS
6413-11-STEP/LOFT-650-A-2. DATE: OCTOBER 1964.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 036-650-00-486-122214.
ID-33-E-375 LOFT, TAN-650. SERVICE BUILDING PRE-AMP TOWER, TOP
THREE FLOORS. FLOOR PLAN, CABLE MAZES, DUCT
LABYRINTH. BORATED WATER TANK ENCLOSURE ON ROOF.
KAISER ENGINEERS 6413-11-STEP/LOFT-650-A-3. DATE:
OCTOBER 1964. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
036-650-00-486-122215.
ID-33-E-376 LOFT. CONTAINMENT AND SERVICE BUILDING (TAN-650).
SECTION THROUGH EAST/WEST AXIS OF BUILDING AS
VIEWED FROM THE SOUTH. SHOWS BASEMENT AND GRADE
LEVELS OF CONTAINMENT BUILDING, CONNECTION TO
CONTROL ROOM ON WEST SIDE, AIR FILTER VAULTS, AND
DUCT ENCLOSURE FOR AIR EXHAUST SYSTEM. KAISER
ENGINEERS 6413-11-STEP/LOFT-650-A-4. DATE: OCTOBER
1964. INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 036-650-00-486-122216.
ID-33-E-377 LOFT. CONTAINMENT AND SERVICE BUILDING (TAN-650).
SECTION THROUGH NORTH/SOUTH AXIS. SHOWS BASEMENT
AND FOUR ADDITIONAL LEVELS OF PRE-AMP TOWER,
SHIELDED ROADWAY, CHAMBERS BELOW REACTOR FLOOR,
RAILROAD DOOR, SUMPS, SHIELDING. SECTION C SHOWS
BASEMENT SUMPS AND CHAMBERS BELOW REACTOR FLOOR.
KAISER ENGINEERS 6413-11-STEP/LOFT-650-A-5. DATE:
OCTOBER 1964. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
036-650-00-486-122217.
ID-33-E-378  LOFT. CONTAINMENT AND SERVICE BUILDING (TAN-650).
SECTION THROUGH EAST/WEST AXIS OF BUILDING AS
VIEWED FROM THE NORTH. SHOWS STEEL LADDER TO TOP
OF DOME, GABLE ROOF OF BORATED WATER TANK
ENCLOSURE, PUMICE BLOCK SIDING OF PRE-AMP TOWER,
METAL SIDING OF DUCT ENCLOSURE. KAISER ENGINEERS
6413-11-STEP/LOFT-650-A-6. DATE: OCTOBER 1964.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 036-650-00-486-122218.
ID-33-E-379 LOFT. CONTAINMENT AND SERVICE BUILDING (TAN-650).
ROOF PLAN AND DETAILS. KAISER ENGINEERS
6413-11-STEP/LOFT-650-A-8. DATE: OCTOBER 1964.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 036-650-00-486-122220.
ID-33-E-380 LOFT. CONTAINMENT AND SERVICE BUILDING (TAN-650).
SOUTH ELEVATION, DETAILS, SECTION. SHOWS PART OF
DUCT ENCLOSURE, RAILROAD DOOR OPENING, ROOF
VENTILATORS, SHIELDED PERSONNEL ENTRANCE, AND
CHANGE ROOM. SECTION F SHOWS VIEW FROM WEST
LOOKING TOWARD SHIELDING AROUND AIRLOCK DOOR ON
MAIN FLOOR. KAISER ENGINEERS
6413-11-STEP/LOFT-650-A-9. DATE: OCTOBER 1964.
INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 036-650-00-486-122221.
ID-33-E-381 LOFT. CONTAINMENT AND SERVICE BUILDING (TAN-650).
SECTIONS H, K, AND L; DETAILS OF PRE-AMP TOWER.
KAISER ENGINEERS 6413-11-STEP/LOFT-650-A-14. DATE:
JANUARY 1966. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
036-650-00-486-122226.
ID-33-E-382 LOFT. "EXPLODED VIEW" OF LOFT CONTAINMENT BUILDING
(TAN-650), INCLUDING CONTROL BUILDING (TAN-630).
EG&G. FEBRUARY 1979. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
036-010-65-220-209565.
ID-33-E-383 LOFT. CONTAINMENT AND SERVICE BUILDING (TAN-650).
ROOM NUMBER AND FUNCTION OF EACH ROOM. IDENTIFIES
TYPE OF FLOOR, PAINT, WALLS, CEILING, DOORS. THIS
IS SHEET ONE OF A TWO-PAGE DRAWING. KAISER
ENGINEERS 6413-11-STEP/LOFT-650-XX. DATE: OCTOBER
1965. INEEL INDEX CODE NO. 036-650-00-486-122228.
ID-33-E-384 LOFT. CONTAINMENT AND SERVICE BUILDING (TAN-650).
ROOM NUMBER SCHEDULE, SHEET TWO OF TWO. KAISER
ENGINEERS 6413-11-STEP/LOFT-650-A-XX. DATE:
OCTOBER 1969. INEEL INDEX CODE NO.
036-650-00-486-122228.
Notes:
1. The historical photographs selected for this report originated
in a photograph collection located at the Idaho National
Engineering and Environmental Laboratory's Photograph Archive in
the Willow Creek building and the Inactive Storage Records
Warehouse at Idaho Falls, Idaho. Negatives are indexed according
to year, name of facility area, and sequence number.
2. The original engineering drawings for the ANP and LOFT
programs were destroyed within the last ten years. The
photographic copies in this report were made from microfilm
aperture cards located at the Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory at the Engineering Research Office
Building.
3. The INEEL photographic and engineering archives date from the
earliest operations at the National Reactor Testing Station. They
document construction progress, events, equipment and procedures,
and periodic aerial surveys of the site. Most of these resources
are available for examination and reproduction.
4. For written historical and descriptive information on Test
Area North, please see main entry for Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, Test Area North, HAER No. ID-33-E. 
5. Additional images and illustrations may be found in the
written historical report, HAER NO. ID-33-E, as accompaniments to
the narrative. For the most part, these are sketches, photographs
from sources other than INEEL, or copies of 35 mm images not
practical for HAER-quality reproduction.
6. The INEEL Index Code for architectural and engineering
drawings is composed of the following elements. Using the example
034-0607-00-693-106758:
034: An NRTS/INEEL "area" number. In this case, the A&M area
 at Test Area North.
    0607: The building or structure number at this "area."
 00: Classification code. In this case, 00 signifies
 "architectural" drawings.
693: A code number for the originating contractor. This code
 number was assigned to the Ralph M. Parsons Company.
  106758: A serial number assigned by the NRTS/INEEL Document
 Control system. This is the only unique number in a
drawing's identification elements.
7. Numbers in the 600 and 1600 ranges were assigned to buildings
roughly in chronological order of their construction. When 600
numbers were consumed, the sequence continued with 1600 numbers.
Structures, such as exhaust stacks and outdoor turntables, were
given 700 and 1700 numbers.
